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lNTRODUCflON

How is it that millions of people entrust trillions of dollars to corporate
managers over whom they have little control and on whose discretion their
profits depend? How is it that most managers most of the time seem to do
a pretty good job looking out for shareholders' interests? This, for me, is
the central mystery of corporate law, made especially intriguing by the
apparent infirmity of the various legal, institutional , and market checks on
managers' discretion.
Sixty years ago, one might have predicted from Berle and Means'
detailed analysis of shareholders' exposure to unconstrained managers , that
a rational investor would shift assets away from equities and into bonds.1
But such a prediction would have been wrong. Investors did not abandon
1 . ADoLF A. BERLE, JR. & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CoRPORATION
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
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equity and were right: Stocks significantly outperformed corporate bonds. 2
The assumptions of this Article are that shareholders made the right deci,
sion, and that they did so, at least in part, because managers generally
perform pretty well.
How is it that most managers do a good j ob most of the time? How is
it that most managers most of the time are worthy of the trust of investors?
The traditional corporate law answers to these core questions fall into three
types . First, there are the legal constraints: The courts , through the
enforcement of specific legal prohibitions (like laws outlawing theft, embez,
zlement, insider trading, and the like) , and through the enforcement of
more vague legal constraints (the duty of care and the duty of loyalty) ,
sometimes catch errant managers. Second , institutional structures such as
the board of directors , outside directors , shareholder voting, proxy contests ,
and derivative suits may keep managers in line. Third, pressure from the
various markets that impinge on the corporation and managers (the product
markets , the managerial labor market, capital markets, and the market for
corporate control) may keep managers in line.
But on examination, none of these checks , with the exception of
competitive product markets , when they exist, seems to provide a very
robust check on managers. Each seems to help a little some of the time,
and only occasionally seems to help a lot. At the end of a term in which I
teach the basic Corporations course or a seminar on Corporate Gover,
nance, after weeks of exploring the weaknesses of each of the checks on
managers , I find myself most impressed by the apparent impotence of the
constraints . 3
But, more importantly , the standard answers tell us little of the mecha,
nism by which these checks constrain managers .
Implicitly, the various
answers seem to assume a crudely behaviorist model of managerial behavior,
a "stick,and,carrot" approach. The implicit assumption seems to be that
the sanction imposed, discounted by the likelihood of detection and pun,
ishment, outweighs the benefit to the agent of sloth or theft. To take but
one familiar example, in the standard 1 980s story , if managers mismanage,
2. See, e.g., STEPHEN ROSS ET AL., CoRPORATE FINANCE 2 3 2-36 (2d ed. 1 988). This is
hardly conclusive proof that managers, on the whole, behave well. Indeed, finance theory
teaches us that, in equilibrium, one would expect that higher variance assets, like equities, will
outperform lower variance assets, such as bonds, of the same corporation.
3. For a comprehensive survey of the (at least apparent) impotence of corporate law con
straints on managerial discretion, see CHRISTOPHER D. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS: THE
SOCIAL CoNTROL OF CoRPORATE BEHAVIOR (1975).
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the stock price will drop and a takeover entrepreneur will buy up the shares
to gain control , replacing bad managers with good managers . The threat of
such a takeover, the story asserts , will lead all managers to manage better. 4
In the corporate context, however, the assumption of "direct deter,
renee" is particularly implausible: There are hundreds of corporations , the
directors and officers of which have comprehensive liability insurance;
damage liability is extremely rare; and, after the enactment by Delaware of
section 102(b)(7) of the General Corporation Law, 5 which allows Delaware
corporations to opt out of director liability for breach of the duty of care,
damage liability has become even rarer. If the principal sanction is not
directly financial but reputational, then one must explain how this sanction
works , an account entirely absent from the standard account.
And yet, the system seems to work. The triplet of restraints-legal ,
institutional , and market-seems to constrain managers generally to act for
shareholders , despite their manifest looseness (if not impotence) . How is it
that they do so? What is the mechanism that connects these constraints
with managerial behavior? In this Article , I do not claim that the tradi,
tional constraints do not "work, " that is, do not generally constrain man,
agers to act for shareholders . Rather , I assume that they do work, and I try
to figure out how. The theory outlined in the following pages is incom,
plete , perhaps at times implausible, and certainly only partially verified .
But it is a theory of how corporate law works , and , in evaluating it, it is
worth keeping in mind the old Chicago School maxim: It takes a theory to
beat a theory. 6 In part, my aim here is to highlight the absence of any
developed theory to explain how corporate law works.
This leads me back to my original question: How is it that managers at
least try to do a good j ob most of the time ? This is, of course , part of a
more general question: How is it that most people most of the time try to
do a pretty good j ob , even though the likelihood of sanctions is obj ectively

4. See, e.g. Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender
Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of
a Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L . REv . 1 1 6 1 ( 1 98 1 ) .
5 . DEL. CoDE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1 994). This i s n o t the place for a n ex tended d iscus
sion of the strengths and weaknesses of a direct deterrence model of co rporate duties. For recent
d iscussions reviewing such models, see John Braithwaite & Brent Fisse, On the Plausibility of
Corporate Crime Theory, in 2 ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 15 (William S . Laufer &
Freda Adler eds., 1 990); John Braithwaite & Toni Makkai, Testing an Expected Utility Model of
Corporate Deterrence, 25 L. & Soc'Y REv. 7 (199 1).
6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Contract and Fiduciary Duty, 36 J.L.
& EcoN. 425 , 434 (1993); Richard A. Epstein, Common Law, Labor Law and Reality: A Rejoinder
to Professors Getman and Kohler, 92 YALE L.J. 1 435 , 1 435 (1983).
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slight? How is it that most tenured law professors (at least at Penn) try to
teach well, even though we all know that we will not be fired if we do not?
The beginning of a thicker answer is that all of us internalize rules and
standards of conduct with which we generally try to comply. We do this
not only because we may fear some sanction, formal or informal , but also
because doing so is important to our sense of self�worth, because we believe
that doing a good job is the right thing to do. How are these rules and
standards , which are the rails along which so much of our lives run, gener�
ated and maintained? For most employees of the firm, the set of formal and
informal systems of socialization, detection, and sanction are sufficient.
Thus , for the typical middle manager , the example of other managers , the
gossip around the coffee machine, and the possibility of discharge by a more
senior manager can provide an adequate set of instructions and sanctions.
The problem faced by such a "norm�based" account of managerial
behavior is that senior managers and directors are, by design, the chief
criticizers and the chief sanctioners . As such, they are less constrained by
gossip around the coffee machine . What replaces gossip and other sane�
tions for this critically important group? How are the rules and standards
that govern the behavior of senior managers and directors generated and
maintained? A claim of this Article is that the Delaware courts provide a
supplemental source of gossip , criticism, and sanction for this set of actors
who are beyond the reach of the firm's normal systems of social control.
The subjects of the study of U.S. corporate governance-the senior
managers and directors of large, publicly held corporations, and the lawyers
who advise them-form a surprisingly small and close�knit community. The
directors of large, publicly held corporations number roughly four to five
thousand. 7 A small group of lawyers , centered in New York and Wilming�
ton, with others in Chicago and Los Angeles, specialize in Delaware corpo�
rate law. The community has its own court , the Delaware Chancery Court,
with review by the Delaware Supreme Court. It has its own newspapers :
the Wall Street Journal and, for the lawyers , the New Yark Law journal.
People know each other and, as we will see below, apparently care about
their reputation in the community. The story I tell in this Article is very
7 . According to Fl.EIDRICK & STRUGGLES, THE CHANGING BOARD ( 1 988) , the average
board of a Fortune 500 company has 1 3 directors. Id. at 2. Thus, there are approximately 6500
d irectorships of Fortune 500 companies. One must subtract from thts the number of directors
who serve on more than one board. Again, according to Heidrick and Struggles, 1 8 . 3 % of direc
tors hold one directorship in addition to their own company, 28% hold two , 1 7 . 9% hold three ,
1 4 % hold four, and 3 .9% hold more than four. Id. at 1 3 .
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much the story of how a small community imposes formal and informal ,
legal and nonlegal , sanctions on its members . 8
From this perspective, three questions immediately present themselves:
First, how is the content of corporate law rules and standards determined?
Second, how are they generated? And third, how are they communicated
to officers and directors? In this Article, I ignore the first question, which
goes to the substance of corporate law, and has been the subj ect of much
scholarship . 9 Instead, I focus on the ·second and third questions, which go
to the mechanisms of corporate law and have been almost entirely ignored.
There is a persistent tendency to acknowledge that Delaware corporate
law largely involves standards , but then to try to reduce it to a set of
rules. 1 0 Take, for example, the following description: "Under Delaware
law, when a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for a target, the target's
Board of Directors is required to act as would ' auctioneers charged with

8. See generally ROBERT ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE
DISPUTES (1991) {noting that people often handle their disputes in a cooperative manner without
relying on the applicable law).
A contemporary anecdote illustrates the close-knit quality of the Delaware corporate law
community, and its ability to sanction members who depart significantly from generally accepted
conduct. In Delaware, judges of the chancery and supreme courts are nominated by the gover
nor, and confirmed by the Senate, for a 12-year term. DEL CoNST. art. IV, § 3. The practice is
that the governor may only choose from a list of candidates assembled by a nominating commis
sion, members of which are appointed by the governor and include both lawyers and nonlawyers.
See generally Guy v. Judicial Nominating Comm'n, 659 A.2d 777 (Del. 1995). As the term of
Justice Andrew Moore drew to a close, the nominating commission did not put his name forward,
even as one among several qualified candidates. Observers agreed that this was not because of
any question regarding the competence of his judicial opinions-indeed, his opinions were and
are generally well respected-but, rather, because of his practice of humiliating lawyers who
appeared before him. Richard B. Schmitt, Reappointment Seems Unlikely for Moore, WALL ST. J.,
May 18, 1994, at 87.
9. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CoRPORATE LAW (1993);
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporate
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469 (1987).
10. On rules versus standards, see, for example, Colin S. Diver, The Optimal Precision of
Administrative Rules, 93 YALE L.J. 65 (1983); Ronald M. Dworkin, The Model of Rules, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 14 (1967); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557
(1992); Duncan Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HAR.v. L . REV. 1685
(1976).
For examples of this tendency within corporate law, see, for example, Marcel Kahan's excel
lent discussion of the Viacom case in which he tries to identify the factors that explain the out
comes of the various Delaware takeover cases. Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The
Delaware Supreme Court's Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CoRP. L. 583 (1994); see also Roberta
Romano, The Shareholder Suit: Litigation Without Foundation?, 7 J.L. ECON. & ORO. 55, 85 (1991)
("As few suits produce a legal rule (only two in this sample), this [public goods] explanation of
lawsuit efficacy turns on the need for a large number of lawsuits in order to obtain a ruling.").
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getting the best price for the stock-holders at a sale of the company." ' 11
This description views Delaware law as largely substantive: When a poten
tial acquirer makes a serious bid for control, the target board must act as a
neutral auctioneer, regardless of what sort of process it might follow in
coming to the conclusion that it should not act as an auctioneer. Likewise,
on this view, the Delaware cases established a rule for the conduct of target
managers: If a potential acquirer makes a serious bid for control, then target
management must act as a neutral auctioneer.
I mean to contrast this view-a view which naturally emerges from
teaching Corporations and trying to help students synthesize cases into
useful principles or algorithms-with a fundamentally different view that
provides a much better description of Delaware fiduciary duty law. In the
1960s, when Delaware was revising its corporation law, Samuel Arsht, a
leading figure of the Delaware corporate bar, is said to have proposed that
the law be simplified to the following principle: Directors of Delaware
corporations can do anything they want, as long as it is not illegal, and as
long as they act in good faith. This principle-which is , in my view, a
completely accurate description of Delaware fiduciary duty
law-conceptualizes Delaware fiduciary duty law in process terms {boards
can do whatever they want as long as they follow the right process) and as
setting standards as opposed to rules {boards must act in good faith) . Most
importantly, the formulation is largely empty until the concept of good
faith is defined. As I describe more fully below, in what is a central claim
of this Article, the Delaware courts fill out the concept of "good faith"
through fact-intensive , normatively saturated descriptions of manager,
director, and lawyer conduct, and of process-descriptions that are not
reducible to rules of the sort described above. Indeed, most such rules� like
the one above, turn out to be manifestly incorrect descriptions of Delaware
lawY
11.

Peter Cramton

&

Alan Schwartz, Using Auction Theory to Inform Takeover Regulation, 7

J.L. ECON. & ORO. 2 7 , 2 7 (199 1 ) (citing Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,

506 A.2d 1 7 3 (Del. 1 986)).
1 2 . Revlon does not stand for the proposition described by Cramton and Schwartz, and,
even if Revlon could be read for that holding, subsequent cases make clear that it does not repre
sent a general principle. Cf. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 5 7 1 A.2d 1 140
(Del. 1990). As I will discuss below, the once common reading of Time-Warner as standing for
the proposition that target management can "just say no " was likewise inaccurate, much to the
chagrin of Paramount. See Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34
(Del. 1 994) (Viacom joined Paramount as a plaintiff in this action); infra text accompanying notes
1 7 4-224.
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To put my point differently, in this Article I seek to take the standard,
like quality of Delaware fiduciary duty law seriously. At the core of my
analysis is a claim that standards work very differently than rules, that
standards are typically generated and articulated through a distinctively
narrative process , leading to a set of stories that is typically not reducible to
a rule.13
My claim here-which is a descriptive claim-is that the Delaware
courts generate in the first instance the legal standards of conduct (which
influence the development of the social norms of directors , officers , and
lawyers) largely through what can best be thought of as "corporate law
sermons . " These richly detailed and j udgmental factual recitations, com,
bined with explicitly j udgmental conclusions, sometimes impose legal sane,
tions but surprisingly often do not.14 Taken as a whole , the Delaware
opinions can be understood as providing a set of parables-instructive
tales-of good managers and bad managers , of good lawyers and bad law,
yers, that, in combination, fill out the normative job description of these
critical players. My intuition is that we come much closer to understanding
the role of courts in corporate law if we think of j udges more as preachers
than as policemen.15
1 3. See generaUy MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LOVE'S KNOWLEDGE: ESSAYS ON PHILOSOPHY
AND LITERATURE ( 1 990) (especially Chapter 1). My Hebrew University colleague Ruth Gavison
argues that standards are always articulated through narratives. If this argument is correct-and I

think it is-then what one sees in Delaware fiduciary duty cases is an example of a more general
legal phenomenon played out in a small community.
This insight raises the question of why Delaware courts rely on such detailed narratives when
other courts interpreting standards, such as the requirement of good faith under § 1 -203 of the
U.C.C. , rely on far briefer descriptions. My intuition is that the difference reflects a difference in
the size of the relevant communities and not a difference between parties engaged in repeat inter
actions, but a full comparative analysis is beyond the reach of this Article. As I discuss in more
detail below, in a small community with repeat players, the potential to generate norms through
critical description without direct legal sanction seems to be greater.
1 4 . I briefly discuss this claim in Edward B. Rock, Preaching to Managers, 17 J. CoRP. L. 605
{1 992) (reviewing LOUIS LOWENSTEIN, SENSE AND NONSENSE IN CoRPORATE FINANCE { 1 99 1)) .
1 5 . This work owes an enormous debt to the work of Robert Cover in the conceptualization
of judicial narratives as sacred texts and in the role of "legal" narrative in constituting com
munity. See Robert M. Cover, The Folktales of Justice: Tales of Jurisdiction, 14 CAP. U. L. REV.
1 7 9 (1985) [hereinafter Cover, Folktales]; Robert M. Cover, Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97
HAR.v. L. REv. 4 (1983). It also owes a debt to the rich discussion of the role of narrative in law
over the last decade. For discussions of that literature, see , for example, Kathryn Abrams,
Hearing the CaU of Stories , 79 CAL. L. REv. 97 1 ( 1 99 1); Jane B . Baron & Julia Epstein, Is Law
Narrative?, 45 BUFF. L. REv. (forthcoming Winter 1 997); Anne M. Coughlin, Regulating the Self:
Autobiographical Performances in Outsider Scholarship, 8 1 VA. L. REV. 1 2 29 (1995); Daniel A.
Farber & Suzanna Sherry, TeUing Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L.
REV. 807 ( 1993); Kim Lane Scheppele, Foreword: TeUing Stories , 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 ( 1 989);
Jane B. Baron, The Many Promises of S toryteUing in Law, 23 RUTGERS L .J . 79 ( 1 9 9 1 ) (book
review). See also LAW'S STORIES: NARRATIVE AND RHETORIC IN THE LAW (Peter Brooks & Paul
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M y claim is not that Delaware law is unpredictable and indefinite. In
fact, as we will see below, despite the fact,specific, narrative quality of
Delaware opinions, over time they yield reasonably determinate guidelines.
My claim is, rather, that the process that leads to reasonably precise stan,
dards proceeds through the elaboration of the concepts of independence,
good faith, and due care through richly detailed narratives of good and bad
behavior, of positive and negative examples, that are not reducible to rules
or algorithms .
The second part of my claim is a causal claim that I can only begin to
defend here: that these standards of conduct are communicated to managers
by corporate counsel, and that the j udgments of the courts play an impor,
tant role in the evolution of (nonlegal) norms of conduct. As I will try to
show below, these claims, if true, have fundamental implications for how
we think about corporate law.
To sketch out this picture of corporate law, I examine the emergence
during the 1 980s of new corporate law standards-or, equivalently, the
elaboration of the same old standards in a new factual context-to govern
management buyouts of large, publicly held corporations (MBOs) . I focus
on the situation in which managers who do not hold a controlling equity
interest rely on outside financing ultimately secured by the assets of the
corporation to buy the corporation from the public shareholders. This

Gewirtz eds . , 1 996) [hereinafter LAW S STORIES].
The approach to cases implicit in this Article is similar to that described in KIM LANE
SCHEPPELE, LEGAL SECRETS: EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY IN THE CoMMON LAW 86- 1 08 (1 988),
in a chapter entitled: "A Theory of Legal Interpretation: The Mutual Construction of Rules and
Facts . " Scheppele uses the common law to examine norms of secrecy; I use the Delaware fidu
ciary duty law to understand norms of corporate governance. See also Robert C. Post, The Social
Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 7 7 CAL. L. REv. 957 (1 989)
(discussing the ways that privacy torts both express community norms of privacy and, at the same
time, protect and remforce those norms and help to create the very community that underlies the
norms).
As the law-and-narrattve literature has emphasized, legal analysis often involves storytelling.
What, for me. is so striking about the Delaware cases is that storytelling is so prominent in the
dec isions and so unabashedly normative. Moreover, through what is probably an accident of
academic specialization, (i.e., law-and-narrative folks do not generally teach Corporations), corpo
rate law opinions have been almost entirely absent from the law-and-narrative discussions. For
example, in LAW'S STORIES, supra, in a volume of papers presented at a recent Yale conference
on law as narrative, there seems to be not a single reference to Delaware corporate law opinions,
nor any entry in the index to corporate law. As Sanford Lev inson notes in his contribution to
the Yale conference, this parochialism may skew the sample. Sanford Levinson, The Rhetoric of
the Judicial Opinion, in LAW S STORIES, supra, at 1 8 7 , 1 8 9-90 ("[Constitutional law] is, to put it
mildly, but one small branch (or genre) of one legal system. No doubt someone whose expertise
was different, even within the U.S. legal system, would stress different aspects of judicial opin
ions . . . . ") . For a notable exception, see David Skeel, Saul and David and Corporate Takeover
Law (Oct. 12, 1995) (unpub lished manuscript, on file with author) .
'

'
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situation must be distinguished, on the one hand, from management
buyouts of divisions (when the selling company can fully protect the inter,
ests of its shareholders) , and from parent,subsidiary freeze,out mergers, when
the parent company already has control. Although each of these other
situations is important, neither poses the same dramatic conflict between
managers' self interest (which is to buy the company for the lowest possible
price) and their duty to shareholders (which is to sell for the highest pos,
sible price) in the context of widely dispersed public shareholders. As such,
MBOs pose particularly hard questions of duty for the officers and directors
that cannot be answered by reference to general social norms. 16
As many of the cases discussed here demonstrate, the "kindergarten"
norms , like loyalty and cooperation, provide limited guidance when direc,
tors are faced with a conflict between loyalty to and cooperation with
senior managers, with whom they have worked for years, and loyalty to the
much more abstract "shareholders. " This conflict is muddied further by the
notion that directors owe their duties of loyalty and care to the "corpora,
tion, " where "corporation" is left undefined, but, in practice at least, is
often thought not to be identical with the shareholders. As we see below
in many of the management buyout cases , when some "outsider" comes
along and "threatens" one's friends, the managers for whom one has the
greatest respect, the directors' "right" response, at least on the unreflective
application of general social norms, may appear to be the support of man,
agement. 17 It is in situations such as these-when general social norms
provide insufficient guidance or may be in conflict with the goals or funda,
mental principles of corporate governance-that the generation and pro,
16. The definition and identification of MBOs is necessarily somewhat imprecise. Is it an
MBO, for example, when an unrelated third party bids for control and offers incumbent man
agement an equity stake and long-term employment contracts? Does it matter whether the offer
of an equity stake was made before or after the bidder achieved control? In each case , the ques
tion is whether the management is "interested ." AB we will see below, because of the case-by
case approach taken by the Delaware courts, the definitional question of what is and what is not
an MBO is not critical.
1 7 . In this connection, the path-breaking article by James D. Cox & Harry L Munsinger,
Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal Implications of Corporate Cohesion, LAw
& CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1 985, at 83, is clearly relevant. See also Donald C. Langevoort,
Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior: The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering
(Nov. 1 996) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
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mulgation of role,specific standards for managers and directors become so
critical. On this view, the Delaware decisions can be viewed as part of the
definition and description of the "roles " that managers and directors are
expected to fill.18
Because MBOs of significant publicly held companies suddenly
assumed prominence in the 1 980s, they provide a case study in which we
can watch Delaware corporate law in action: the development and articula,
tion of standards of conduct and the communication of those standards to
officers, directors, and lawyers. The evolution of the standards of conduct
relating to MBOs is a sufficiently narrow example so that I can focus on the
mechanics of their generation-on the language of the opinions-in suffi,
dent detail to make the claim plausible. Finally, MBOs provide a useful
context to consider the ebb and flow of corporate law: how quickly cases
appear, how many cases there are relative to the number of transactions,
and how much it costs (at least in terms of plaintiffs' attorneys' fees) to
develop new norms.
In Part I of this Article, I trace out this evolution in the MBO opin,
ions of the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts. In Part II, I begin to
trace the transmission of these standards to their ultimate target by examin,
ing press accounts {both trade and popular) , extra,j udicial utterances, and
the interesting but little discussed legal genre, the "memorandum to our
clients, " that a number of prominent Wall Street firms use to keep their
clients apprised of developments in the law. The critical empirical
1 8 . Because my target here is how corporate law works, I leave to one side the d ispute over
the morality of "role morality. " For discussions of role morality in the corporate context, see, for
example, PETER A. FRENCH, CoLLECfiVE AND CoRPORATE REsPONSIBILITY (1 984); ELIZABETH

WOLGAST, ETHICS OF AN ARTIFICIAL PERSON: LOST RESPONSIBILITY IN PROFESSIONS AND
ORGANIZATIONS (1 992); Lawrence E . Mitchell, Cooperation and Constraint in the Modem
Corporation: An Inquiry into the CAuses of Corporate Immorality , 73 TEX. L. REV. 477 (1995). See
also, e.g. , DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY (1 988); Michael 0.
Hardimon, Role Obligations , 91 J. PHIL. 3 3 3 (1 994) (discussing role morality as an issue in moral
philosophy); Gerald J. Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional Ethics, 55 N .Y.U. L. REV. 63
(1 980); Richard Wasserstrom, Roles and Morality , in THE GooD LAWYER: LAWYERS' ROLES AND
LAWYERS' ETHICS 25 (David Luban ed . , 1983) (discussing role morality in the legal context).

Part of what makes these cases interesting is that the situations generally do not involve
conflicts between demands of private morality and role obligations, but, rather, are situations in
which the guidance provided by ordinary morality runs out.
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work-the investigation not of what the courts are saying, but of what the
directors and their lawyers are hearing-is a separate project.19
In Part III, I explore some of the implications of this normative/narra,
tive theory of corporate law. This view of Delaware fiduciary duty law has
important implications for how lawyers should advise their clients, as a
review of the QVC v. Viacom20 cases demonstrates. It also has important
implications for how we think about shareholder litigation in the Delaware
courts. In particular, a review of the quantity and timing of Delaware MBO
opinions, in the context of the development of MBOs as a transactional
form, suggests that the problem with shareholder litigation in Delaware
courts could be j ust the opposite of the conventional wisdom: too little
rather than too much. Moreover, a further implication is that the genera,
tion of legal standards or nonlegal norms, both of which are public goods,
should be thought of as the primary and not the tertiary function of share,
holder litigation. 2 1 I close with a brief conclusion and an outline of fur,
ther research. 22
19.

Michael Useem and

I

are working on a project to examine what lawyers tell boards and

what boards hear about their fiduciary duties through interviews with the relevant actors. We
use an approach similar to that of }AY W. LORSCH, DIRECTORS: PAWNS OR POTENTATES (1989),

and MYLES MACE, DIRECTORS: MYfH AND REALITY (1971). See MICHAEL USEEM, EXECUTIVE
DEFENSE: SHAREHOLDER POWER AND CoRPORATE REORGANIZATION : THE REALITY OF
AMERICA'S CoRPORATE BOARDS (1993).
20.

QVC Network, Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1245 (Del. Ch.

1993), aff'd, 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994).
21. On this view, but beyond the reach of this Article,it may make more sense to construe
incentive compensation and criminal liability-i.e., positive and negative inducements to
managers-as important insofar as they assist in the articulation or promulgation of legal stan
dards and social norms, or because of their role in expressing such standards and norms, and not
because they act to constrain managers in any direct way.
Deborah A. DeMott is struck by many of the same features of the Delaware case law
22.
that I examine in detail here. The approach I take in this Article is somewhat similar to her
approach in Deborah A. DeMott,Puzzles and Parables : Defining Good Faith in the MBO Context,
25 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 15 (1990), which analyzes the MBO cases as giving examples of what
counts as "bad faith."

Other aspects of this analysis are briefly alluded to in Robert C. Clark,

Agency Costs Versus Fiduciary Duties, in PRINCIPALS AND AGENTS: THE STRUCT'URE OF BUSINESS
55 Oohn W. Pratt & Richard]. Zeckhauser eds.,1985),and Melvin Aron Eisenberg,New Modes
of Discourse in the Corporate Law Literature , 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 582, 589-90, 594 (1984),
which describe corporate law as norm generative and role descriptive. See also Ronald J. Gilson
& Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intennediate Standa.rd for Defensive Tactics : Is There Substance to
Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247,271 (1989).
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WHEN M ANAGERS TRY TO BUY THE COMPANY: A CASE STUDY IN
THE EMERGENCE OF CORPORATE NORMS

A.

Setting the Stage: The Leverage Buyout Boom

Leveraged buyouts of publicly held companies date at least to the early
1970s. 23 During this first wave, controlling shareholders of small com,
panies that had gone public in the hot new issues market of the late 1960s
and early 1970s found that the costs of being publicly held outweighed the
benefits in the recession, battered market of the mid, 1970s.24 In response,
some of these companies were "taken private" by their managers/control,
ling shareholders. 25 Although there was a certain amount of attention
paid to these transactions , and much criticism, 26 these transactions were
economically insignificant.
All this changed in 197 9 when Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts (KKR)
organized a leveraged buyout of Houdaille, a Fortune 500 machine tool
companyY KKR's ability to acquire Houdaille, combined with William
Simon's enormous and widely publicized profits on the 1984 public offering
of Gibson Greetings, which had been acquired in a divisional leveraged
buyout from RCA j ust three years before/8 stimulated the growth of LBOs
and, with that, the growth of the subset, MBOs.

2 3 . Louis Lowenstein, Management Buyouts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 730, 730 (1 985). In a
leveraged buyout (LBO) , a company is acquired from its public shareholders, using borrowed
money which is ultimately secured by the assets of the target company. In a management buyout
(MBO) , the managers of the company participate in the acquisition group.
24. Id.
25 . Thus , these transactions were often known as "going-private" transactions.
2 6 . See, e.g., Arthur M. Borden, Going Private-Old Tort, New Tort or N o Tort?, 4 9 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 987 ( 1974); Victor Brudney, A Note on "Going Private," 6 1 VA. L. REV. 1 0 1 9 ( 1 975);
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J.
1 3 5 4 (1978); A.A. Sommer, Jr. , "Going Private": A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1 974- 1975
Transfer B inder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep . (CCH) 1 80, 0 1 0 (Nov. 20, 1 974).
27. See GEORGE ANDERS, MERCHANTS OF DEBT: KKR AND THE MORTGAGING OF
AMERICAN BUSINESS 1 9-4 1 (1 992); EDWARD K. CRAWFORD, A MANAGEMENT GUIDE TO
LEVERAGED B UYOUTS 3-5 ( 1987); Lowenstein, supra note 23.
28. ANDERS, supra note 27, at 37.
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In addition to the potential for large profits , hostile tender offers, 29
which likewise increased in frequency in the early 1980s , provided the
other stimulus for the growth of MBOs. As managers ' j obs became more
insecure , the attraction of securing control through an MBO grew.
And the numbers of LBOs and MBOs grew dramatically. Table I
summarizes the growth of LBOs between 198 1 and 1990.30 In the two
years after the Houdaille MBO in 197 9, MBOs passed the $2 billion thresh,
old. By 1984 , there were around sixty deals worth about $ 13 billion. By
1986, the value of the forty,three going,private transactions was around $25
billion. By 1988 , when, as we will see below, the Delaware j urisprudence
on MBOs reached its maturity, there had already been around 2 5 0 deals
worth around $ 7 5 billion. In the space of a decade, there were around 400
buyouts valued at more than $ 160 billion. As I will develop in more detail,
these numbers pose one of the most striking features of the development of
the Delaware MBO norms: compared to the pace of the deal,making and
the vast amounts at stake, these cases arose late.
B.

Management Buyouts i n the Delaware Courts

In an MBO, when senior managers with outside financial partners buy
control of the company from the public shareholders , they face obvious and
severe conflicts of interest between their self,interest (to acquire the com,
pany for a low price) and their duty to shareholders (to sell the company for
a high price) . M oreover, this conflict arises in a context in which managers
inevitably have inside information regarding the corporation, information

29. In a hostile tender offer, a b idding company seeks control of a target company by acquir
ing the target company's shares directly from the target shareholders over the opposition of the
target management.
30. Table I, drawn from Leveraged Buyout Trends 1 98 1 Through First Half 1 987, MERGERS &
ACQUISITIONS, Nov.-Dec. 1 987, at 8 1 , 8 1 [hereinafter Leveraged Buyout Trends] , and LBO
Signposts, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS , Nov.-Dec. 1 99 1 , at 6 1 , 6 1 , includes all "going private
transactions" involving pub licly held companies, but excludes divisional leveraged buyouts. See
Table I infra p. 1 09 1 . As such, it is somewhat over-inclusive in that a small number of going
private leveraged buyout transactions cannot fairly be characterized as MBOs because manage
ment does not participate. For example, see the KKR buyout of RJR Nabisco in which KKR
outbid the CEO's buyout group. In re RJR Nab isco, Inc. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A. 1 0389,
1 989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, a t * 5 (Feb . 14, 1 989). The numbers in Table I are consistent with the
numbers of MBOs identified in other studies. See, e.g., Robert L. Kieschnick, Jr. , Management
Buyouts of Public Corporations: An Analysis of Prior Characteristics, in LEVERAGED MANAGEMENT
BUYOUTS: CAUSES AND CoNSEQUENCES 35 , 47 tb l.2-l (Yakov Amihud ed ., 1 989) (listing statis
tics for going-private transactions from 1 9 8 1 to 1 985); John Easterwood et al. , Limits on Manage
rial Discretion in Management Buyouts: The Effectiveness of Institutional, Market and Legal
Mechanisms (Dec. 1 995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). For my purposes here,
the exact numbers are less important than the order of magnitude.
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that they have acquired in the course of their employment and at firm
expense. In addition, management is also sometimes in the position to
control the timing of the transaction, again based on its inside information.
This severe conflict of interest likewise puts the board of directors in an
awkward position: Directors often have personal ties with the very man,
agers who are seeking to buy the company. Indeed, those managers are
often themselves members of the hoard.
Although the existence and severity of the conflict is obvious, the
appropriate solution is not. Professors Brudney and Chirelstein, two of the
earliest commentators , took the position that the conflicts were so severe,
the potential benefits so slight, and the mechanisms for controlling con,
flicts so feeble, that management buyouts should be per se illegal.3 1
But Delaware courts do not rely on such per se rules. Instead , in a
quite remarkable series of decisions over the latter part of the 1980s , the
Delaware courts elaborated a set of principles governing the behavior of
officers , directors , and lawyers involved in management buyouts. It is this
development that I wish to survey here.
1.

The Doctrinal Background

Management buyout cases were analyzed within the classic doctrinal
structure of Delaware fiduciary duty law, that is , under either the business
j udgment rule or the entire fairness standard. 32 Under the business
j udgment rule, there are three core elements to the analysis: First, as a
threshold matter , the directors must be " independent" in the sense of
financially disinterested; second, the directors must have acted with good
faith; third, they must have acted with due care, that is , not with gross
negligence . 33
When the requirements of the business j udgment rule are not satisfied,
the " entire fairness " standard applies , under which the directors have the

Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 26, at 1 365 -70.
I n its classic articulation, the business judgment rule shields directors from liability and
shields a decision from injunction, if the decision is made by independent directors acting in
good faith and with due care. See, e.g. , R]R Nabisco, 1 989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9, at *39. See
generaUy ROBERT C. CLARK, CoRPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1 986) .
3 3 . A question lurks in the discussion o f R]R Nabisco whether, i n addition to independence,
good faith, and due care, the decision must also be "reasonable" or "rational." See , e .g. , R]R
Nabisco, 1 989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9; see also ALI , PRINCIPLES OF CoRPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 4.0 1 (1994) (discussing the pros and cons of reasonable
test versus good faith test). Whether the irrationality of a decision is an independent basis for
liability or injunction, or whether it is simply evidence of lack of good faith and due care is
unclear and of little practical importance.
31.
32.

1 02 4

44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1009 (1 997)

burden of establishing that the transaction is entirely fair to the corpora�
tion. In such cases , the courts review the terms of the transaction and not
simply the process leading up to it. According to the Delaware courts , the
entire fairness standard has two aspects: fair dealing and fair price.34
The MBO cases were analyzed within this bipolar framework. In cases
in which managers were, in fact, on both sides of the transaction, the
review was under the entire fairness standard. 35 In cases in which a spe�
cial committee was involved, the review was, in the first instance , con�
ducted pursuant to the business j udgment rule and, if its conditions did not
obtain, then under the entire fairness standard. 36 Although perhaps odd
to those unaccustomed to Delaware case law, the doctrinal discussions in
the MBO cases did not go beyond the identification and description of
these two basic standards.37
What is important to see about each of these standards of review is
that they are standards , not rules .38 The critical concepts of the business
j udgment rule are " independence , " "good faith, " and " due care. " The
critical concepts of the entire fairness standard are "fair dealing" and "fair
price." These are the classic terms used for signaling the presence of
"standards" and, as we see both in the MBO cases and more generally in
Delaware law, are only given content in the distinctive narratives of the
Delaware courts.
2.

The Doctrinal Pre�History

As we will see below, a striking feature of the Delaware case law is that
although MBOs were prominent and common from at least 1 98 1 , manage�
34. Rabkin v. Philip A. Hunt Chemical Corp . , 498 A.2d 1099 (Del. 1 985); We inberger v .
UOP, Inc . , 457 A.2d 70 1 , 7 1 1 (Del. 1 983).
35 . See, e.g. , the early cases of EAC Industries and Greenfie/a, discussed infra Parts l.B.4.a
and I.B.4.b, respectively.
36. See , e.g. , the critical trilogy, MacmiUan, Fort Howard, and RJR Nabisco, discussed infra
Part l.B.5 .
3 7 . In cases dealing with hostile tender offers, the Delaware courts also developed what may
either be considered an intermediate standard of review, or alternatively, an application of the
business judgment rule in a particular recurring factua l context. See generaUy Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 22 (discussing the Delaware proportionality test) . In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co . , 493 A.2d 946 {Del. 1 985), the court, recognizing that directors face a potential
conflict of interest when a hostile tender offer has been made, reviewed director action under a
"proportionality" standard. Under this standard, one first looks to see if there was a " threat" to
the corporation and, if so , whether the directors' actions m response were "proportional" to the
threat. The Unocal standard was not generally relied upon in MBO cases.
3 8 . This is so despite the business judgment rule's name.
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ment buyout cases did not begin to appear in the Delaware courts in appre,
ciable numbers until 1985 or 1 986 (depending on whether one considers
the Revlon39 case to be in part an MBO case) , and the norms governing
MBOs were not worked out until 1 988- 1 989 . When the cases did arise,
however , they arose against the background of the earlier cases in which a
parent acquired minority shares of a partially owned subsidiary, and in
which management bought a division from a parent corporation.
In Delaware, one line of cases addressed the question of when and how
a parent corporation can freeze out minority shareholders of a subsidiary.
During the 1970s , Delaware flirted with prohibiting such mergers absent an
independent "business purpose. "40 And even if a merger did have such a
purpose , the burden was placed on the controlling shareholders to demon,
strate " entire fairness. " 4 1 This "business purpose" requirement was quickly
undermined when the Delaware Supreme Court held, a month later, that a
business purpose of the parent corporation sufficed. 42
In 1 983 , the Delaware Supreme Court decided Weinberger v. UOP,
Inc. , 43 a case that finally abandoned the business purpose test in parent,
subsidiary mergers , and that set the doctrinal stage for Delaware 's analysis
of MBOs. The Signal Companies owned 50.5% of UOP , and nominated
and elected six of the thirteen members of the UOP board. After two
Signal officers , who were also directors of UOP , concluded in a feasibility
study that acquiring the remaining shares of UOP would be a good invest,
ment for Signal at any price up to $24 per share , Signal decided to acquire
the remaining shares . Signal offered to merge with UOP, with the UOP
minority shareholders receiving $2 1 per share.
The UOP board, advised by its investment banker , considered and
ultimately accepted the Signal offer , but, according to the court, was never
informed of the existence or content of the feasibility study developed by
two of the UOP directors for Signal's use. In particular, the non,Signal
directors were never informed that the feasibility study concluded that a
price up to $24 per share would be a good investment for Signal. It was
this failure by Signal�affi liated directors that the court found to be the
primary breach of fiduciary duty.
3 9 . Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc . , 5 0 6 A.2d 1 7 3 (Del. 1 986).
40. S inger v. Magnavox Co . , 380 A.2d 969, 97 8-80 (Del. 1 977), overruled by Weinberger v.
UOP , Inc. , 457 A.2d 7 0 1 (Del. 1983).
4 1 . Id. at 980.
4 2 . Tanzer v. International Gen. Indus., lnc. , 3 79 A.2d 1 1 2 1 , 1 1 24 (Del. 1 97 7) .
4 3 . 4 5 7 A . 2 d 7 0 1 (Del . 1 983). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Supreme
Court opinion. See id. at 704-08.
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In holding that Signal had breached its fiduciary duties in cashing out
the minority shareholders of UOP, the court emphasized the absence of an
independent committee to represent the public shareholders:

[T]he result here could have been entirely different if UOP had
appointed an independent negotiating committee of its outside
directors to deal with Signal at arm's length. Since fairness in this
context can be equated to conduct by a theoretical, wholly indepen,
dent, board of directors acting upon the matter before them, it is
unfortunate that this course apparently was neither considered nor
pursued.44
This language in Weinberger led to the near universal use of " special com,
mittees " of independent directors in MBOs. The story of management
buyouts thus becomes a set of stories about how managers should behave,
on the one hand, and how special committees should behave in represent,
ing the interests of the corporation or the shareholders on the other. 45
The first Delaware case involving a management buyout of a division
that I have been able to identify is the 1 982 case of Field v. Allyn. 46 In
that case, incumbent management participated in what we would now
characterize as a management buyout of Penn Central's 92.6% interest in
the Pittsburgh and Lake Erie Railroad. From today's vantage point, two
things stand out. First, the maj ority shareholder, Penn Central , actively
protected its own interests, by shopping for competing bids, as well as the
minority shareholders' interests, by insisting that it would not sell its shares
to anyone who would not immediately make a tender offer for the minority
shares at an identical price.
Second, the opinion makes clear that the court was writing on a clean
slate. Plaintiffs, although convinced that something was deeply improper
about management participating in a buyout of the company when 1 00% of
the purchase price was ultimately secured by the company's own assets , had
great difficulty in, as the court said, "placing their finger on precisely what
it is that is wrong. "47 The court, noting "the absence of any direct prece,
44. Id. at 709 n.7 (citation omitted).
45. The use of special committees in the context of derivative suits, see , e.g. , Zapata Corp .
v. Maldonado , 430 A 2d 7 79 (Del. 1 9 8 1 ) , and uninvited and (from management's perspective)
unwelcome b ids for control, see, e.g. , In re TWA, Inc. Shareholders Litig . , No. CIV.A.9844,
1 98 8 WL 1 1 1 27 1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2 1 , 1 988), provided additional points of reference for the court's
appraisal of special committees in MBO transactions.
46. 457 A. 2d 1 089 (Del. Ch .) , aff'd per curiam, 467 A.2d 127 4 (Del. 1 983). The factual
account is drawn from the Delaware Supreme Chancery Court opinton. See id. at 1090-96.
47. Id. at 1090.
.
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dent cited by the plaintiffs under the law of Delaware or elsewhere, " 48
reviewed the transaction, found nothing improper , and granted summary
j udgment to defendants .
3.

The Normative Backdrop: Two Plausible Views

In order to appreciate the dilemma facing directors during this period,
and the role that Delaware courts played in developing role specific norms
for MBOs , one must briefly reconstruct the competing normative frame,
works within which directors functioned. In particular, one must recall the
radically different views of takeovers , in general , and the role of the board
of directors in MBOs , derivatively, that clashed during the 1 980s.
Two inconsistent views competed both intellectually and practically.
According to one view-the "managerialist" view-hostile tender offers
were bad for companies, communities , and society as a whole. From this
perspective, the 1 980s were a dangerous time, with sharks circling proud
and once,proud companies , looking for any sign of weakness, and then
moving in for the kill. In the process , enormous debt was incurred, com,
panies were destroyed, assets sold off, the work of generations of expansion
lost, and the nation mortgaged its future.
According to the competing view-the "free market" view-tender
offers were the great engine of managerial accountability and efficiency.
They were a sign that markets worked. When managers mismanaged , the
market price of the stock dropped, providing an opportunity for an entre,
preneur to enter, buy up the shares at a premium above market price , fix
the problems in the company, and profit thereby. When managers of com,
panies with free cash flow spent it on inefficient expansion or diversifica,
tion, the solution was to break up the company and sell off pieces to people
who knew how to manage them more efficiently. On this view, takeover
entrepreneurs benefited shareholders and society as a whole by moving
assets to their highest and best use , by disciplining bad managers, and by
paying premia to target shareholders.
If one adopted the managerialist view-as many managers and directors
instinctively did-then one might plausibly conclude that the best solution
for a company was to "remain independent. " When, however, sharks had
been spotted, a second,best solution was to sell the company to the man,
agers , thereby protecting the company from the depredations of a hostile
takeover. From this perspective, it was plausible to take the position that it

48.

Id. at 1 09 1 .
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made sense to sell the company to the managers, if they could pay a fair
price. If, however, managers could not afford a fair price, other defensive
measures should be used to prevent a leveraged bust, up takeover.
If, by contrast, one started from a "free market" position, it was wrong
to sell the company to managers for a "fair price" without first checking the
market to see if the shareholders were getting the highest price for their
shares, whether from managers or from a takeover entrepreneur. If one
started with the premise that the company belongs to the shareholders, and
the managers ' and directors' duty was to maximize shareholder value, then
it followed immediately that the company should not be sold to managers
without first making sure that shareholders were receiving top dollar.
In the Delaware MBO cases that follow, one witnesses the managerial,
ist intuitions of managers and directors in confrontation with a changing,
increasingly market,driven environment, with the chancery court serving as
referee. One sees an evolution-under the critical and often caustic eye of
the Delaware courts-in what directors believe to be the right thing to do, a
change that is both reflected in, and apparently at least in part caused by,
the Delaware decisions.

4.

The Early MBO Cases
a. EAC Industries, Inc.

v.

Frantz Manufacturing Co. ( 1 985)

The first Delaware MBO case involving a publicly held company seems
to have been the 1 985 case of EAC Industries, Inc. v. Frantz Manufacturing
Co. 49 In that case, the CEO's attempt to acquire the company in an
MBO transaction was frustrated when the retiring chairman of the board
sold his shares to a third party, EAC, thereby giving it a fifty,one percent
stake. The chancery court, in an opinion later affirmed by the supreme
court, enj oined the transfer of a block of stock to an employee stock owner,
ship plan (" ESOP") that would have diluted the EAC's holding to below
fifty percent, and blocked other measures adopted by the board to interfere
with EAC's acquisition of control over the corporation.
The EAC case provides an early example of what not to do if you were
a manager. Vice Chancellor Walsh painted a vivid picture of the actions of
Musgrove, Frantz's CEO, in response to EAC's acquisition of a control

49. No. CIV.A. 8003 , 1 985 WL 3 200 (DeL Ch. June 28, 1 985) , aff'd, 5 0 1 A.2d 4 0 1 (Del.
1 985). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion, id. at * 1 -*5 ,
and the Delaware Supreme Court opinion, 501 A.2d at 40 1 -06.
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position and EAC's changes to the by,laws :50 " Musgrove, confronted with
what appeared to be a fait accompli, nevertheless acted promptly to limit
EAC's attempt at control. "51 The court detailed Musgrove's tactics ,
including the accelerated issuance of shares to the proposed (but not yet
established) ESOP, the trustees of which were Musgrove and "two subordi,
Moreover, the trustees chose suboptimal
nate officers of Frantz. "52
financing to circumvent the " EAC sponsored bylaw changes requiring
unanimous director approval [that] foreclosed board action necessary to
guarantee the ESOP loan. "53 Finally, Musgrove called a board meeting at
which counsel to the corporation moved for the adoption of a resolution
establishing an executive committee, consisting of Musgrove, a former
employee , and a local banker, with authority to discharge the duties of the
board. 54
The case held that , under these circumstances , issuance of the shares
to the ESOP would be enjoined on the grounds that "funding an ESOP in
response to a shift in ownership of a corporation is not valid because the
directors' action was not taken under the provision of the then valid
bylaws. "55 But to focus on that holding is to miss the point of the
opinion. What stands out is the depiction of M usgrove-in both the chan,
eery and supreme court opinions-as a manager willing to do anything,
even to take steps to dilute the maj ority control of an arms,length pur,
chaser, EAC, in order to preserve his position as CEO. As the Restaurant
Associates case, which I will discuss shortly, makes clear, it would not be

50. Under Delaware law, bylaws (like other corporate actions) may be authorized by a
consent solicitation. D EL. CODE ANN . tit. 8, § 228(a) (1 994). Here , EAC presented several
modifications of Frantz's bylaws designed to prevent the Frantz board from interfering with its
acquisition of control.
5 1 . EAC Indus . , 1 985 WL 3200, at *4.
52. Id.
5 3 . Id.
5 4 . There i s also a passing reference to MBOs i n Moran v . Household International, Inc. , 490
A.2d 105 9 , 1 082 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 500 A.2d 1 3 46 (Del. 1 985), in the course of the court's discus
sion of Household's counterclaim against the plaintiffs. One of the members of the plaintiff
tender offerors was Moran, a former director of Household. The chancery court rejected House
hold's claim that "Moran [had] used his position as a director to gain access to confidential infor
mation concerning Household's assets for the purpose of formulating a leveraged buy-out . . . for
[his own] benefit and at the expense of [the] other shareholders. " Id. Although the evidence
presented supported Household 's claim that Moran conducted detailed analyses of Household, the
court found that "there was nothing secret about that activity, " nor was any of that information
used "in a manner hostile to Household 's interests. " ld. "To the contrary, the consistent theme
which runs through Moran and D-K-M's acquisition interest in Household was a desire to involve
management in a leverageci buy-ou r, a goal Moran was legally free to pursue if he wished. Field
v. Allyn, supra. " Id. (citing Field v. Allyn , 457 A.2d 1 089, 1 098 ( 1 983)).
55. Frantz Mfg. Co . v. EAC Indus. , Inc., 5 0 1 A.2d 40 1 , 409 (Del. 1 985).
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correct to conclude from this opinion that managers and directors cannot
ever take steps to dilute the working control of a shareholder group .
Rather, what we learn from this case is that it is improper to do so with
Musgrove ' s lack of good faith.
b . Greenfiekl

v.

National Medical Care (1986)

The next Delaware MBO case seems to have been Greenfield v .
National Medical Care, Inc. 56 Following an aborted merger, National
M edical Care considered a variety of options . After preliminary merger
negotiations with W.R. Grace became deadlocked over NMC' s president's
insistence that the price not fall below that of the aborted merger, Grace
suggested a leveraged buyout in which management would have a substan,
tial equity interest (around twenty,five percent) , a proposal which, after
modifications , was ultimately recommended by a special committee of
NMC directors and approved by the board. Plaintiff shareholders chal,
lenged the merger on the grounds that the NMC officers "breached their
fiduciary duties by depriving NMC's publ ic stockholders of their investment
at a grossly inadequate price. "57
In an opinion denying defendants' motion to dismiss , Vice Chancellor
Berger relied on the plaintiffs' complaint challenging the independence of
the NMC board, in combination with the plaintiffs' claims that the price
was unfair and the lockup prevented the stockholders from obtaining a
higher offer , to hold that the complaint "sufficiently states a claim for
breach of fiduciary duty" :58
5 6 . Nos. 7 7 20 , 77 65 , 1986 WL 6505 (Del. Ch. June 6 , 1986). The factual account is drawn
from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at * 1 -*2. Although the famous Revlon case
is not often thought of as an MBO case, it does have an MB O aspect: In response to Ronald
Perelman's attempt to acquire Revlon, Revlon's board "approved a plan to enter into a leveraged
buyout agreement with Forstmann L ittle in which e ach shareholder would receive $56 cash per
share with Revlon's management given an opportunity to acquire an equity interest in the corpo
ration." MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, Inc., 5 0 1 A.2d 1 2 3 9 , 1 245 (Del. Ch.
1 985), aff'd, 506 A.2d 173 {Del. 1986). But management's potential equity interest in the
Forstmann Little LBO did not figure prominently in the court's discussion. Much more central
to the analysis was the CEO's "strong personal antipathy to Mr. Perelman, " Revlon, 506 A.2d at
1 7 6 , and the directors' personal interest in avoid ing potential liability to noteholders. Revlon,
5 0 1 A.2d at 1 25 0 .
5 7 . Greenfield, 1 986 WL 6505, at *3.
5 8 . Id. a t * 4 (citing Hanson Trust PLC v . ML SCM Acquisition, Inc . , 7 8 1 F.2d 264 (2d Cir.
1 986)).
The Hanson Trust case seems to have been the first significant MBO case in any court and
was often cited in the Delaware opinions. See, e.g. , Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan , Inc . ,
559 A.2d 1 2 6 1 , 1 284, 1286 (Del. 1989); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v . J . P . Stevens & Co . (ln re
J.P. Stevens & Co . Shareholders Litig .}, 542 A.2d 770, 784 (Del. Ch. 1 988) ; Greenfield, 1 9 86 WL
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[The complaint] goes on to charge that the individual defendants are
interested because certain officers and directors and other key man,
agement personnel of NMC will be substantial stockholders in NMC
Holding or otherwise benefit from the merger. The Proxy Statement
reveals that Messrs. Hampers, Lowrie and Hager [all NMC directors
and officers] were to own approximately 2 5 % of the common stock
of NMC Holding at the effective time of the merger. Mr. Paganucci
[another NMC director] is a director of a Grace subsidiary and the
Vice President,Finance of Dartmouth College. NMC Holding
agreed, if the merger were effected, to contribute $2.5 million to
Dartmouth College over a period of years . . . .
. . . The special committee is also attacked on the grounds that
one of its members-Dr. Hager-was a paid consultant to NMC, later
was asked to become a director of and was allowed to purchase stock
in NMC Holding and did not withdraw from the committee until
after it had recommended the merger. 59
As a " legal " matter, the court simply denied defendants' motion to
dismiss: It did not find against the defendants on the underlying claim, it
did not impose any liability, and it did not issue any injunction. And yet,
in refusing to grant the motion to dismiss , and in focusing on these specific
allegations of the plaintiffs' complaint, the court sent a strong message,
both to the parties directly involved in the case, as well as to others.
This case, like the EAC case, provides an example of improper motiva,
tion and improper conduct. In both opinions, the courts provide vivid
depictions of managers hobbled by conflicts of interest , acting to protect
their own interests in conflict with the interests of the shareholders who
they were obliged to serve.
c. Restaurant Associates I ( 1 987)
The first full account we get of the performance of a special committee
in the context of a proposed management buyout is Freedman v. Restaurant
Associates Industries, Inc. (Restaurant Associates 1}.60 The case falls on the

6505 , at *4. The Hanson Trust case involved an attempt by management to use a lockup agree
ment on critical assets to protect a management buyout plan, which emerged in response to a
hostile tender offer for control. The Second Circuit reversed the district court's denial of a
request for a preliminary injunction enjoining the lockup agreement.
59. Greenfield, 1986 WL 6505 , at *3.
60. No. CIV.A.92 1 2 , 1987 WL 1 4323 (De l. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) . The factual account is
drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at * 1 -*5 .
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boundary between going�private cases (because the management group had
effective voting control of the company , controlling about forty�eight per�
cent of the votes) and MBO cases (because the controlling shareholders
were also the managers) . Plaintiffs sought a preliminary inj unction enj oin�
ing the closing of a tender offer on the grounds that the management/ con�
trolling shareholder group advanced their personal interests as buyers and
blocked the development of competing bids .
What stands out in Chancellor Allen's opinion denying the plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction is his detailed account of how effec�
tively the special committee represented the interests of the outside share�
holders , despite management's voting control. The committee , comprised
of independent directors with no financial interest in the proposed buyout,
promptly hired Skadden, Arps , Slate, Meagher and Flom as its legal adviser
and Prudential Bache to provide it with financial advice. When, shortly
after the management group publicly disclosed its intention to make a
tender offer, the shareholders had the good fortune to receive a competing
proposal , the committee did what it could to facilitate a bidding contest.
After considering the two proposals , the committee informed the
board that management's proposal was unacceptable. The committee then
met with the other bidder and told him that, although the management
group opposed his proposal, he would be considered a qualified bidder once
he delivered a proposed letter from his contemplated source of financing,
which he soon provided.
Despite somewhat higher bids from the management group , the com�
mittee continued to reject management's offers, insisting that it would
conduct further discussions with the competing bidder. That bidder, after
reviewing confidential information from the company, indicated that he
would increase his offer further, provided that financing was obtained and
the due diligence investigation was satisfactory. In response , the managers
informed the committee that they would refuse to sell their shares to the
bidder, that they would vote against the proposed merger , and that unless
management's lower offer was accepted on that same day, the offer would
be withdrawn.
Here, in the court's account, the special committee, rather than cav�
ing in to management's demand, showed its true independence:

Given the management group's strategic position in the Company's
capital structure and its unwavering hostility to Soliman's proposal,
the special committee suggested that Soliman make a proposal under
which Soliman would be able to buy one million authorized, but as
yet unissued, Class B treasury shares at $ 1 9 per share . . . . Effectua�
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tion of this proposal would dilute the management group's voting
power to approximately 40%, at which level a hostile tender offer
was thought more feasible. 61
But because Soliman, the competing bidder, had not yet conducted his due
d iligence , he was unwilling to proceed on this basis. The committee again
conferred and proposed "recommend[ing] that Restaurant's board grant a
ten day option to Soliman to purchase at least one million authorized but
unissued Class B shares at $ 1 9 per share. In exchange, Soliman would
make a non,refundable payment of $2 million. The ten day option would
allow Soliman to conduct a due diligence investigation before buying the
stock. "62
When the full board subsequently met, the management directors
opposed the granting of the option to Soliman, voting it down 6-5 . At the
same meeting, the special committee recommended rej ecting management's
$ 1 6 per share offer. The special committee met again on September 1 2 , at
which time it resolved not to approve any management group proposal that
would pay the public shareholders less that $ 1 8 per share. Ultimately, the
management group raised its offer to the public shareholders to $ 1 8 per
share, whereupon a merger agreement was negotiated and executed. Even
then, the merger agreement " contained a provision permitting the board to
withdraw if the circumstances indicated that fiduciary duties might be
violated by going forward, "63 a provision interpreted by counsel for the
special committee as not precluding further proposals by Soliman. Soliman
made several further proposals at prices above $ 1 8 per share, none of which
were unconditioned, and ultimately sold his interest. The management
group commenced its tender offer at $ 18 per share .
Against this detailed factual context, the court denied plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary inj unction against the completion of the tender
offer , and, likewise , denied plaintiffs' request that Soliman be granted a
" lockup" option to encourage and facilitate an unconditioned bid. Not
surprisingly, given the court's description of the behavior of the special
committee, the court held that

cases such as this demonstrate that [the use of specially constituted
committees of disinterested directors when transactions involve
elements of self dealing] , when pursued in good faith, is a close
surrogate for the structure that ordinarily provides protection to
61.
62.
63.

Id. at *4.
Id.
Id. at *5 .
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shareholders. Here there is no structural reason to doubt the effec,
tiveness of the independent committee-it was appropriately consti,
tuted, well advised and active. Moreover, the results it achieved
bespeak an aggressive and effective attempt to maximize public
shareholder values. 64
Thus , in this context, the special committee's attempt to dilute the
management group's working control over the corporation by issuing autho,
rized but unissued shares to Soliman, far from being an example of improper
behavior (as it was in EAC) , is itself strong evidence of the special commit,
tee's vigorous efforts on behalf of the shareholders. Moreover, one would
predict that , if the board composition had been slightly different (with one
fewer management director and one more outside director) , and the board
had voted six to five in favor of issuing the option to Soliman, the court
would not have enj oined that issuance.
Despite the court's refusal to enjoin the transaction, and despite the
special committee's efforts , the management tender offer did not close as
expected. On October 1 9 , 1987 , two days after the court's decision, the
market crashed, leading management to cancel and renegotiate the terms of
the transaction. As we will see below, the court issued a second opinion
three years later, which demonstrates the extent to which norms had devel,
oped and been clarified.
d. Rosman

v.

Shoe,Town I (1 988)

While Restaurant Associates I presented an effective special committee,
the next MBO case provided another negative example. In Rosman v. Shoe,
Town (Shoe,Town 1),65 although Vice Chancellor Hartnett denied
plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary inj unction because plaintiffs failed to
establish inadequate disclosure, he cast a jaundiced eye on the transaction:

also find that some aspects of the transaction are troublesome.
These include that the corporation has a history of going private and
then going public and then going private again which has resulted in
the capital of the public stockholders being used by the corporation
I

64. Id. at *7.
65 . No. CIV.A.9483, 1988 WL 3638 (Del. Ch. Jan. 1 8 , 1988) . The factual account is
drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at * 1 -*2.
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with little benefit to the investors. It also appears that several of the
directors have been active participants in these manuevers [sic] .66
Plaintiffs also correctly pointed out that a special committee appointed
to supervise the sale of the corporation was instructed not to be concerned
with price and that Shearson, Lehman, which was hired by the directors to
advise the special committee, never expressed an opinion as to the price
the corporation would be expected to bring. 67
Although plaintiffs lost their preliminary injunction motion, the case
continued .68 The court's skepticism returned to haunt defendants . In
Shoe,Town II ,69 Vice Chancellor Chandler, who had taken over the case
from Vice Chancellor Hartnett, refused to grant the directors' motion to
dismiss the breach of fiduciary duty claims , instead finding that plaintiffs
had stated a claim:
Plaintiffs have challenged the independence and effectiveness of the
special committee. Central to this challenge is their contention that
the special committee was dominated by Kaye. The complaint also
alleges that one of the two purported independent directors compris,
ing the special committee (Lachman) was not actively involved in
the process. The other (Cohn) is charged with lacking independence
because he is related to a member of the management group. In
addition, it is alleged that the special committee was not authorized
to consider the fairness of any proposed transaction, except as to
procedure. The special committee is purported to have not actively
negotiated with any potential acquirers. Even this limited function
was supposedly hampered by the fact that the special committee was
not permitted to retain independent counsel. Plaintiffs have also
challenged the disinterestedness of the board majority that approved
the transaction . . . .
In light of the specific allegations of the complaint, combined
with the averments that the transaction was approved by an inter,
ested board and that the special committee was a sham, I conclude
66. Id. at * 1 .
67 . Here we also see a clear example of the managerialist intuition, described earlier.
68. Plaintiffs may well have desired to lose this motion, as they probably had little interest
in passing up the offering price at a premium above market-at least so long as the subsequent
action for damages was not foreclosed.
69. In re Shoe-Town, Inc. Stockholders Litig. , No. C.A.9483 , 1 990 WL 1 3 475 (Del. Ch.
Feb. 1 2 , 1 990) .
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that the complaint states a claim for breach of fiduciary duty suffi,
dent to withstand a motion to dismiss. Cf. Greenfield v. National
Medical Care, Inc. , Del. Ch. , C.A. Nos. 7720, 77 65 , Berger,
V.C . . . . (citing Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc. ,
2d Cir. , 781 F.2d 264 ( 1 986)).70
Without actually finding that the defendants breached their fiduciary
duties-on a motion to dismiss, the plaintiffs' allegations are taken as
true-the court thus provided a clear indication that a special committee
acting as alleged would breach its fiduciary duties .71 The case ultimately
settled for $2 . 1 5 million.
Note several themes that emerge in Shoe Town I. First, the court
reacted critically to the instruction to the special committee not to be
concerned with price. Second, the court found troublesome the fact that
an investment banker supposedly serving shareholder interests never
expressed an opinion regarding the price the corporation could be expected
to bring. In Shoe Town I, then, the court-without enjoining the
transaction-identified relevant characteristics of the process that would
likely be influential in future determinations of good faith and fair deal,
ing.72
e. In re ]. P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders litigation (1988)
Finally, the last and most important of the early MBO/special commit,
tee cases is the decision in the battle for J.P. Stevens & Co. , a large textile
70. Id. at *5 .
7 1 . In Shingala v. Becor Western Inc. , No. CIV.A.885 8, 1 988 WL 7 3 90 (Del. Ch. Feb . 3 ,
1 988) , Vice Chancellor Berger approved a settlement in an MBO situation. In this case, the
board appointed a special committee that retained independent counsel and a financial advisor
after management indicated that it was interested in proposing a buyout. Lawsuits were filed
after the special committee and the management group entered into a merger agreement that
included a "no shop " provision, but one that "was expressly subj ect to a 'fiduciary out' clause
allowing the Becor board to act if the failure to do so would conflict with the proper discharge of
the directors' fiduciary duties." Id. at * 1 . Shortly thereafter, Be cor received an acquisition offer
from a third party and expressions of interest from others. The settlement of the litigation pro
vided a mechanism for an auction of B ecor. The board then took over and conducted an auction
that, as described by the court in its decision approving the settlement, seems to have been con
ducted in a way that was calculated to maximize , and likely did maximize, the value that public
shareholders received for their shares.
7 2 . Shoe-Town II, a later case , shows the evolution m the specificity of the norms governing
the behavior of special committees and belongs in that later set of cases.
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manufacturer. 73 In the Stevens case, management informed the board of
its plan to take the company private in an LBO. The board immediately
created a special committee charged with considering management's pro,
posal and with considering and making recommendations with respect to
any other available alternatives , including proposals from third parties. A
press release disclosed all this within two days, and triggered a bidding war
between West Point,Pepperell, another textile firm, and Odyssey Partners ,
an investment partnership, which quickly surpassed management's bid.
Because West Point was a competitor, its b id raised some antitrust con,
cerns . Odyssey, on the other hand, was an investment partnership with no
operating capacity, which, along the way, invited the management group to
join. The court detailed various ways in which Odyssey received preferen,
tial treatment over West Point, including, most importantly, better access
to confidential information.74 Ultimately, the special committee recom,
mended accepting Odyssey's slightly lower offer because it did not have
West Point's potential antitrust problems. West Point sought, inter alia, a
preliminary injunction enjoining provisions that provided for reimburse,
ment of expenses and a "topping fee, " and the completion of the Odyssey
offer, so as to permit West Point to consider making a higher offer based on
information wrongfully withheld until shortly before.75
The core of West Point's claim was that the special committee acted
to protect management's interests. When it became clear that management
could not meet the other offers , the special committee, according to West
Point, did the next best thing by pushing the transaction towards manage,
ment affiliated Odyssey.
Although the court refused to enjoin the transaction, because West
Point did not carry its burden of establishing lack of good faith, it was still
troubled and , in what is characteristic of this set of cases and, I believe ,
Delaware fiduciary duty cases more generally, made a point of expressing its
concerns:
Thus, [in West Point's view,] Odyssey, rather than being an arm's,
length bidder, as West Point is, appears in this version to be a white
knight, favored by management and by a Special Corrunittee that
7 3 . West Point-Peppere ll, Inc. v. J.P. S tevens & Co. (In re J.P. Stevens & Co. Shareholders
Litig.), 542 A.2d 7 7 0 (Del. Ch. 1 988). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chan
cery Court opinion. See id. at 7 7 3-78.
74. ld. at 7 7 7 .
7 5 . Id. a t 7 7 2 .
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vibrates sympathetically to management's desires. Maybe that is
true; it surely is plausible. For example, one is left with the suspicion
that the need to reach a final decision may not have been so great as
to require the Special Committee to decide by March 13th to sign a
merger agreement, when another month might have resolved the
antitrust question that presented the reason for preferring a lower
offer. And if one is inclined to second guess board decisions, the
decision to agree to a $ 1 per share break,up payment on March 1 3
seems a likely candidate for review. Odyssey had just submitted a
proposal materially lower than West Point. If Odyssey really wanted
to acquire the Company, how much leverage did it have, in those
circumstances, to insist on a $ 1 7 million break,up fee? So the claim
that the real purpose of that fee provision was to disadvantage West
Point is not altogether hollow. And why did the Special Committee
so easily accept Odyssey's threat to retract its March 28th $64 offer,
if it was not accepted immediately? Would not the practicality of
the matter suggest to the Special Committee that if Odyssey was
willing to pay $64 on the 28th, it would be willing to do so a few
days later?
Other legitimate questions could be asked, but, in the end, plain,
tiffs' plausible story is not, in my opinion, sufficiently supported by
the evidence at this time to permit the conclusion that it is reason,
ably likely that at trial it would be found that the Special Committee
sought to promote the interests of management by advantaging
Odyssey at the possible expense of the shareholders.76
As it turned out, the bidding war continued, with West Point making
additional bids and resolving the antitrust concerns . Ultimately, Odyssey
and West Point entered into a bidding agreement with each other, ending
the auction. 77
From one perspective, the opinion is rather peculiar. What is one to
make of the court's ruminations if it ultimately denies the motion for a
preliminary injunction? If plaintiff has failed to carry its burden of estab,
lishing lack of good faith, who should care whether plaintiff's story is "plau,
sible"? Who should care whether one can make plausible arguments
against the easy grant of a lockup option to Odyssey Partners?
76. Id. at 779-80.
7 7 . On the antitrust issues raised b y such a b idding agreement, see Edward B . Rock,
Antitrust and the Market for Corporate Control, 77 CAL. L. REv. 1 3 65 ( 1 989).
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The answer is obvious: Anyone who cares about whether this transac�
tion will ultimately proceed, and anyone who cares about whether future
transactions will be permitted to proceed, will read the court's words with
great care and attention. And they will read them primarily because they
give insight into how someone with the power to block a transaction reacts
to certain recurrent features. To those who structure transactions , the
words send an unambiguous message: If you want your next transaction to
proceed, pay attention.
f. Summary
Between 1 985 and early 1 988, the Delaware Chancery Court thus
issued five significant opinions evaluating management buyouts. In only
one of these cases (EAC) did the chancery court enj oin the transaction. In
one (Restaurant Associates) , the court expressed its approval of the special
committee's performance. In the rest, the court expressed varying degrees
of disapproval, suspicion, and doubt about the performance of management
and the special committees , leaving open the possibility of damages.
These opinions illustrate a striking feature of the Delaware fiduciary
duty cases, specifically, the multivalent character of the outcomes. In these
cases, and in the ones that follow, the courts avail themselves of one of
three options: denying the request for an inj unction and blessing the behav�
ior; denying the motion for an injunction and criticizing defendants' behav�
ior; or granting the injunction. The intermediate position plays three roles.
First, it provides guidance applicable to future cases, that is , what kind of
behavior the courts are likely to find to be a breach of fiduciary duty.
Second, in these intermediate cases , although the court denies plaintiffs'
motion for a preliminary injunction, it also typically denies defendants'
motion to dismiss, leaving defendants with some substantial damages expo�
sure. Finally, and perhaps most importantly-and certainly least noticed-it
tells directors , who we may suppose are generally trying to do a good job,
what they should do. This pattern continued in the most important MBO
cases.
5.

The Defining Trilogy: Macmillan, Fort Howard, and R]R Nabisco

After these early discussions, we come to the critical trilogy of 1988
and 1 989: Macmillan, Fort Howard, and, finally, the biggest deal of all time,
R]R Nabisco. These cases build on the experience of the earlier cases , and
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give us detailed and dramatic accounts with a vivid set of heroes and vil,
lains. In what follows, I have struggled with striking the right balance
betwee n demonstrating the fact,specific, normatively charged quality of the
opinions through the quotation of the courts' language, and readability.
The following descriptions of the Delaware opinions are a pale substitute
for reading the opinions themselves. The confirmation or falsification of
my claims can only be found there. At the same time, I am acutely aware
of the limited extent to which one can impose on one's audience.
a. The Battle for Macmillan
(1)

Macmillan I Uuly 1 4, 1 988)

In the wake of takeover bids in the publishing industry, the manage,
ment of Macmillan, Inc. , a prominent publishing company, became con,
cerned that the firm might become a target. Management's response to this
concern led to two chancery court opinions78 and one supreme court opin,
ion79 providing vivid and sharply critical descriptions of managerial cor,
ruption, of director passivity, and of investment banker manipulation.
Together the opinions provide Exhibit A for how not to behave in an
MBO.
Macmillan's two "inside" directors, Edward Evans ("Evans ") , the chair,
man and CEO, and William F. Reilly ("Reilly"), the president and chief
operating officer, turned out to be the principal villains in what even the
courts thought of as a "drama. " From start to finish, Vice Chancellor
Jacobs tells us in his opinion,
two central concepts remained constant. First, Evans, Reilly, and
certain other members of management would end up owning abso,
lute majority control of the restructured company. Second, manage,
ment would acquire that majority control, not by investing new
capital at prevailing market prices, but by being granted several
7 8 . Robert M. Bass Group , Inc. v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc. Shareholders Litig.), 5 5 2
A.2d 1 227 (Del. Ch. 1 988) (Macmillan D ; Mills Acquisition Co . v . Macmillan, Inc. , No.
CIV.A. l 0 1 68 , 1 988 WL 1 08332 (Del. Ch. Oct. 18, 1988) (Macmillan In.
79. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1 2 6 1 (Del. 1 989) . The factual
account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See Macmillan I, 552 A.2d at
1 228-3 8 .

Saints and Sinners

1 04 1

hundred thousand restricted Macmillan shares and stock options.
Those shares and options would then be "exchanged" . . . into
several million shares of the recapitalized company.80
How Evans and Reilly pursued this goal forms the core of all three opin�
ions. To appreciate fully the nature of these opinions, it is necessary to
examine how the Delaware Chancery and Delaware Supreme Courts tell
the story.
Vice Chancellor Jacobs tells a sad tale: In the first step of Evans and
Reilly's campaign (June 1987) , they asked the board, and the board agreed,
inter alia: to grant Evans and Reilly additional shares of restricted stock and
new employment contracts with "golden parachutes" ; to approve a loan of
$60 million that the [already existing] ESOP would then borrow to fund its
purchase of one million Macmillan shares; to replace Citibank as ESOP
trustee, substituting Evans , Reilly, and two Macmillan employees , who
would thereby obtain voting control of all unallocated shares deposited in
the ESOP. In the second step, management proposed a restructuring of the
corporation that would, in effect, have given the management group con�
trol.
Management's worries about a hostile tender offer turned out to have
foundation: On October 2 1 , 1 987 , two days after the October 1 9 market
crash, an investment group led by Robert Bass disclosed that it held approx�
imately 7 .5 % of Macmillan stock. In response, Macmillan management
called a special board meeting at which Bass , the chancery court tells us ,
"was portrayed to the board as a 'greenmailer' whose modus operandi was
to 'creep' to a control position in publicly held companies . . . . Based on
that presentation, the Board determined that the Bass Group's history and
the volatile market situation constituted a threat to Macmillan and its
shareholders. " 8 1
But, says Vice Chancellor Jacobs , management did not accurately
inform the board. In fact, officials of companies supposedly victimized
"submitted affidavits attesting that the management of those firms had
requested Bass (or affi liates) to join their respective boards of directors
and/or to j oin in investments with them. " 82 In light of this evidence,
80.
81.
82.

Macmillan I, 552 A.2d 1227. 1229-30.
Id. at 1 2 3 2 .
Id.
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Jacobs concluded, "management's pej orative characterizations of the Bass
Group , even if honestly believed, served more to propagandize the Board
than to enlighten it. "83
Around this same time, management decided to form a special com,
mittee of the board to evaluate its restructuring proposal. The court details
the steps that Evans and Reilly took to corrupt the process from its incep,
tion, by extensively interviewing and eventually selecting the special com,
mittees ' investment banker without ever disclosing these contacts to the
committee eventually appointed. 84
The special committee subsequently met, again with Evans , Reilly, and
other members of the management group, to hear a presentation by Lazard,
the compromised investment banker for the special committee that, in the
court's telling, was focused entirely on how to facilitate management's
restructuring (which would give the management group control) and how to
defeat the Bass group's proposal.85 Then, without any negotiation, the
special committee recommended (and the board approved) management's
proposed restructuring and rej ected the Bass bid, based in part on Lazard's
opinion that the $64,per,share offer was "inadequate. "86 Subsequently, in
response to a sweetened Bass offer, Lazard, in the court's account, again
revealing the extent to which it was management's tool , "concluded that it
could furnish an ' adequacy' opinion that would enable the Special
Committee to rej ect the $7 3 per share cash portion of the Bass offer. "87
Ultimately, the special committee and the board rejected both Bass offers .
After this detailed narrative of the behavior of Evans, Reilly, and the
directors, the court appraised their conduct. Rej ecting defendants' claim
that the Bass Group represented a threat to Macmillan because of their
83.
84.

Id.

"In total, Lazard professionals worked with management on the proposed restructuring
for over 500 hours before their 'client,' the Special Committee, formally came into existence and
retained them. " Id. at 1 233-34. Indeed, the court noted in a foomote:
On May 1 8 , the day after the Bass Group offer, a Lazard partner working on the restruc
turing wrote a letter to Mr. Evans ("Dear Ned ") , stating that "all of us at Lazard are
keenly interested in working with you in any way that we can in connection
with . . . the Bass Group offer] . "
Id. a t 1 234 n. l 9 (alterations i n original).
85. Id. at 1235 .
86. Id. a t 1 236.
87 . Id. at 1 2 3 7 .
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supposed reputation as "greenmailers" as unsupported by the record, the
court condemned both the special committee and management. 88
Neither [the Board nor the Special Committee] took reasonable
measures to uncover the facts . . . . Where, as here, corporate direc,
tors decide to resist a takeover bid on the ground that it constitutes a
threat, Unocal requires that their decision rest upon a reasonable
investigation and be made in good faith. That decision cannot rest
upon a studied avoidance of a reasonable investigation, in order to
rely upon self,serving conclusions without basis in fact.89
Macmillan II (October 1 8, 1 988)

(2)

Three months later, in Macmillan II, we see Evans and Reilly continu,
ing to undermine the integrity of the process.90 In the wake of Macmillan
1, management abandoned its restructuring plan. On the very day that the
restructuring plan was enjoined, Macmillan's management began looking
for a (management,) friendly bidder. After Kohlberg, Kravis and Roberts
("KKR") contacted Macmillan, the two firms had extensive discussions
"concerning a possible leveraged buyout of all of Macmillan's stockholders,
in which Macmillan senior management would participate. "91 At around
the same time, Robert Maxwell, through Maxwell Communications Corp.
88. See id. at 1 240:
The Special Committee made no effort, directly or through its advisers, to investigate
the B ass offer. Management's investigation consisted of sending Mr. McCurdy to have a
single cursory meeting with Mr. Scully, a Bass representative. That encounter was little
more than a charade, because Mr.McCurdy was instructed not to {and therefore did not)
negotiate or substantively discuss the terms of the Bass offer.
89. Id. at 1 24 1 . The court then went on to note two other "offending qualities [of the
restructuring] that exacerbate its unreasonableness and which therefore merit comment. Id. at
1 244. First, the court pointed ou t, the restructuring would render the part of the restructured
company that held Macmillan 's information-based businesses "takeover proof' because it would
tend to entrench the management group. Second, management's proposed 39% ownership "[was]
derived from valuation methods that [were] either incorrect or, at the very least, highly question
able. ld. Finding that the restructuring proposal posed the threat of irreparable harm to share
holders, and that the balance of the equities favored the plaintiffs, the court preliminarily
enjoined the restructuring. ld. at 1246-47 .
90. See Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., No. CIV.A. 1 0 1 68, 1 98 8 WL 1 08332
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1 8 , 1 988). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court
opinion. See id. at *3-* 1 1 .
9 1 . Id. at *3.
11

11
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(" MCC") , also indicated an interest in acquiring Macmillan. In its opin,
ion, the court details the extent to which management aided KKR while
discouraging Maxwell. Management gave KKR access to company person,
nel and nonpublic information, including presentations by senior manage,
ment. By contrast, Macmillan did not even respond to Maxwell's proposal
for five weeks. Proceeding anyway, Maxwell announced an $80 all,cash,
all,share tender offer on August 1 2 , topping the Bass offer by a significant
amount.
Despite efforts to equalize the information given to the competing
bidders by developing a common "script, " Evans and Reilly, the villains of
Macmillan I, undermined the process by making an unauthorized telephone
call to KKR, tipping MCC's bid to KKR (presumably so that they could
outbid it in the final round) . Neither Evans , Reilly, nor KKR disclosed to
Macmillan's financial or legal advisers that Evans had tipped off KKR Nor
did Evans and Reilly inform their fellow directors. In the final round of
bidding, after a further conversation with each bidder in which Bruce
Wasserstein, the investment banker for the management group, who inexpli,
cably also ran the auction, again gave KKR more information than MCC,
KKR came out on top.
In the chancery court opinion, Vice Chancellor Jacobs makes clear
that Evans and Reilly breached their fiduciary duties by tipping off KKR
But, while the court found Evans' and Reilly's behavior improper, and
unfair to MCC, it was unconvinced that the auction failed to promote
shareholders' interest-in his eyes, the critical measure-in achieving the
highest available price. The court thus condemned the behavior but
refused to enjoin the "lockup. " At the same time, the court concluded that
the poison pill no longer served any purpose, and ordered it withdrawn,
giving MCC the opportunity to proceed with its offer, either by waiving its
condition that the lockup be declared invalid or by successfully invalidating
it on appeal.
Maxwell then appealed to the Delaware Supreme Court, which invali,
dated the lockup in an oral opinion on November 2 , followed by a written
opinion on May 3 , 1 989. As we will see , the Delaware Supreme Court's
opinion is even more contemptuous of Evans and Reilly, their investment
bankers, and the board than was the chancery court's. This decision
opened the way to MCC's ultimate acquisition of Macmillan at $90 . 25 per
share. It is to that opinion I now turn.
.

.

Saints and Sinners

(3)

1045

The Delaware Supreme Court 's Macmillan (May 3 , 1 989)

In the Delaware Supreme Court opinion,92 Justice Moore agreed with
Vice Chancellor Jacobs in his overall view of the transactions. In summa,
rizing Vice Chancellor Jacobs findings, the Delaware Supreme Court
touched on each of the highlights: the central goal of making sure that
Evans and Reilly ended up in control without investing new capital; the
domination of the allegedly " independent" board by the financially inter,
ested members of management; the "directors' evident passivity in the face
of their fiduciary duties" ; the "rather grim and uncomplimentary picture of
Bass and its supposed 'modus operandi' in prior investments, " including the
inaccurate claim that it was a "greenmailer"; the increases in nonemployee
director compensation and the creation of a nonemployee director retire,
ment plan. Like the chancery court, the supreme court focused on the
corruption of the special committee process by Evans and Reilly.93 Like
the chancery court, the supreme court focused on the extensive and undis,
closed dealings between the management group and Lazard, the special
committee's investment banker, before the special committee was formed,
and its subsequent passivity.
Having summarized Macmillan I-the Bass offer-with its passive spe,
cial committee , corrupt managers , and manipulative investment bankers,
the court moved on to Macmillan II. As the supreme court put it, clearly
conscious of the extent to which this was a morality play:
Thus, Macmillan I essentially ended on July 1 4 , 1 988 [with the chan,
eery court's preliminary injunction] . However, it only set the stage
for the saga of Macmillan II to begin that same day. It opened with
92. Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. , 559 A.2d 1 2 6 1 (Del. 1 989). The factual
account is drawn from the Delaware Supreme Court opinion. See id. at 1 2 65-78.
93 . See id . at 1 2 67 :
Due to the significant financial interests of Evans, Reilly, Chell, McCurdy and other
managers in the proposed restructuring , management decided in February or March to
establish a "Special Committee" of the Board to serve as an "independent" evaluator of
the plan. The Special Committee was hand picked by Evans, but not actually formed
until the May 1 8 , 1988 board meeting. This fact is significant because the events that
transpired between the time that the Special Committee was conceived and the time it
was formed illummate the actual working relationship between management and the
allegedly "independent" directors. It calls into serious question the actual independence
of the board in Macmillan I and II.
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Macmillan's senior management holding extensive discussions with
KKR in an attempt to develop defensive measures to thwart the Bass
Group offer.94

The biggest development, of course, was the entry of Robert Maxwell.
Despite Maxwell's overtures and tender offer, no Macmillan representative
ever attempted to negotiate with Maxwell. Instead, in Moore's story, "rep,
resentatives of Macmillan and KKR met to negotiate and finalize KKR's
buyout of the company. In this transaction Macmillan senior management
would receive up to 20% ownership in the newly formed company. "95
Now that a deal with KKR had been struck, Evans instructed
Macmillan's financial advisors to notify the
six remaining potential bidders, during September 7 and 8, that "the
process seems to be coming to a close" and that any bids for
Macmillan were due by Friday afternoon, September 9. It is particu,
larly noteworthy that Maxwell was given less than 24 hours to pre,
pare its bid, not having received this notification until the night of
September 8. 96
Against this background, the court then described the auction process
as one that was systematically corrupted by management and their invest,
ment bankers, and in which the special committee utterly failed in its task.
In the supreme court's opinion, like the chancery court's opinion, the court
describes the critical unauthorized tip to KKR and the other efforts made to
further KKR's bid.
In response to these failures , the supreme court (without addressing the
question of whether Evans' and Reilly's breaches of fiduciary duty likely
resulted in a lower price for shareholders) reversed the chancery court's
refusal to enjoin the lockup agreement with KKR, again using harsh lan,
guage to describe the behavior of the various participants:
Evans' and Reilly's conduct throughout was resolutely intended to
deliver the company to themselves in Macmillan I, and to their
94.
95 .
96.

Id. at 1 1 7 2 .
Id. a t 1 2 7 3 .
Id. Equally central to the supreme court's summary is that Evans, rather than the spe-

cial committee, seems to have been doing all the negotiating on behalf of Macmillan:
In a September 8 meeting with Robert Maxwell and his representatives, Evans
announced that the company 's management planned to recommend a management-KKR
leveraged buyout to the directors of Macmillan, and that he would not consider
Maxwell's outstanding offer despite Maxwell's stated claim that he would pay " top dol
lar" for the entire company.
Id.
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favored bidder, KKR, and thus themselves, in Macmillan II. The
board was torpid, if not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly
independent auction, free of Evans' interference and access to confi�
dential data. By placing the entire process in the hands of Evans,
through his own chosen financial advisors, with little or no board
oversight, the board materially contributed to the unprincipled
conduct of those upon whom it looked with a blind eye.97
Finally, the court invalidated the lockup granted to KKR , setting the stage
for M axwell's ultimate acquisition of Macmillan.
When grouped together, these three opinions in Macmillan establish
Evans and Reilly as among the villains of Delaware corporate law, with
Wasserstein as an archetype of the unprincipled investment banker. The
very language of the opinions proclaims its identity as a morality play:
"management's pej orative characterizations of the Bass group, even if hon�
estly believed , served more to propagandize the Board than to enlighten it" ;
"little more than a charade " ; "they chose to close their eyes "; "studied
avoidance of a reasonable investigation, in order to rely upon self�serving
conclusions without basis in fact" ; "offending qualities that exacerbate its
unreasonableness "; "domination of the allegedly ' independent' board by the
financially interested members of management, coupled with the directors'
evident passivity"; "tainted process " ; "Wasserstein falsely claimed " ;
"Wasserstein mistakenly assured" ; "clandestinely and wrongfully " ; "Evans '
and Reilly's deliberate concealment of material information"; "the board
was torpid, if not supine " ; " the unprincipled conduct of those upon whom
it looked with a blind eye " ; "fails all basic standards of fairness . "

Id. a t 1 2 7 9-80. The court goes o n to state:
It is clear that on July 14, 1 98 8 , the day that the Court of Chancery enjoined the
management-induced reorganization, and with B ass' $73 offer outstanding, Macmillan's
management met with KKR to discuss a management sponsored buyout. This was done
without prior board approval. By early September, Macmillan 's financial and legal advi
sors, originally chosen by Evans, independently constructed and managed the process by
which b ids for the company were solicited. Although the Macmillan board was fully
aware of its ultimate responsibility for ensuring the integrity of the auction, the directors
wholly delegated the creation and administration of the auction to an array of Evans'
hand-picked investment advisors. It is undisputed that Wasserstein, who was originally
retained as an investment advisor to Macmillan's senior management, was a principal, if
not the pnmary, "auctioneer" of the company. While it is unnecessary to hold that
Wasserstein lacked independence , or was necessarily "beholden" to management, it
appears that Lazard Freres, allegedly the investment advisor to the independent directors,
was a far more appropriate candidate to conduct this process on behalf of the board. Yet,
both the board and Lazard acceded to Wasserstein's, and through him Evans', primacy.
Id. at 1 28 1 .
97.
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And, if this were not enough, Evans and Reilly, as well as Macmillan's
general counsel , Beverly Chell , were charged by the SEC with violating
section 1 3 (d) of the Securities Exchange Act for filing a misleading disclo
sure regarding the ESOP established in connection with management's
buyout offer and to fend off other bids . All they disclosed was that the
ESOP plan was buying Macmillan shares 11 to allow participating employees
to acquire stock ownership interests in the company. " 98
Consider how Evans , Reilly, or Wasserstein felt when reading these
opinions. Consider how the members of the special committee , identified
by name in the opinion, 99 must have felt to be characterized as 11torpid , if
not supine" by the Delaware Supreme Court , 1 00 combined with the
equally strong terms used by the chancery court. Consider what it must be
like to live with such a public shaming, to see in acquaintances' eyes the
unasked question, 11How could you have stood by and allowed this to hap,
pen? " Imagine how other managers and directors , when they read or heard
about these opinions , felt about the prospect of being similarly pillor
ied . 101 Anecdotal evidence confirms what we all would expect: No one ,
including directors and officers of Delaware corporations , Wall Street
investment bankers , and Wall Street lawyers , enjoys being held up to this
sort of public condemnation.
Different people can be expected to be affected in different ways by
this sort of attention. Edward Evans seems to have retired from public life.
He does not serve as a director of any publicly traded company except for
Fansteel, a small metals firm largely owned by his family. 1 02 According to

(
)
\
....

l,
\

I
98. Kevin G. Salwen & David B. Hilder, Macmillan Officers Charged in Failure to Disclose
ESOP Was Takeover Defense, WALL ST. J . , Dec . 7 , 1 989, at A6.
99. "The Special Committee consisted of Lewis A. Lapham, an old college classmate of
Evans' father, (Chairman), James H. Knowles, Jr. , Dorsey A. Gardner, Abraham L. Gitlow and
Eric M. Hart. Hart failed to attend a single meeting of the Committee." Mills Acquisition Co . ,
5 5 9 A.2d at 1 2 68 n.9.
1 00. ld. at 1 2 80.
1 0 1 . See, e.g. , Cynthia Crossen & Karen B lumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal That Failed:
Macmillan Tried Many Defenses to Stop Suitors , WALL ST. J., Nov. 4 , 1988 , at B 1 [hereinafter
Crossen & B lumenthal , An Anti-Takeover Arsenal] (summarizing the Delaware Supreme Court's
criticism of Evans and Reilly); Cynthia Crossen & Karen B lumenthal, Macmillan, Inc.
Restructuring Blocked in Court, WALL ST. J . , July 1 5 , 1988, at 20 [hereinafter Crossen &
B lumenthal, Macmillan , Inc.] (summarizing the Delaware Chancery Court opiniOn in Macmillan 0 ;
David B . Hilder, As Wasserstein Perella Climbs to Top Rank, Criticism Grows, WALL ST. J . , Dec .
1 1 , 1 989, a t C 1 (summarizing the Delaware Supreme Court's criticism of Wasserstein m
Macmillan and the Delaware Chancery Court's criticism in Interco).
102. Fansteel Inc. Proxy Statement (Mar. 24, 1 995), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy
File, at •4 (noting that Edward Evans' father, T.M. Evans, owns 4 7 . 1 1 % of Fansteel). Edward
Evans 1s also a director of HBD Industries, Inc. , another firm controlled by his father. Id. ; Crane
Co. Proxy Statement (Mar. 1 5 , 1 995), available in LEXIS, Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at * 1 6 (not-

r
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their annual proxy statement, " [s] ince 1 989, E. P . Evans has engaged in
personal investments . " Moreover, forever more , Evans must disclose in
proxy statements that " [i] n December 1 989, Mr. E.P. Evans , without admit,
ting or denying any allegations contained in a complaint filed by the Secu,
rities and Exchange Commission, consented to the entry of final j udgment
of permanent injunction prohibiting him from violating Section 1 3 (d) of
the Exchange Act and Rules 1 3d, l and 1 3 d,2 thereunder. " 103
By contrast, William Reilly has maintained a higher profile, staying on
to run Macmillan for a year or so after the Maxwell buyout and then going
on to serve as Chairman and CEO of K,III, a high profile KKR leveraged
investment vehicle which he has built into a publishing conglomerate by
acquiring magazines from Rupert Murdoch and other media properties. 104
Reilly is also a director of FMC Corporation, a large, publicly held diversi,
fied chemicals company. 105
b . Fort Howard (August 8 , 1 988)

Macmillan I was decided July 14 , 1 988, by Vice Chancellor Jacobs.
Almost immediately thereafter, Chancellor Allen was presented with
another special committee in another management buyout case, this time
involving Fort Howard Corporation, a paper company. 106 Although, as
we will see , the participants behaved substantially better than those in
Macmillan, and Chancellor Allen did not enjoin the transaction, he did
severely criticize the performance of the special committee, providing
another cautionary tale for managers and directors involved in MBO trans,
actions .
The scene is, by now, an increasingly familiar one (for both the reader
and for the Delaware Chancery Court) . In the spring of 1 988, Fort
Howard's management, concerned that a temporarily depressed stock price
(post-October 1987) might lead it to be the target of an unfairly low and
perhaps coercive takeover attempt, began to meet with an investment
bank, Morgan Stanley, to discuss ways to elevate its stock price. Shortly

ing that HBD Industries is controlled by T.M. Evans).
1 03 . Fansteel Inc. Proxy Statement, supra note 1 02 , at *4.
1 04. See generally Patrick M. Reilly, Classroom Ruler: A KKR Vehicle Finds Profit and Education
a Rich but Uneasy Mix, WALL ST. J . , Oct. 1 2 , 1 994, at Al .
1 05 . K-Ill Communications Corp. Proxy Statement (April 2 4 , 1 996) , available in LEXIS,
Fedsec Library, Proxy File, at *4.
106. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.999 1 , 1 988 WL 8 3 1 47 (Del.
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion.
See id. at *2-*9.
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thereafter , Morgan Stanley presented various options, recommending a
leveraged buyout and indicating its interest in participating with senior
management in such a transaction. Subsequently, Fort Howard' s CEO
informed Morgan Stanley that he and others of the senior management
were interested in pursuing such a transaction. That same day, he met with
a friendly, veteran director. The CEO informed the director, a law school
classmate, that a special committee of the board would have to be formed
to consider the buyout proposal and that the CEO wanted that director to
serve as its chairman. They discussed other possible members of a special
committee and agreed on two others.
At the next board meeting, the CEO presented his "proposal to make
a proposal " to the board, and informed the board that Morgan Stanley and
the three management directors were interested in exploring an LBO of
Fort Howard . The management directors then left the meeting, and out,
side legal counsel guided the remaining directors through the adoption of
the necessary resolutions to appoint a special committee and to select out,
side legal counsel and a financial adviser. The membership of the special
committee was exactly as the CEO had suggested.
At its first meeting, the special committee made a determination to
keep the developments confidential. Peter Atkins, a partner at Skadden,
Arps , Slate , Meagher and Flom, and the committee's outside legal counsel,
advised that disclosure was not legally required at that time. In the absence
of advice that there was a legal obligation to disclose, the special committee
here, like the special committee in Restaurant Associates I, discussed earlier,
elected secrecy. 1 07 Meanwhile , the special committee retained First Bos,
ton as its financial adviser.
Subsequently, in the course of a meeting to review draft merger docu,
ments , a report of high trading volume was received. The volume indicated
that there had been a leak of information concerning the possibility of a
buyout. Again, the question of disclosure was raised. The special commit,
tee concluded that a press release should be issued, which Atkins drafted.
But after telephone discussions with the management group, which did not
want any press release, the special committee again agreed not to proceed.
The next day, after a telephone inquiry to the company about a rumored
management LBO in the works , Fort Howard finally issued a press release.
The special committee met over the next several days , and ultimately
accepted an offer from the management group without having actively

1 07 . As before, this reflected a preference for the company to remain independent if manage
ment could not finance an MBO at a "fair" price.
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solicited competing b ids. The special committee did, however, make clear
in the initial press releases that the company had the right to and would
entertain alternative proposals , and, furthermore, would cooperate with any
such person in the development of a competing bid. Within days of the
press release, eight inquiries were received.
First Boston, on instructions of the special committee, screened the
inquiries initially and provided each serious inquiry with all of the materials
that had been given to Morgan Stanley and First Boston. All eight were
provided with the materials but, ultimately, no other bidders entered the
fray.
Without doubt, the Fort Howard Special Committee performed more
effectively than the Macmillan committee. But, although the court did not
enj oin the transaction, it still found fault with the special committee's
performance:

[T]here are aspects [of the Special Committee's performance] that
supply a suspicious mind with fuel to feed its flame.
It cannot, for example, be the best practice to have the interested
CEO in effect handpick the members of the Special Committee as
was, I am satisfied, done here. Nor can it be the best procedure for
him to, in effect, choose special counsel for the committee as it
appears was done here. It is obvious that no role is more critical
with respect to protection of shareholder interests in these matters
than that of the expert lawyers who guide sometimes inexperienced
directors through the process. A suspicious mind is made uneasy
contemplating the possibilities when the interested CEO is so active
in choosing his adversary. The June 7 decision to keep the manage,
ment interest secret, in a sense, represents a decision to sell the
Company to management if it would pay a fair price, but not to
inquire whether another would pay a fair price if management would
not do so. It implies a bias that, while as explained below, I accept
as valid for purpose of this motion, nevertheless is a source of con,
cern to a suspicious mind. Similarly, the requested meeting between
First Boston and Morgan Stanley. For present purposes, I cannot
conclude that plaintiffs' reading of that affair will be shown to be
correct. But it is still odd for the Special Committee to risk infect,
ing the independence of the valuation upon which it would neces,
sarily place such weight, by requiring its expert to talk directly with
Morgan Stanley. And that risk is run for what can only be seen as a
minor benefit to the convenience of the individuals involved. So
there is ground for suspicion with respect to the good faith of the
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Special Committee, but, on balance, not such that seem at this stage
persuasive. 108

In refusing to draw any inference of bad faith, the court relied heavily
on the effectiveness of the limited market test in probing the market for
alternative possible transactions, and the wholehearted response to the
eight inquiries received.
What is most striking, here as before, is the way the court, without
enj oining the transaction, nonetheless makes clear that the behavior of the
special committee fell below the appropriate standard. Although the Fort
Howard committee did not behave as badly as the "torpid, if not supine"
committee in Macmillan, and although Fort Howard's management acted
better than Evans and Reilly did (by, for example, leaving the meeting after
announcing their interest in pursuing an LBO, and not tipping confidential
information during the bidding) , the relationship between management and
the special committee, and between their supposedly independent invest,
ment bankers, was nonetheless too cozy. The opinion made clear to the
planners of all future deals that the court expects a higher standard of behavior. 109
Fort Howard, 1 988 WL 8 3 1 47 , at * 1 2 .
At just about the same time, Chancellor Allen wrote a second opinion reviewing the
performance of a special committee in an MBO transaction. See In re Amsted Indus. Inc. Litig . ,
N o . CIV . A . 8224 , 1 988 WL 92736 {Del. Ch. Aug. 2 4 , 1 988). I n ruling on a settlement motion
(which Allen ultimately approved) , Allen expressed concern with how the special committee
performed:
The Committee was authorized to receive, review and evaluate the fairness of any such
LBO proposal and also to evaluate the fairness of any other acquisition proposal that
might be made by a third party. The Special Committee was, however, specifically
directed not to engage in a search for alternative transactions.
1 08 .
1 09 .

I conclude that the claims that could be made in this instance with regard to the
propriety of the process as it relates to securing the best available transaction are signifi
cantly stronger than those frequently encountered in transactions of this type. Impor
tantly here, the record discloses no active effort by the Special Committee to attempt to
shop the Company or to engage in an alternative form of proceeding designed to
encourage the emergence of an offer that would compete with the management
sponsored ESOP LBO transaction. Compare In re Fort Howard Corporation Share
holders Litigation, Del. Ch. C.A. No. 999 1 (August 8, 1 988) .
. . . The board relied upon the investment banker who was of the view that the tax
advantages that the ESOP enjoyed permitted it to pay a price higher than that which a
non-tax advantaged buyer would be able to pay. If the investment b anker was correct
about that, the price offered was the highest available. But where the transaction is so
important to the shareholders as this one was, the question does arise, "why did the
mdependent Committee of the board-if it was motivated in good faith to achieve the
best transaction for the shareholders-not check that opinion by shopping the Company,
or at least negotiating for a period in which it could publicly encourage any interested
party to come forward?" I discount the defendants' position that the market had been
fully, though passively, checked.
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Why might this be influential? If the court does not punish at time
one , why should people feel that there is a higher standard at time two?
First, such an opinion puts actors on notice that higher standards are liable
to be applied to future deals, perhaps because of a notion that the court let
the present deal go through because of insufficient precedent. Second, to
the extent that actors internalize the articulated standard , they may well
change their behavior irrespective of whether or not they face personal
liability. Third, the criticism signals that the court will not subsequently
grant a defendant 's motion to dismiss, thereby substantially increasing the
settlement value of a case.
c. R]R Nabisco (January 3 1 , 1 989)
The lessons of Fort Howard, it appears , were immediately taken to
heart in the next big deal , the biggest LBO of all time, the buyout of RJR

Amsted, 1988 WL 92736, at *3, *7 .

Chancellor Allen had another case involving the performance of a special committee in the
context of a parent subsidiary merger around the same time. See In re TWA, Inc . Shareholders
Litig., No. CIV.A.9844, 1 988 WL 1 1 1 2 7 1 (Del. Ch. Oct. 2 1 , 1 988). Consistent with his opin
ions in Fort Howard and Amsted, he preached about how a special committee should behave:
First, as pointed out above, the directors did not seem to understand that their duty was
to strive to negotiate the highest or best available transaction for the shareholders whom
they undertook to represent. Second, it is not clear that Dillon Read itself thought its
responsibility was to push for the best available price rather than one it could regard as
falling within a range of fairness.
. . . Third, Dillon Read never brought its various analyses down to a single range of
value for TWA shares . . . . Thus, the special committee was not apprised whether Dillon
Read, had it forced itself through the analytical step between the analysis it did and the
opinion it expressed, would have regarded the price offered as at the lowest edge of a
broad range of arguably fair prices, or at some other position on such a scale . That infor
mation would be quite pertinent to a negotiator who understood that a "fair price" is
always an arguable point on a range; who understood that, while a self-dealing fiduciary
must offer a "fair" price, minority shareholders-particularly where a majority of minority
voting provision is employed-have no obligation to accept a price that falls within some
range of fair prices; and, who sought not merely to bless a transaction that a banker was
willing to call fair, but who sought to negotiate the highest possible price. But the
special committee in this case, appearing to reflect a complacency referable to an imper
fect appreciation of the proper scope and purpose of such a special committee , did not
ask its advisor to express a view about a range of fair value for TWA shares held by the
minority shareholders.
Id. at *4- *5 . Based on these findings, the court declined to permit the presence of a special
committee to result in the application of the business judgment rule. On the contrary, finding
that the " special committee did not supply an accep(able surrogate for the energetic, informed
and aggressive negotiation that one would reasonably expect from an arm's length adversary," id.
at * 7 , the court held that the defendants would bear the burden of establishing entire fairness at
trial.
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Nabisco. 1 1 0 Luck , and a very small community, resulted in Peter Atkins
again representing the special committee, and this time the committee
performed in an exemplary fashion. We will never know whether he did so
because of a desire to avoid criticism, to ensure that the deal withstood
scrutiny, or a bit of both. 1 1 1
On October 1 9 , 1 98 8 , at an RJR board meeting, F . Ross Johnson,
RJR's president and CEO, informed the board that he and a management
group were seeking to develop a transaction to take the company private in
a leveraged buyout, and suggested a price of $75 per share . Charles Hugel,
chairman of RJR' s board but not an officer of the company, had some
advance notice that this subject would be brought up, and had invited
Peter Atkins to be present. On October 20, the very next day, the board
issued a press release announcing the proposed transaction and the appoint,
ment of a special committee, with Hugel as chairman. The special commit,
tee immediately retained two financial advisors, Dillon Read (the
company's regular investment banker) and Lazard Freres , as well as Mr.
Atkins' firm , Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher and Flom.
The contrast between Fort Howard and RJR Nabisco is sharp . In Fort
Howard, the management group handpicked the special committee and its
advisors. Here , the chairman of the board, apparently on his own initia,

1 10. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig . , No. CIV.A. 1 0389 , 1 989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9
(Feb. 1 4 , 1 989). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See
id. at * 1 2-* 3 5 .
1 1 1 . See DeMott, supra note 2 2 , a t 3 4 . I n their book o n the RJR Nab isco buyout, Bryan
Burrough and John Helyar quote the lawyer who represented F. Ross Johnson, when he heard
that Peter Atkins had been chosen to represent the special committee, as saying "Oh God":
Goldstone groaned when he heard Hugel had brought along Atkins. Until that moment
he had held out some hope the board wouldn' t disclose Johnson's presentation that
night, giving the management group a chance to finish its negotiations in secrecy. Now
he knew that an announcement was all but certain.
The clincher was Atkins's past . . . . Atkins had been selected to advise Fort
Howard by the company's chief executive, the man making the bid, a fact that troubled
the court and called into question Atkins's actions in favor of secrecy. "It is obvious
that no role is more critical with respect to protection of shareholder interests in these
matters than that of the expert lawyers who guide sometimes inexperienced directors
through the process," the court said. "A suspicious mind is made uneasy contemplating
the possibilities when the interested CEO is so active in choosing his adversary ."
Atkins's choice of secrecy, the judge nored, was "a source of concern to a suspicious
mind. "
The opinion all b u t accused Atkins o f selling o u t his neutrality t o a buyout group.
Goldstone guessed he was still stinging from the rebuke. J ack Nusbaum concurred. "It
was clear Atkins was going to b e living down Fort Howard , " Nusbaum recalled. "We
figured he was going to be holier than Caesar's wife . "
BRYAN B URROUG H & jOHN HELYAR , BARBARIANS AT THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO
18 1-82 (1 990).

Saints and Sinners

105 5

rive, brought i n outside counsel at the first indication of a management
buyout. In Fort Howard, the special committee deferred to the manage,
ment group's desire for secrecy and did not make any disclosure, even after
a report of unusual trading volume indicated a leak of information, until a
rumor of a management buyout left them no choice. By contrast, here full
disclosure of the possible management buyout was made the very next day,
effectively broadcasting the message that the company was for sale.
Within four days , KKR informed the special committee that it was
planning to make an offer to acquire RJR at $90 per share in cash and
securities, and, on October 27 , commenced a tender offer. Thereafter, the
special committee acted as auctioneer, issuing a press release announcing
that it was interested in receiving proposals to acquire the company. Again
there is a stark contrast with Fort Howard, in which the committee did not
take any steps to solicit competing bids until after it had reached an agree,
ment with the management group.
Ultimately, three bids were made by the deadline, and, in the ensuing
auction rounds , the price escalated from Johnson's initial suggestion of $75
per share, past KKR's opening bid of $90 per share, to KKR's ultimately
successful bid of around $ 1 1 0 per share in cash and securities. The special
committee was so independent of the management group that, in the share,
holders' class action that was brought, plaintiffs were put in the position of
arguing that the special committee was " inappropriately motivated to repu,
diate, and more importantly, to be seen publicly as repudiating the
Company's management. " 1 1 2 To avoid being tarred by the public criti,
cism directed at the management group, it was essential to the special
committee that KKR win, or so the plaintiffs argued.
The court focused on the special committee's conduct of the
auction-applying the supreme court's Macmillan holding-and concluded
that the committee acted in good faith and with due care in ending the
auction when it did, without returning to the bidders for one more round of
bids as plaintiffs argued they should have done. 1 1 3 But the core of the
case seems to lie in the independence of the committee from the start.
Unlike the committees in Macmillan or Fort Howard, this was not a com,
mittee that could supply a suspicious mind with fuel to feed its flame.
When RJR Nabisco is placed next to Macmillan and Fort Howard, we
see several things. First, we see a detailed example of how an effective
special committee behaves in a management buyout transaction. Second,
1 12 .
1 13.

R]R Nabisco , 1 989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9 , at *6.
Id. at *65-*66.
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we see graphic evidence of how conduct seems to be shaped by Delaware
opinions , even when the plaintiffs "lose , " as they did in the Fort HOOJard
preliminary inj unction motion. Peter Atkins ' performance in Fort HOOJard
received a negative review from the most important of the critics , the Dela,
ware Chancery Court. He had an opportunity to try again two months
after his bad review, and he took that opportunity, leading one reviewer of
Barbarians at the Gate: The Fall of R]R Nabisco to characterize Atkins as one
of the book's few heroes . 1 14 Finally, when you put together the strongly
negative portrayal of managers and directors in Macmillan, the somewhat
less negative, but still negative, portrayal in Fort Howard, and the very
positive portrayal in RJR Nabisco, you have a pretty clear set of guideposts
for how managers and directors in management buyout transactions should
behave.
In retrospect , the lessons may seem obvious. But at the time , the
norms were substantially less clear. What led the directors astray in
Macmillan and Fort Howard was a lack of clarity with respect to their roles .
Were they to represent the interests of shareholders actively? Were they to
facilitate the managers ' buyout so long as the price was within the "range of
fairness " ? Were they to protect managers and perhaps shareholders from a
hostile tender offer in the event that managers could not finance a buyout
at a price within the range of fairness? Up until the Macmillan, Fort
HOOJard, R]R Nabisco trilogy, there were relatively few and relatively vague
guideposts . After these cases , the norms became fairly clear, sufficiently so
that managers and directors who , by and large, were trying to do the right
thing had sufficient guidance to figure out what the right thing was .

6.

Other Important Stories

The Macmillan, Fort Howard, R]R Nabisco trilogy went a long way
towards describing the norms of conduct in management buyout transac,
tions. At this point, the style of the Delaware courts' opinions changed
somewhat, leaning towards the confident application of reasonably well,
established norms , with less need to articulate those norms explicitly
through the detailed narratives of the earlier cases.

1 1 4.

Thomas ] . Andre, Jr. , Barbarians at the Gate: The FaU of R]R Nabisco, 5 9 U. CrN. L.

REV. 479 ( 1 990) (book review).
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a. In re Amsted Industries Inc. Litigation ( 1 986- 1 989)
The Amsted Industries 1 1 5 litigation . provided another opportunity for
the courts to articulate norms of conduct, although it was complicated
somewhat by the fact that the review of management's behavior was in the
context of whether to approve settlement of a class action. 1 1 6 Here, as in
cases like Fort Howard, one finds the court refusing to set aside the transac,
tion at the same time that it expresses grave reservations about the behav,
ior of the board . 1 17
b. In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litigation ( 1 989)
The Formica Corporation was created in a management buyout of a
division of a large conglomerate. 1 18 Two years after the original buyout,
the company went public. Then, two years after its IPO, management, in
the wake of some vague threats of a hostile takeover, thought that it might
make sense to go private again. Management ultimately decided to try an
MBO and informed the board that it planned to make an offer at $ 1 8 per
share. Here , Vice Chancellor Jacobs shows us another example of an effec,
tive special committee chair, Stephen Bershad , a former investment
banker. Bershad rej ected management's desire to rely on an investment
bank valuation in place of a market test, arguing that " whatever might be
the merits of investment banker,generated analytic models, only the mar,
ketplace could determine Formica's real value, and that value would not be
known unless the company was shopped . " 1 1 9 Moreover, Bershad drove a
tough bargain in negotiating a breakup fee and expense reimbursement
arrangement that would be sufficient to assure that management's MBO bid

1 1 5 . In re Amsted Indus. Inc Litig., No. CIV.A.8224, 1 988 WL 927 36 (Del. Ch. Aug. 2 4 ,
1 988).
1 1 6. For discussions of the difficulties that a court has in evaluating the strength of a case in
the context of a settlement, see, for example, John C. Coffee, Jr. , Understanding the Plaintiff's
Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and
Derivative Actions , 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 669 ( 1 986); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. , The Settlement Black
Box, 75 B.U. L. REV. 1 257 (1995); Jack B. Weinstein & Karin S. Schwartz, Notes from the Cave:
Some Problems of judges in Dealing with Class Action Settlements , 163 F.R.D. 369 (1995).
1 1 7 . See supra note 1 09.
1 1 8. In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig . . No. CIV.A. 10598, 1 989 WL 258 1 2 (Del. Ch.
Mar. 2 2 , 1 989). The factual account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See
id. at * l-*7 .
1 19. Id. at *6.
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would remain in place while the company shopped , but not so big as to
deter other bidders. 120
Here, unlike in Macmillan, Jacobs concluded that the special commit,
tee could be relied upon. Moreover, the language of his opinion has the
confidence and clarity that comes from having decided several similar
cases. 121
But, although the committee performed well, the court did not miss
the opportunity to criticize some features of the structure used. In particu,
lar, Vice Chancellor Jacobs noted that permitting the CEO to explore the
company's strategic alternatives when he was actively considering an MBO
and employing an investment banker with ties to management to represent
the special committee were inappropriate. The court found that it would
have been preferable (though not required) to assign the tasks to uncon,
flicted parties .
c. Braunschweiger

v.

American Home Shield Corp . ( 1 989)

The American Home Shield case , decided in the fall of 1 989, 1 22 shows
a similar familiarity with accepted approaches by the court, but not yet by
the parties . Although Chancellor Allen did not grant a preliminary inj unc,
tion, because he believed both that it would not be in the interests of the
shareholders (for fear that no higher bid would be forthcoming) and that

120. For example , negotiations hit a stumbling block with regard to expense reimbursement:
management's investment banker would not agree to any cap. Again the special committee
proved its independence: "A press release rejecting the proposal and authorizing Shearson to
shop the company was prepared and circulated, but ultimately, the investor group relented and
agreed to a $5.5 million cap on reimbursable expenses. " Id. at * 7 .
1 2 1 . Vice Chancellor Jacobs wrote:
[T]his case is not one (as plaintiffs suggest) where an acquisition proposal materializes out
of nowhere, and unknowledgeable directors are hastily impressed into "special commit
tee" service, but given no adequate time or resources to discharge their duties. Here , the
process that eventually resulted in the management LBO proposal began when Glazer
first surfaced in August, 1 98 8 . The independent directors, most notably Messrs. Bershad,
Dunphy, and Cruickshank, were actively and knowledgeably involved in that process
from that time forward. They carried out their duties in "hands on" fashion, indepen
dently of Mr. Langone, in their capacities as directors, and later, as the Special Commit
tee. During that period, those d irectors had to and did, make certain judgments. And
while certain of those judgments arguably might be subj ect to criticism, the evidence
does not support a conclusion that they were made without appropriate due care.

ld. at * 10.
122. Braunschweiger v . American Home Shield Corp . , No. CIV.A. 1075 5 , 1 98 9 WL 1 2 85 7 1
(Del. Ch. Oct. 26, 1 989) .
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monetary damages would be adequate , h e harshly criticized the defendants ,
sending a strong signal to them that summary j udgment would not be
granted and that they faced significant exposure in a full trial :

There is surely room to litigate the claims asserting that the direc,
tors , in whose hands consideration of the ServiceMaster proposal was
placed, failed to inform themselves adequately of what opportunities
or alternatives were available to the Company if a cash out merger
was to be negotiated and recommended to the shareholders . . . .
Here, while there had earlier been inquiry by the Company's man,
agement of available finance,oriented deals, it is not apparent that
any serious check was done to uncover potential strategic buyers
either before announcement of the acceptance of ServiceMaster's
proposal or after it. 123
Subsequently, after shareholders approved the transaction, the court
denied defendants' motion for summary j udgment because , the court held,
defendants ' disclosures to shareholders were insufficient, thereby undermin,
ing any effect a shareholder vote might have. 124
d. Restaurant Associates II ( 1 990)
By 1 989, then, the really interesting part of the story is over. The
norms of conduct for MBOs , although not reduced or reducible to a set of
"safe harbor" rules , nonetheless are sufficiently well mapped out such that
informed and experienced counsel should know how to guide the board and
the special committee through an MBO transaction. From the courts'
perspective, the general norms are pretty clear, even if they have not
reached all of the parties , especially managers of smaller companies not
advised by the core group of corporate law firms . Not surprisingly, the
courts ' view of appropriate behavior evolved over the period during which
the norms were formulated. This becomes clear when one returns to the

1 2 3 . Id. at *6.
1 24 . Additional MBO cases from this period include In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litigation,
No. CIV.A. 1 0 2 7 8 , 1 988 WL 1 16448 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1 , 1 988) (denying motion for preliminary
injunction), In re KDI Corp. Shareholders Litigation, No. CIV.A. 1027 8 , 1 990 WL 2 0 1 385 (Del.
Ch. Dec. 1 3 , 1 990) (granting defendants' motion to dismiss); Roberts 11. General Instrument Corp. ,
No. CIV.A. 1 1 639, 1 990 WL 1 1 8356 (Del. Ch. Aug. 1 3 , 1 990) (denying motion for preliminary
injunction); and Norberg 11. Young's Market Co . , No. CIV.A. 1 1 208 , 1 1 2 5 3 , 1 98 9 WL 1 5 5 462
(Del. Ch. Dec. 1 9 , 1 989) (denying motion for preliminary injunction).

1 060

44 UCLA LAW REVIEW 1 009 ( 1 997)

second act of Restaurant Associates, 1 2 5 which had been one of the very
early MBO cases to result in an opinion.
To recall briefly, in Restaurant Associates I, 1 2 6 the court seemingly
had been very impressed with the strength and independence of the special
committee. In the first opinion, the court recounted how the special com,
mittee, despite obstacles by the managers who controlled forty,eight percent
of the votes , went so far as to propose dilution of management's votes in
order to encourage a competing bidder to offer a better deal for share,
holders . Ultimately, no bid was forthcoming and even management's b id
was withdrawn after the October 1 987 market crash.
But now, three years later, the court had a more refined sense of appr0'
priate behavior. The managers and the special committee after the market
crash promptly renegotiated the price downwards from $ 1 8 per share to
$ 1 4. 25 per share. In refusing to dismiss the plaintiffs ' claims against the
outside directors , the court found fault in the committee's failure to shop
the company:

While the special committee has no per se duty to shop the com,
pany, it did have a duty to proceed reasonably to maximize share,
holder value. The plaintiffs, in alleging that the special committee
did not shop the company and agreed to the sale of the company at a
point in time, immediately following the October 1987 market
break, when its stock price was particularly depressed {and given
what preceded that agreement) have alleged circumstances that, if
true, might support a conclusion that the special committee did not
act reasonably. 127
C.

What Is the Delaware Standard Governing MBOs ?

Can the Delaware MBO cases be reduced to a reasonably predictable
standard or rule ? Can one provide an algorithm to figure out what the
courts will do? If so, what does it look like? This Article argues that, col,
lectively, the cases do provide such guidance, but in a distinctive way that
differs fundamentally from the rule,based view.

1 2 5 . Freedman v . Restaurant Assocs. Indus. , No. CIV.A.92 1 2 , 1 990 WL 1 3 5 92 3 (Del. Ch.
Sept. 2 1 , 1 990) . The factual account is drawn from the Chancery Court opinion. See id. at
*2-*3.
1 2 6 . Freedman v . Restaurant Assocs. Indus. , No, CIVA.92 1 2 . 1 987 WL 1 43 2 3 (Del. Ch.
Oct. 1 6 , 1 987).
1 27 . Freedman , 1 990 WL 1 35 9 2 3 , at *8.
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Consider a plausible substantive candidate for a rule governing
MBOs: 1 2 8 Managers may buy the company if and only if independent
directors have auctioned the company and managers submit the highest
bid. Although a plausible rule, this is clearly not Delaware law. It is clear,
for example, that the special committee need not auction the company
before selling the company to management; a post,agreement "market test"
is sometimes enough. 1 2 9 Moreover, directors may sometimes sell the com,
pany for less than the highest bid, if other factors make the lower bid more
attractive (e.g. , less uncertainty) . 1 30 Moreover, directors may, under cer,
tain circumstances, decide not to sell the company at all . 1 3 1 In other
words , the submission by managers of the highest b id in an auction of the
company is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for buying the
company.
Now consider the standard as articulated by Vice Chancellor Jacobs in
the relatively late case of In re Formica Corp . : 1 32

In any transaction where corporate management seeks to acquire the
equity interest owned by the public shareholders , a conflict of inter,
est is inherent. Management's personal motivation as a potential
buyer is to pay as little as possible. Management's duty as a fiduciary
is to obtain the highest available value for the stockholders. See
Revlon, Inc.

v.

MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings , Inc. , Del. Supr. , 506

A.2d 1 73 ( 1 986); In Re: Trans World Airlines, Inc. Shareholders Litig. ,

Because of
that inherent conflict, the responsibility to represent the share,
holders' interests adequately falls upon the independent directors,
who must exercise the utmost good faith and the appropriate degree
of care to assure "the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary prin,
ciples of fairness in the conduct of an auction for the sale of the
corporate enterprise. " Mills Acquisition, Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. ,
Del. Ch. , C.A. No. 9844, Allen, C. (October 2 1 , 1 988) .

1 2 8 . Another plausible candidate would be per se prohibition, as advocated by Brudney and
Chirelstein. See supra note 26. fu the cases show, that is clearly not the rule that developed in
Delaware.
1 29 . See, e.g. , In re Formica Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A. 10598, 1 98 9 WL 258 1 2
(Del. Ch. Mar. 2 2 , 1 989); In re Fort Howard Corp . Shareholders Litig . , No. CIV.A.999 1 , 1988
WL 8 3 1 47 (Del. Ch. Aug. 8, 1 988).
1 30. See, e.g. , In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig. , No. CIV.A. 10389, 1 98 9 Del. Ch.
LEXIS 9 (Feb. 1 4 , 1 989); West Point-Pepperell, Inc. v. J.P. Stevens & Co. (In re J . P . Stevens &
Co. Shareholders Litig.), 542 A. 2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1 988) .
1 3 1 . Paramount Communications, Inc. v . Time Inc., 57 1 A.2d 1 1 40 (Del. 1 990) .
1 3 2 . Formica, 1 989 WL 2 5 8 1 2 .
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Del. Supr. , Nos. 4 1 5 and 4 1 6 , Consol . , Moore, J. (Bench Ruling,
Nov. 2 , 1988, Opinion Pending) . 1 33

This summary, while on its face vague, is reasonably clear to those
who have read the underlying cases , including those specifically cited. In
conj unction with those cases, it provides substantial guidance on how to
structure a management buyout transaction. A special committee should
be established to negotiate with management and third parties. The special
committee should retain its own investment bankers and legal counsel. In
establishing the special committee, counsel should make sure that the
managers do not appoint the members or their investment banker. The
special committee should issue a press release announcing that management
has made a bid and should be forthcoming in providing information to
prospective bidders for control. If third parties enter the contest, the spe,
cial committee should behave in an evenhanded manner and should not
favor the management group. In any event, the special committee should
test the market, although it need not conduct an auction, to see if compet,
ing offers are reasonably likely to be available.
Jacobs' summary is a summary, not a standard. The narratives are not
the scaffolding-the investigative process-by which the norm is con,
structed, which can then be jettisoned once the standard is formed and
articulated. On the contrary, the articulated "standard" does nothing more
than stand in for the cases: The narratives it summarizes are the content of
the norm. 134 In the application of the standard-at least by a court, if not
by the actor himself-the narratives become critical in characterizing the
new fact pattern and extending the legal norm to a new situation.
Indeed, this interpretation is the only way to explain the coexistence
of the typically open,textured and extremely vague statement of the legal
norm under Delaware law (in an MBO, " independent directors, . . . must
exercise the utmost good faith and the appropriate degree of care to assure
'the most scrupulous adherence to ordinary principles of fairness in the
conduct of an auction for the sale of the corporate enterprise"') 13 5 and the
reasonable predictability of Delaware outcomes that is essential to business
planners. It is only if the statement is a summary that stands in for the set
1 3 3 . Id. at * 1 0.
1 34 . This view of Delaware fiduciary duty law is consistent with (but does n o t require) the
more general claim that standards can only be articulated through narrative.
1 3 5 . Formica, 1 989 WL 258 1 2 , at * 1 0 (quoting Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc.,
5 5 9 A. 2d 1 2 6 1 , 1 2 85 (Del. 1 989)).
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of cases that constitute the norm-with the guidance being provided by
those cases , with all their factual specificity-that there could be sufficient
certainty.
Confusion emerges in several situations: First, when there are too few
cases from which to triangulate the norm; second, when a player confuses
the summary with the constitutive narratives ; third, when a player inter,
prets the cases as establishing a substantive safe harbor, rather than
explicating a conduct norm.
D.

Summary

The preceding study of the Delaware MBO cases shows that the stan,
dards governing MBOs evolved through the incremental description of
good and bad performances by managers . The overall doctrinal structure
was unchanged throughout: From the beginning to the end, cases were
analyzed either under the rubric of the "business j udgment rule" or the
"entire fairness standard , " with an occasional reference to the intermediate
Unocal test. At no point does the court ever say: "This is how you must do
MBOs . " Nor does the court ever say, " If you do MBOs this way, then we
will leave you alone. "
It is arguable that this fact,intensive, heavily normative narrative style
is characteristic of all common law adj udication. It is likewise arguable that
this style is , at least, characteristic of all standards. At the least, this seems
to be the characteristic style of Delaware fiduciary duty case law.
This descriptive claim raises further questions. First, how do the narra,
tives reach their ultimate audience, and in what form do they do so? This
is the subject of the next Part. Second, if I am right as a descriptive mat,
ter, what are the implications for corporate law? That is the subj ect of Part
IV .
II.

TRACES OF THE TRANSMISSION O F NORMS: THE CASE OF

MBOs

The central hypothesis of this Article is that a large part of what the
Delaware courts do is tell stories as a way of articulating and expressing
norms , as a way of giving content to the amorphous and highly contextual
concepts of "good faith, " " independence , " "due care, " and "fair dealing. "
If this is correct, then one would predict that these stories would make
their way out into the relevant community. There are two primary hypoth,
eses for how the norms might be transmitted. First, the stories themselves
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might be transmitted directly to the target audience (directors and officers) ,
either in detail or in summary form. Second, the stories may be digested by
an intermediary, Delaware corporate lawyers , who then apply the norms
without actually telling the stories to the clients. 1 36 In this Part, I exam,
ine some of the evidence of the public and semipublic manifestations of the
transmissions of norms . I find some evidence of both sorts of mechanisms
at work. This evidence is drawn from a number of genres , including the
community's newspapers , the Wall Street Journal and the New York Law
Journal, Delaware j udges' extraj udicial speeches and articles , and finally a
popular but little studied genre of legal literature, the "memoranda to our
clients" sent by leading law firms to their clients.
A.

Newspaper Accounts

As one would expect, Delaware cases are covered by the maj or busi,
ness press. With regard to the MBO cases , one finds that although the
early and minor cases receive no more than passing mention, 1 37 the
maj or , high,profile cases generate substantial coverage that focuses on what
one would expect a priori, the dramatic clash of egos and the emergence of
heroes and especially villains. 138 In these articles, one finds the broad,
casting of the stories told by the Delaware opinions, pitched at a somewhat
higher rhetorical level and with supplemental reporting.

1 3 6. A failure to discover any evidence of transmission of these stories is therefore ambigu
ous. One explanation of such a lack of evidence would be that, while my hypothesis might be
correct as a description of what the Delaware courts do, there has been a breakdown in communi
cation that results in the stories not being transmitted to their intended audience. Secondly, it
could be that counsel digests the stories and transmits advice, but not the stories. Finally, my
hypotheses for how Delaware corporate law works may be incorrect.
1 3 7 . See, e.g. , Formica Corp . , WALL ST. J . , Apr. 1 4 , 1 989, at C 1 5 ; Formica Corp . : Data Has
Been Received by 15 Interested Parties , WALL ST. ] . , Mar. 1 6 , 1 989, at Cl 3 ; Formica Corp. Enters
Confidentiality Pacts with Third Parties, WALL ST. ] . , Feb. 2 3 , 1 989, at A6; Formica Corp. : Potential
B idders Total 70; 7 Sign Confidentiality Pacts, WALL ST. ] . , Feb. 2 7 , 1 989, at A4; ServiceMaster
L P . , WALL ST. ] . , Apr. 2 5 , 1 989, at B4.
1 3 8 . See, e .g. , Crossen & Blumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal, supra note 1 0 1 , a t B 1 ; John
Helyar & Bryan Burrough, The R]R Nabisco Takeover-Buy-Out Bluff: How Underdog KKR Won
R]R Nabisco Without Highest Bid, WALL ST. J . , Dec. 2 , 1 98 8 , at A 1 ; Hilder, supra note 1 0 1 ,
at C 1 .
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The Early Cases

Of the early cases , the two that received the most attention were Becor
Westem 1 39 and ]. P. Stevens . 1 40 In Becor Western, management's MBO
bid was reported on February 1 8 , 1 987 , putting the world on notice that
Becor was in play. 1 4 1 By June 1 987 , the Journal reported that " [i] n the
past five months, no fewer than five bids have been made for Becor. 11 1 42
Management's bid, according to analysts quoted in the article, "was gener,
11
ally perceived to be low. 1 43 And, according to an arbitrager quoted,
"Management was trying to steal the company for bottom dollar, and with
the amount of exposure these deals have caused, they won't be able
4
to. 11 14 Subsequent coverage by the Journal showed the board acting as an
auctioneer, 1 45 and ultimately accepting management's bid. 1 46 The only
significant mention of the Delaware courts came in the report of the com,
pletion of the takeover by the management bid , which was conditioned on
the settlement of the class action shareholder suit in the Delaware
Chancery Court. 1 47
The battle for J.P. Stevens , which involved an active bidding contest
for a larger, better,known company with prices escalating sharply, com,

1 3 9 . Shingala v . Becor Western Inc . , No. CIV.A.885 8 , 1 988 WL 7 3 90 (Del. Ch. Feb. 3 ,
1 988) .
1 40. In re J.P. Stevens Shareholder Litig . , 5 4 2 A.2d 7 7 0 (Del. Ch. 1 988). National Medical
Care and Shoe,Town were also covered. See National Medical Care Holder Sues to Block Company 's
Purchase, WALL ST. J . , Aug. 2 2 , 1 984, at 3 3 ; Shoe-Town Inc. : Court Declines to Block Acquisition
by Managers, WALL ST. J . , Jan. 20, 1 988, at 7 .
1 4 1 . Alex Kotlowitz, Becor Western Buyout to Total $238. 1 Million, WALL ST. J . , Feb. 1 8 ,
1 987 , a t 1 6 .
1 42. Michael J. McCarthy, Becor Western's Cash Stockpil.e Helps Lure Would-Be Acquirers
Offering Creative Deals, WALL ST. ]. , June 2 6 , 1 987 , at 45 .
1 4 3 . Id.
1 44 . Id.
1 45 . See, e.g. , Becor Slates July 9 as Bid Deadline, Sets Valuation Guidelines, WALL ST. J . , June
2 9 , 1 987 , at 1 0; Becor Western Board to Study Latest Bids at Meeting Thursday , WALL ST. J . , July
1 3 , 1 987 , at 1 2 .
146. See Becor Western Inc. Accepts Bid by Group Led by Management, WALL ST. J . , July 20,
19 87 , a t 9 .
1 47 . B-E Holdings Buys Concern, WALL ST. J . , Feb. 5 , 1 98 8 , availabl.e in 1 988 WL 48 1 1 7 6.
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manded more attention. But again the proceedings in the Delaware courts
did not figure prominently in the press reports. There was passing mention
of the litigation accusing the directors of breaching their fiduciary duties (in
agreeing to sell the company to Odyssey Partners) and seeking to block the
merger and force the company to tum over confidential information to
other bidders. 1 48 Such references, however, were vastly overshadowed by
the corporate maneuvering.
2.

The Formative Cases

By contrast, the opinions of the Delaware courts figure much more
prominently in the formative cases of Macmillan , Fort Howard, and R]R

Nabisco.
a. Macmillan
Here , not only did the Journal report the scheduling of potentially
determinative hearings , 1 49 the Journal also found Vice Chancellor Jacob's
view of the actors ' behavior to be newsworthy:

In granting the restraining order, Judge Jacobs bluntly described the
impact the plan could have on shareholders. If the plan were found
to be a breach of directors' fiduciary duty, it would cause "irreparable
damage to Macmillan shareholders, " he said. Not only would the
restructuring change the company's capital and corporate structure,
he wrote, it "would adversely affect the quality of the shareholders '
investment and prevent or drastically reduce {their) opportunity to
realize greater value for their shares than is being afforded by the
restructuring . . . . " Noting the judge's terms, two persons in the
Macmillan camp were downbeat. Said one: "The flavor of the order
was more negative than we would have liked. " 150
But still the account pays little attention to the details of the story Jacobs
told, as opposed to the effect and tone of his decision. 1 5 1
1 48 . See, e.g. , Ed Bean, PeppereU Ufts Bid for Stevens to $ 1 . 1 4 BiUion, WALL ST. J . , Mar. 25 ,
1 988, at 4; PeppereU Begins $ 1 . 1 1 BiUion Offer For ].P. Stevens, WALL ST. J . , Mar . 2 8 , 1 98 8 , at 20.
1 49. See, e.g. , Hearing to Reopen Today on MacmiUan Revamping, WALL ST. J . , June 1 0 , 1 98 8 ,
at 29 ( " A vice chancellor i n the Delaware Chancery Court will reconvene a hearing at 1 0 a.m.
EDT today to decide whether Macmillan Inc.'s restructuring should be halted.") .
1 50. Johnnie L . Roberts, MacmiUan's Bid to Restructure is Dealt Setback, WALL ST. J . , June 1 3 ,
1 988, a t 2 2 .
1 5 1 . See Crossen & B lumenthal, MacmiUan, Inc. , supra note 1 0 1 , at 20 (" [i]n a sometimes
harshly worded decision").
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It was only after the shooting was over that a more detailed account
was presented of the Macmillan story. Thus, in the wake of the Delaware
Supreme Court' s opinions that invalidated the board's attempt to favor the
management group, the Journal gave a fuller account of the whole story,
tracking the narrative given by the Delaware courts. 15 2 The Journal, like
the courts , vilified " Edward P. Evans , Macmillan's proud and stubborn
chairman and chief executive officer. " 15 3
The Delaware courts' criticism of Bruce Wasserstein, management's
investment banker, likewise found its way into a front page article. 15 4
Here , the reporters focused on both the courts ' criticism of the opinion
Wasserstein gave that Maxwell's bid was inadequate, 155 and Wasserstein's
handling of the final bidding contest in which Evans tipped KKR .
b. R]R Nabisco
The battle for RJR Nabisco-the biggest LBO of all time-of course
received the most press attention, yielding countless articles and a book.
But in these accounts , the focus shifted to the special committee's striking
independence from the management group . 156 This same perspective was
also reflected in the book that the Journal reporters subsequently wrote. 15 7
3.

Summary

The Wall Street Journal accounts , then, focus primarily on those few,
high,profile deals that are newsworthy. Moreover, the Journal seems to play
a prominent role in broadcasting the stories only in those few cases when a
judge actually stops a deal or threatens to stop it. The nuances of critical
judicial commentary unaccompanied by an inj unction are lost. But when
the Journal does get interested, as in the Macmillan or R]R Nabisco cases , its
prominence and additional reporting amplify the volume of criticism from
the Delaware court. As one experienced Wall Street transactional lawyer

1 5 2 . See, e.g. , Crossen & B lumenthal, An Anti-Takeover Arsenal, supra note 1 0 1 , a t B l .
1 5 3 . Id. Indeed, Evans is allowed to hang himself: "[Evans] contends that the maneuvers
were meant only to protect shareholders. He also maintains that he has been more a hapless
victim than an active player in the struggle. 'I didn't mean to do it,' he says. 'It was more or
less done to me. ' " Id.
1 5 4 . See Hilder, supra note 1 0 1 , at C l .
1 5 5 . "The valuations were 'obviously intended to accord with management's restructuring , '
the court said . " Id.
156. See, e.g. , Helyar & Burrough, supra note 138, at Al.
1 5 7 . BURROUGH & HELYAR, supra note 1 1 1 .
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put it in private conversation, "We 're not afraid of what the Delaware
courts say. We're afraid of what the press says . "
B.

Extrajudicial Utterances

Some Delaware judges give speeches and appear on panels. This pro�
vides an additional platform from which to summarize and promulgate
standards of conduct for members of the corporate bar and their clients . A
good example of this, in the context of MBOs, is Chancellor William T.
Allen's Business Lawyer article , Independent Directors in MBO Transactions:
Are They Fact or Fantasy?, a slight revision of a speech previously delivered
at the University of California, San Diego, Seventeenth Annual Securities
Regulation Institute. 158
The tone of the article is captured by an early paragraph:

I remain open to the possibility that [special] committees can be
employed effectively to protect corporate and shareholder interests.
But I must confess a painful awareness of the ways in which the
device may be subverted and rendered less than useful. I conclude,
as well, that it is the lawyers and the investment bankers who in
many cases hold the key to the effectiveness of the special com�
mittee. 1 59
To elaborate this view, Allen relied on a contrast between those com�
mittees that performed badly, such as in Macmillan (quoting the "torpid, if
not supine" phrase from the Delaware Supreme Court opinion and the
"little more than a charade" language from the chancery court opinion) ,
and those that performed well, citing RJR Nabisco as well as Restaurant
Associates. 1 60 And, moreover, in focusing on these cases , with which
many in his audience (both in San Diego and those reading the article)
were familiar, he recalled , in summary form, the critical details.
If it is possible that special committees can perform well, what, asked
Allen, distinguishes those that act well from those that act badly? 1 6 1

158.
45 Bus.
159.
1 60.
161.

William T. Allen, Independent Directors in MBO Transactions: Are They Fact or Fantasy?,
LAW. 2055 ( 1 990).
Id. at 2056.
Id. at 2059-60.
Id. at 2060.
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Here, in what can be read as an attempt to exhort the corporate bar to
counsel virtue, Allen argued that the duties of members of the special
committee in these transactions were radically transformed , and that

[w}hen special committees have appeared to push and resist their
colleagues, it has been . . . because the men and women who com�
prised the committee have understood that as a result of accepting
this special assignment, they have a new duty and stand in a new
and different relationship to the firm's management or its controlling
shareholder. 1 62
The lawyers and investment bankers, Allen argued, hold the key to estab�
lishing the integrity of the process.
Just so the audience would not miss the message, Allen made clear
that

much, of course, will tum on the court's evaluation of the integrity
of the special committee's process. In reaching that evaluation, the
court will be mindful-and the lawyers advising the committee need
to be mindful as well-that the committee, if respected, holds the
shareholders ' welfare in its hands; the court will be mindful that
claims of so�called structural bias in the process are plausible; and,
that the court's own power of perception is limited. 1 63
Moreover,

this is not a call to pay even greater attention to appearances; it ts
advice to abandon the theatrical and to accept and to implement the
substance of an arm's�length process. To do this, the lawyers and
the bankers must be independent of management. They must accept
in their hearts that in the MBO or the auction context, their client
is the committee and not management. They must clearly and
emphatically remind their client that, at this juncture, the CEO and
his associates are to be treated at arm's�length. And the lawyers and
bankers must act on that view. That means that from the outset,
the advisors must be prepared to forego future business. It comes to
that. 164
1 62 .
1 63 .
1 64.

Id. at 206 1 .
Id. at 2062.
Id.
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Here, then, is a relatively explicit attempt-delivered from the podium
rather than the bench-to induce better behavior by managers . 1 65 On
this view, to be a moral director is to walk with the shareholders.
C.

"A Memorandum to Our Clients "

If my hypothesis is correct, one would predict that the stories of the
Delaware courts would find their way into the communications between
lawyers and their clients. The best evidence of this would be the actual
advice that lawyers give their clients, but such evidence is generally not
available. 1 66
An indirect record of such communication is the relatively well,
known , but little,studied legal genre , the "memorandum to our clients , "
that prominent firms use to keep their clients apprised of changes in the
law (and , of course, to market their services) . In connection with this
proj ect, I have collected such materials from the relevant time period
( 1 980- 1 990) from Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen and Katz , Sullivan and
Cromwell , and Skadden, Arps, Slate , Meagher and Flom, three firms that
had active takeover practices during that period. Only the Wachtell
Lipton memoranda provide any detailed discussion of the duty of indepen,
dent directors in an MBO transaction. Why neither of the other firms
seems to have summarized and distributed such advice widely awaits further
research.
The materials from Wachtell Lipton are consistent with my hypothesis
but provide relatively little direct support. In the course of the 1 980s , as
MBOs became more prominent and as more cases on MBOs arose, one
finds two types of memoranda in the files. One such memorandum is "The
LBO White Knight, " 1 67 in which Martin Lipton addresses MBOs briefly
in the course of a discussion of the suggestion that directors must conduct
an auction once a company is for sale. Lipton argues that auctions are
often not the best way to maximize shareholder value, and therefore it

1 65 . Delaware judges also, of course, address other issues when making public addresses.
Thus, Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II, in The 1 980s-Did We Save the Stockholders While the
Corporation Burned?, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 277 (1992), looked back on the takeover decade with a
mixture of skepticism with regard to the economic benefits, and with pride w ith respect to the
role the Delaware Supreme Court played in constraining what he viewed as abusive behavior.
1 66 . It is not available-in part because it is protected by the attorney-client privilege, and in
part because the parties generally have additional reasons for not disclosing it. But that is not to
say that it is totally inaccessible. In a companion project, still in its preliminary stages, Michael
Useem and I will try to gather more direct evidence through structured interviews with lawyers
and d irectors. See supra note 1 9.
167. Martin Lipton, In Defense of White Knight LBOs, LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 1 8 , 1 986, at 1 .
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would be foolish to mandate them. He notes that the decisions he
discusses-Revlon, Hanson, and Fruehauf-may have been " influenced by
the fact that management of the target had an equity participation in the
LB0 . " 168 But, he argues , this is true with respect to almost every LBO,
and management' s equity participation should not create a special standard
for LBOs. Instead,

[w]hile one must recognize the skepticism of the courts with respect
to lock,up of an LBO that management originates and participates in,
those doubts should not exist where the LBO is in response to an
unsolicited bid . . . . Any possible detriment to shareholders arising
from management participation is overwhelmingly counterbalanced
by the benefit of a higher bid.169
In contrast to Lipton's short, policy,oriented discussion of LBOs ,
Wachtell Lipton also prepared and circulated a much longer, much more
complete treatment , which was eventually published in various PLI vol,
umes . Barry Bryer and Craig Wasserman, two partners at Wachtell Lipton,
prepared a long memo originally entitled "Representing a Public Company
in a Leveraged Buyout Transaction: An Update, " 1 70 and eventually evolv,
ing to "Management Buyouts and the Duties of Independent Direc,
tors . " 171
Thus , in their early memo, written before many of the MBO cases
were decided, and relying on extensions from the cases governing parent,
subsidiary freeze,out mergers, Bryer and Wasserman provided a long and
detailed discussion of Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. , 1 72 including concise sum,
maries of the court's narrative, as well as similar discussions of other freeze,
out cases. They then turned to the then existing maj or MBO cases: Revlon,
from Delaware, SCM, from the Second Circuit, and Fruehauf, from the
Sixth Circuit. In the later memos, the earlier treatments were largely pre,
served, but supplemented with fairly complete accounts of the cases directly
addressing MBOs. The result is a memo that is sixty,six pages long, single
spaced.
From an academic perspective , reading these memos is very hard
going. Although the discussions of legal doctrine are extremely sophisti,

1 68 . Id. at 9.
169. Id. at 1 0- 1 1 .
1 7 0. Barry A. Bryer & Craig M. Wasserman, Representing a Public Company in a Leveraged
Buyout Transaction: An Update (Dec. 9, 1986) (on file with author) .
17 1 . B ARRY A. BRYER ET AL., MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS AND THE DUTIES OF INDEPENDENT
DIRECTORS (1 989) .
1 7 2 . 457 A. 2d 7 0 1 (Del. 1983).
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cated , the memoranda are filled with enormous factual detail about the
cases . Compared to more academic discussions, 1 73 the case discussions
seem only partly digested: one finds only summaries of the factual back,
ground without the synthesis that makes such case,by,case presentation
unnecessary.
But the fact that the most sophisticated practitioners writing for
sophisticated clients and practitioners present Delaware law in this way
reflects a recognition-intuitively obvious to practicing lawyers , perhaps less
obvious to those of us who spend our time responding to student requests
for the "rule"-that the guidance resides in those specific factual accounts ,
and that summarizing the factual discussion is close to the l imit of how far
one can go to reduce the cases to a "rule. " Clients are no less insistent
than students in demanding clarity. The difference is that practitioners
suffer a greater penalty than academics for giving in to the desire to provide
clarity at the sacrifice of accuracy.
Ill.

A.

SOME I MPLICATIONS OF A N ORMATIVE/NARRATIVE TH EORY

Missing the Point of Delaware "Law": Viacom

v.

QVC

What difference does it make if you think of Delaware law as a set of
instructive tales of good and bad managers , as opposed to a set of substan,
tive rules ? The answer is that it can make all the difference in the world.
A comparison of the Tirne,Wamer 1 74 and ParamountNiacom v . QVC175
cases provides striking evidence for the generality of my normative/narra,
tive view of Delaware fiduciary duty law. At the same time, this compari,
son provides an interesting example of the intersection of law office
practice, commentary in the trade press , and j udicial opinions , s imilar to
what occurred in the development of the standards governing MBOs .
During the takeover battles of the 1 980s , a hotly contested question
arose whether a corporation faced with an all,cash, all,share tender offer
could refuse to withdraw a poison pill and "j ust say no" to the bidder. In
the Interco case , 176 Chancellor Allen, applying the Unocal standard,

1 7 3 . See, e.g. , Lawrence A. Cunningham & Charles M. Yablon, Delaware Fiduciary Duty Law
After QVC and Technicolor: A Unified Standard (and the End of Revlon Duties?), 49 Bus. LAW.
1 5 93 (1994); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 2 2 .
174. Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 5 7 1 A.2d 1 1 40 (Del. 1 990).
1 7 5 . P aramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1 994).
1 7 6. City Capital Assocs. L.P. v. Interco Inc., 55 1 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988). The factual
account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery Court opinion. See id. at 79 1 -94.

Saints and Sinners

1073

ordered the removal of a "poison pill" preferred rights plan. Allen held
that when the only "threat" facing shareholders came from a noncoercive
(all, cash, all,share) tender offer , the board could not leave the pill in place
to force shareholders to accept an alternative management,recommended
restructuring of approximately the same value, even if one assumed that the
board believed in good faith and after prudent investigation that the
management,sponsored restructuring was superior. Many read Interco as
casting doubt on the "just,say,no" defense. 177 That case, which became
moot after the Delaware Supreme Court had accepted an interlocutory
appeal , 178 provoked a substantial amount of criticism. 179 As of 1 98 9 , the
supreme court had not addressed the question.
Then, in 1 989, Time Inc. and Wamer Communications announced a
stock,for,stock merger. 1 80 Soon, however, the Time, Wamer merger faced
a "threat. " Two weeks before the annual shareholders' meeting at which
the Time shareholders would vote on the merger, Paramount announced a
$ 1 7 5 per share all,cash all,share tender offer for Time, a substantial pre,
mium over both the market price of $ 1 03-$ 1 1 3 prior to the announcement
of the proposed Time,Warner merger and the post,announcement market
price of $ 1 05 -$ 1 2 2. Paramount's bid was conditioned on, inter alia, the
termination of the Time, Warner merger agreement, financing, and the
removal of Time's poison pill , as well as a number of other "defensive "
measures . 181
In response to Paramount's offer, Time and Warner, obviously worried
that Paramount's bid would lead Time shareholders to reject the Time,
Warner merger in order to be able to accept Paramount's offer, renegotiated
the transaction and replaced the merger with a debt,financed cash tender
offer by Time for the shares of Warner. Because bidding firm shareholders
have no right or occasion to vote on a tender offer, this restructuring elimi,

1 7 7 . See . e.g. , Theodore N. Mirvis, 'Time/Warner': Delaware Supreme Court Speaks , N.Y.L.J . ,
Mar. 29, 1 990, a t 5 , 6.
1 7 8 . Interco Inc. v. City Capital Assocs. L.P., 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. Ch. 1 988) (unpub lished
table decision).
1 7 9 . See, e.g. , Laurie P. Cohen, Lipton Tells Clients That Delaware May Not Be a Place to
Incorporate, WALL ST. J . , Nov. 1 1 , 1988, at B7 (discussing Martin Lipton's memorandum to
clients recorrunending reincorporation in other states if the Interco decision was not reversed).
1 80 . Under the original plan, Warner shareholders would end up with about 62% of the
corrunon stock of the merged entity, with the Time shareholders receiving the remainder. In
terms of market capitalization and 1 988 net income, Warner was the larger of the two companies.
1 8 1 . The factual account is taken from the chancery court opinion, see Paramount
Corrununications Inc. v. Time Inc . , No. CIV.A. 10866, 1989 WL 79880, at *2-* 1 7 (Del. Ch.
July 1 4 , 1 989), and the Delaware Supreme Court opinion, see Paramount Corrununications, Inc.
v. Time Inc., 57 1 A.2d 1 1 40, 1 1 43-49 (Del. 1 990). See also Mirvis, supra note 1 7 7 .
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nated the problematic vote by Time's shareholders. Paramount and Time
shareholders sought an inj unction restraining Time from purchasing
Warner shares pursuant to its tender offer.
In the chancery court, Chancellor Allen denied the plaintiffs ' motion
Plaintiffs appealed to the Delaware
for a preliminary inj unction. 1 82
Supreme Court, which affirmed the chancellor's holding but on broader
grounds . According to Justice Horsey, plaintiffs' " Revlon claim" fails
because of " the absence of any substantial evidence to conclude that Time's
board, in negotiating with Warner, made the dissolution or breakup of the
corporate entity inevitable, as was the case in Revlon . " 1 83 According to
Horsey, " Revlon duties" are only triggered when " a corporation initiates an
active bidding process seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganiza,
tion involving a clear break,up of the company . . . . Revlon duties may also
be triggered where , in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its
long,term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the
breakup of the company. " 1 84 Thus , because the Time board's reaction to
the Paramount bid was only a defensive response and "not an abandonment

1 82 . The chancellor rejected plaintiffs' claim that the original merger agreement, that, plain
tiffs claimed, would transfer control of Time to Warner's shareholders, put Time into a "Revlon
mode" with the obligation to maximize present share value. Time Inc. , 1 989 WL 7 9880 , at *24.
The chancellor held that when, as in the case of Time and Warner, both companies were widely
held public corporations, a stock-for-stock merger left corporate control unaffected: "Control of
both remained in a large, fluid, changeable and changing market." Id. at * 5 5 .
The chancellor also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Time board had a duty to give
shareholders a choice with respect to whether the corporation should be sold. First, the chancel
lor held that recasting the transaction to avoid a shareholder vote breached no duties because
Delaware law did not afford a shareholder vote in the original transaction. B ecause the original
Time-Warner merger was a triangular merger in which Warner and a wholly owned subsidiary of
Time would merge, the Delaware General Corporation Law, section 25 1 , did not grant the share
holders of Time a vote; only the shareholders of the Time subsidiary were required to approve the
merger, but, as those votes were held by Time, Time's board had the right to vote them. Time
shareholders' right to vote on the original transaction arose only because of a New York Stock
Exchange rule. Finally, interpreting Unocal, the chancellor rejected plaintiffs' claim that the
Warner tender offer was a disproportionate response to a noncoercive Paramount offer that did
not threaten a cognizable injury to Time or its shareholders. Rather, although the restructuring
of the transaction was "reactive in important respects (and thus must withstand a Unocal analy
sis) ," id. at *68, the Chancellor held that the restructuring was a reasonable response to the
threat posed by the Paramount bid to the realization of Time's major strategic plan.
1 8 3 . Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc., 5 7 1 A.2d 1 1 40, 1 15 0 (Del. 1 990). Like
the chancery court opinion, the supreme court's opinion opened with a long account of the Time
board's behavior in planning and execu ting the merger with Warner. Justice Horsey then
rejected Chancellor Allen's formulation of the Revlon question as a choice between short-term
and long-term strategy, and rejected his reliance on the fact that control, both before and after
the merger , remained in the market. Id. at 1 1 50-5 1 .
1 84. Id. at 1 1 50.
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of the corporation's continued existence, Revlon duties are not triggered,
though Unocal duties attach. " 1 85
With respect to the analysis under Unocal, Justice Horsey held that the
first part of the Unocal test-the requirement that "reasonable grounds for
believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness existed" -was
satisfied by the directors ' showing of good faith and reasonable investiga;
tion. 1 86 But Justice Horsey went somewhat farther, emphasizing that "we
have repeatedly stated that the refusal to entertain an offer may comport
with a valid exercise of a board's business j udgment. " 1 87 Justice Horsey
then reached out to rej ect Chancellor Allen's suggestion in Interco that an
all;cash, all;shares offer, falling within a range of values that a shareholder
might reasonably prefer, "cannot constitute a legally recognized ' threat' to
shareholder interests sufficient to withstand a Unocal analysis . " 1 88 In con;
trast to the chancellor's opinion, Justice Horsey construed the threat of the
Paramount offer more broadly, noting that Time shareholders might be
confused by the Paramount offer or might not fully understand the impact
of Paramount's conditions , and that the timing of the Paramount offer to
follow issuance of Time's proxy notice could reasonably be viewed to upset,
if not confuse, the Time stockholders' vote. 1 89
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Time;Wamer was widely
viewed as the complete undermining of Revlon and as an endorsement of
the "j ust;say;no" defense. In an early article in the National Law Journal,
Robert Todd Lang, co;managing partner of New York's Weil, Gotshal and
Manges, which represented a Warner investment banker, was quoted as
saying that " ' Although the Supreme Court still hasn't given corporate
boards the unlimited right to 'just say no' to hostile bidders , the opinion
gives boards the power to say 'no' if they have good business reasons for
refusing to negotiate or to consider an unsolicited offer. "1 1 90
In an article also published in the National Law Journal, leading take;
over lawyers at the Skadden, Arps , Slate, Meagher and Flom firm, James C.
Freund and Rodman Ward, Jr. , read Time,Wamer broadly. According to
their analysis, Time,Wamer's narrow interpretation of Revlon rendered the
doctrine almost irrelevant:

185.
186.
187.
1 88 .
1 89.
190 .
at 14.

Id. at 1 1 5 0-5 1 .
Id. at 1 1 5 2 .
Id.
Id.
ld. at 1 15 3 .
Sherry R. Sontag, Time May Create Broad Takeover Defense, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 1 2 , 1 990,
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slips a safety latch onto the Revlon trigger. According to the
court, corporate reorganizations that don't bust up the company
don't give rise to Revlon duties to maximize immediate shareholder
value. Such duties arise only with "an active bidding process seeking
to sell" the company or an effort "to effect a business reorganization
involving a clear break,up of the company. "
The company most likely to end up in the Revlon soup is one
which, like Revlon itself, would "abandon its long,term strategy and
seek an alternative transaction . . . involving the break,up of the
company"-a course of action which is so far "out" as to be barely
discernible on the horizon, because it may be just about the only
thing that could involuntarily trigger an auction. 191
Time

With respect to the j ust,say,no defense, Freund and Ward state:

The "just say no " defense is definitely looking better and better.
While not explicitly endorsing the tactic (which wasn't at issue in
the case) , the Time court's strong support of the business-judgment
rule and its reluctance to intervene in the board's management of
the company provide genuine muscle to directors' efforts in resisting
a takeover. After all, the Supreme Court came right out and said
that, "absent a limited set of circumstances as defined under Revlon ,
a board of directors . . . is not under any per se duty to maximize
shareholder value in the short term, even in the context of a
takeover. " 192
Similarly, Theodore Mirvis , a partner at Wachtell, Lipton, Rosen &
Katz who writes often in the New Yark Law Journal, read the Delaware
Supreme Court's decision as "an undeniable endorsement of 'Just Say No'
where the decision not to redeem the pill is made in good faith and on an
informed basis. " 1 93 The supreme court's rej ection of the chancery court' s
decisions i n Interco and Pillsbury , "which cast doubt o n a board of directors'
right to 'Just Say No' by refusing to redeem a poison pill rights plan in the
face of an all,cash, all,shares premium tender offer, " was , for M irvis, a
strong endorsement of the defense. 1 94 Mirvis read the court as holding
that directors need not abandon corporate business plans when a bid is

1 9 1 . James C. Freund & Rodman Ward, Jr., What 's 'In, ' 'Out' in Takeovers in Wake of
Paramount v. Time, NAT'L L.J., Mar. 26, 1 990, at 2 2 , 23.
192. Id. at 2 5 .
1 93 . Mirvis, supra note 1 7 7 , a t 6.
194. Id. at 5.
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received '" unless there i s clearly no basis to sustain the corporate stra,
tegy. "1 1 95 The message for directors , according to Mirvis , is that

[d] irectors' identification of threats will be upheld provided only that
the board identifies the threat in good faith and with reasonable
investigation; the risk that the stockholders will mistakenly not
appreciate the company's long,term value is an approved form of
threat, and the directors do not have to negotiate with a bidder
before acting on the basis that the bid is too low.
Directors' responses will not be held to be unreasonable even
though they preclude stockholder choice and an immediate control
premium. Defense can be effective. 196
Moreover, as Mirvis pointed out, the Delaware Supreme Court seemed
to rej ect explicitly the notion that a firm could unwittingly find itself in
"Revlon,land. " 197 Rather, the Revlon duty to maximize current share,
holder value is implicated only when a corporation itself initiates a bidding
process seeking to sell itself or to effect a reorganization involving a clear
breakup of the company, or when a corporation, acting in response to a
bid, abandons its long,term sti ategy and pursues an alternative involving
the breakup of the company. 1 98
Finally, in extraj udicial statements, Justice Andrew Moore, a j ustice of
the Delaware Supreme Court and a member of the panel that decided Time,
Warner, seemed to state explicitly that Time,Wamer validated the j ust,say,
no defense. 199
Thus, post- Time,Wamer, one could be excused for concluding that the
"rule" in Delaware was that a board of directors could "just say no " to an
unwelcome tender offer, and that Revlon, once a maj or feature of the doc,
trinal landscape, was now confined to its facts and need never apply unless
the target board chose to trigger it.
But as Paramount, the loser in the Time,Wamer case, was to discover
to its surprise, reading Delaware cases as establishing "rules " is a deeply
misleading and dangerous approach. Beginning in 1 983 , Paramount (then
known as Gulf & Western) began to transform itself from a diffuse con,

1 9 5 . ld. at 6.
1 96 . Id. at 7 .
197 . Id. a t 6.
198. Id.
199. 'just Say No ' May Be Viable Defense, but Not Carte Blanche, Panelists Say, 2 1 Sec. Reg. &
L. Rep. (BNA) 1832 (Dec. 1 5 , 1 989) ("Although the Delaware Supreme Court has not yet tack
led the 'just say no' defense head on, Justice Andrew G.T. Moore II of that court told a Dec. 8
conference that case law indicates that it may be a vtable defense to hostile takeovers. ") .
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glomerate into an entertainment and publishing company. 200 Its unsuc,
cessful attempt to acquire Time in 1 989 was one stage along this road.
Beginning in 1 990, Paramount began to consider a merger with Viacom.
Preliminary negotiations were unproductive. Throughout this period, Para,
mount's board of directors devoted substantial attention to Paramount's
strategic goals and the steps taken by management to achieve those objec,
rives.
In the spring of 1993 , negotiations became more serious. Vigorous ,
arms,length negotiations over price and terms of a merger were conducted
throughout the spring and summer of 1 993 , finally resulting in an agree,
ment in mid,September. The merger agreement provided for the conver,
sion of Paramount shares into Viacom shares and cash, with a total value of
around $69 per share. In addition, Paramount's board agreed not to shop
the company, unless counsel determined that it had a fiduciary obligation
to do so, and to pay Viacom a termination fee of $ 1 00 million, payable if
Paramount terminated the merger agreement as the result of a competing
transaction, if shareholders rej ected the merger, or if the board recom,
mended a competing transaction. Finally, Viacom was granted a " lockup "
stock option. In announcing the merger, Redstone and Davis issued a joint
press release stating that the proposed merger offered the "greatest long
term benefits to stockholders and audiences around the world" and that no
other company could provide Paramount and Viacom what they could offer
each other.
But, just as Paramount tried to barge its way into the Time,Warner
merger, so QVC tried to derail the Viacom,Paramount merger. A week
after the Paramount board approved the Viacom,Paramount merger, QVC
proposed an acquisition of Paramount by QVC at approximately $80 per
share in cash and securities. Paramount, after extensive board meetings ,
documentation, and reports by consultants , rej ected QVC's offer , adhering
to its original plan to merge with Viacom, albeit now at a higher price , as
Viacom had raised its offer in response to QVC's b id. Over the ensuing
weeks , as the QVC offer became more definite and less contingent, Para,
mount adhered to its intention to merge with Viacom.

200. This account is drawn from the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Court opinions. See
Paramount Communications, Inc. v . Time Inc., 57 1 A.2d 1 1 40 (Del . 1990).
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If one read Time�Wamer as validating the j ust�say�no defense , then one
might reasonably conclude that the Paramount board could "just say no" to
QVC. After all , they had a long�term plan to expand as a communications
and entertainment company. They-like Time and Warner-had looked
carefully at potential merger partners and had concluded that the fit with
Viacom was best. The directors had reviewed a detailed analysis prepared
by the management consultants Booz Allen that indicated that the merger
with Viacom would "create over $3BN [billion] more incremental share�
holder value than a merger with QVC. " 20 1 This situation, Paramount
could and did argue, was unlike Smith v. Van Gorkom202

because the directors were at all times fully informed and attentive to
their duties. And [the facts] are not controlled by Revlon , because
Paramount did not put itself up for sale, initiate an active bidding
process, or abandon a long,term business strategy by seeking or
effecting a reorganization or other transaction involving the breakup
of the company. 203
Rather , said Paramount, this case was j ust like Time, Wamer: a corporation,
pursuing a well,thought,out long,term plan that the board believed " [would]
afford higher long term value to shareholders and [would] be in the corpora,
tion' s best long, run interests, " 204 rej ected a last minute attempt to scuttle
it.
But it turns out that such a reading was badly mistaken. Paramount
lost in both the Delaware Chancery and Supreme Courts , just as it had lost
in the Time�Wamer case. Both courts enjoined the selective removal of the
poison pill and the stock lockup, both of which were designed to facilitate
the Viacom transaction. Why?
One can tell a doctrinal story distinguishing Time,Wamer, as both the
chancery and supreme courts did. In the chancery court, Vice Chancellor
Jacobs, after noting the arguments that Time�Wamer significantly reformu,

20 1 . QVC Network , Inc. v. Paramount Communications Inc., 635 A.2d 1 2 45 , 1255 (Del.
Ch. 1 993) (citation omitted).
202. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1 985) (holding that directors in a takeover situation breached their
duty of care).
203 . QVC, 635 A.Zd at 1 2 63-64.
204. Id. at 1 263.
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lated the circumstances triggering Revlon, avoided the general doctrinal
issue. Rather, according to Jacobs , the critical circumstance is that "the
Paramount board has committed the company to a transaction that will
shift maj ority voting control from Paramount's public shareholders to Mr.
Redstone. "205
The Delaware Supreme Court told a similar doctrinal story. Chief
Justice Veasey, with Justices Moore and Holland (both of whom were on
the panel that decided the Time,Wamer case) , affirmed, likewise finding the
change of control to Redstone critical in distinguishing Time,Wamer.
Contrary to Paramount's argument, the Delaware Supreme Court argued:

[O]ur decision in Time,Wamer expressly states that the two general
scenarios [when a corporation initiates an active bidding process
seeking to sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a
clear breakup of the company] are not the only instances where
"Revlon duties" may be implicated. The Paramount defendants'
argument totally ignores the phrase "without excluding other possi,
bilities." Moreover, the instant case is clearly within the first gen
eral scenario set forth in Time,Wamer. The Paramount Board, albeit
unintentionally, had "initiate[d] an active bidding process seeking to
sell itself" by agreeing to sell control of the corporation to Viacom in
circumstances where another potential acquiror (QVC) was equally
interested in being a bidder.206
Time,Wamer and Viacom are two different cases. As a technical matter, the
cases-like all cases-are distinguishable. But the doctrinal arguments are
not particularly persuasive : The Delaware Supreme Court in Time,Wamer
had expressly refused to adopt the chancery court' s attempt to distinguish
Revlon on the basis of whether a change of control was present. Similarly,
the notion that a firm could "unintentionally" put itself up for sale was
likewise rejected in Time,Wamer. After all, if it could be said that the
Paramount board had (albeit unintentionally) initiated an active bidding
process seeking to sell itself, the same could have been said of the Time
board . The music in the two opinions is unmistakably different. Is there
another basis on which the two cases are more consistent?

205 .
206.

Id. at 1 2 65 .
Paramount Communications Inc. v. QVC Network Inc. , 637 A.2 d 3 4 , 47 (Del. 1 994).
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If it is the factual narratives that constitute the standard i n Delaware
fiduciary duty cases , as I argue, the cases are far more consistent. In Time,
Warner, fully informed directors acted deliberately pursuant to a well,
thought,out long,term plan. Along comes Paramount, which tries to stop
the Time board. In response, the directors rej ect Paramount's efforts and
determine to continue their long,term plan. In Viacom, a strong,willed
CEO misleads the board , keeps crucial information from them, prevents
them from discussing the terms of the bid with Barry Diller, and structures
the transaction so that QVC is at a serious disadvantage because of personal
antipathy for Diller. From this perspective, the cases are completely consis,
tent with Delaware norms. Strong,willed CEOs who dominate directors are
disfavored. 207 Allowing personal antipathy for a b idder to interfere with
the board's serious consideration of the bid is wrong. 208 Tilting the play,
ing field towards management's preferred bidder immediately raises ques,
tions.209
In this regard , consider the chancery court's opinion. In detailing the
various rounds and the eventual terms of the deal, Vice Chancellor Jacobs
emphasized that no matter how the merger was structured, Redstone, the
controlling shareholder of Viacom, would end up as controlling shareholder
.
1
of t he com b.tned enterpnse . 2 0
The opinion then continues , describing QVC's feared and unwelcome
acquisition proposal and Paramount's response: delay, delay, delay.
Throughout, management gave very negative assessments of QVC's offers ,
claiming that they were subject to numerous conditions and uncertainties.
One director testified that management's summary
207 . Cf. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc . , 636 A.2d 956 (Del. 1 994); Mills Acquisition Co .
Macmillan, Inc. , 5 5 9 A.2d 1 2 6 1 (Del. 1 989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings,
Inc . , 506 A.2d 1 7 3 (Del. 1 986); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1 985); Guth v. Loft,
5 A.2d 503 (Del. 1 939).
208. See, for example, Michel Bergerac's "strong personal antipathy" for Ronald Perelman in
Revlon, 506 A.2d at 1 7 6 .
2 0 9 . See, for example, the behavior o f Macmillan's Chairman and Chief Executive Officer
Evans and its President and Chief Operating Officer Reilly in Macmillan I, 552 A.2d 1 227 (Del.
v.

Ch. 1988).
2 1 0. QVC Network, Inc. v . Paramount Communications Inc. , 635 A.2d 1 2 45 , 1 250 (Del.
Ch. 1 993). The style of Jacobs' opinion is particularly noteworthy from the standpoint of this
i\rticle. It self-consciously follows the dramatic form. For example, part I.C. of the opinion is
headed "Enter QVC," with the first subheading, "B idders Beware . " Id. at 1 25 2 . Subsequent
sections read as if they are describing subsequent scenes, as indeed they are. The whole "fact
section" of the opinion reads like a drama.
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created a negative impression of the QVC offer from the outset of
the meeting: "My reaction was that this was not what I consider a
live offer. It was full of contingencies and I would consider holes in
it and I was very-by the time I got through reading this, I was very
negative on the whole subject. "21 1
Here we get to the board's crucial failures. Although it appears that
the board focused its attention on the contingencies of the QVC offer
rather than the comparative economic merits of both offers ,

[n]o director suggested that inquiries be made to QVC to ascertain
whether its financing conditions could be resolved, and no director
asked Lazard to discuss whether the QVC offer was financeable . . . .
In sum, although financing concerns were central to the board's
rejection of the QVC proposal, the board did not request that man�
agement obtain more information from QVC regarding financing as
it did at its September 27 meeting. Instead, and with this limited
data regarding the conditions of QVC's offer, the board simply fol�
lowed management's lead in rej ecting the unwelcome offer.21 2
These findings echo Macmillan I, with the CEO's description of Bass as a
"greenmailer" serving more to propagandize than to inform the board.
At the crucial moment-the November 15 board meeting, by which
point it was clear that QVC's bid offered a higher present value to
shareholders-management and the board failed to fulfill their duties to the
shareholders :

The defendants make much of the "conditions " to QVC's tender
offer and of that offer's supposedly illusory nature. The board is, of
course, entitled to take such conditions into account in evaluating
the QVC bid. But, the board's position might be more persuasive
had management or the board first chosen to discuss those condi�
tions with QVC, to ascertain which of them would likely be fulfilled
or waived, before concluding a priori that the conditions were fatal
and dismissing them out of hand. It is commonplace for tender
211.
2 12.

Id. at 1 2 5 7 .
Id. at 1 2 5 8 (citations omitted).
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offers to have conditions of some kind. That, however, does not
render them "illusory. " If the mere existence of conditions per,
mitted a board to ignore a higher competing bid for control on that
basis alone, Revlon and Unocal would have little meaning. In this
case, discussions with QVC would have revealed (for example) that
QVC's financing commitments would soon be in hand. Here, the
board did not even ask QVC on November 1 5 (as it had in Septem,
her) to produce evidence of its financing. A discussion with QVC
would also have revealed that QVC had received (or would immi,
nently receive) Hart,Scott,Rodino antitrust clearance. But meeting
with QVC was the last thing management wanted to do, and by
skillful advocacy, management persuaded the board that no explora,
tion was required. 213
The board' s failure even to talk with QVC is the crucial finding. In
doctrinal terms , this is translated into a finding that the board was not
adequately informed. In substantive terms , this is a fact,specific finding of
the board's lack of good faith. The board went through the steps they
thought Time,Wamer required-they had a long,term plan-but they evi,
dently did not do so with the proper intentions. They did not do so in
good faith.
In the Delaware Supreme Court opinion affirming Vice Chancellor
Jacobs' opinion, the same facts are emphasized and the same themes
sounded:

When the Paramount directors met on November 1 5 to consider
QVC's increased tender offer, they remained prisoners of their own
misconceptions and missed opportunities to eliminate the restrictions
they had imposed on themselves. Yet, it was not "too late" to
reconsider negotiating with QVC . . . . Nevertheless, the Paramount
directors remained paralyzed by their uninformed belief that the
QVC offer was "illusory." This final opportunity to negotiate on the
stockholders' behalf and to fulfill their obligation to seek the best
value reasonably available was thereby squandered. 2 14
213.
2 1 4.

Id. at 1 2 69.
Paramount Communications Inc.

v.

QVC Network Inc . , 637 A.2d 34, 50 (Del. 1 994).
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Subsequently, the Court concludes :

The directors' initial hope and expectation for a strategic alliance
with Viacom was allowed to dominate their decisionmaking process
to the point where the arsenal of defensive measures established at
the outset was perpetuated (not modified or eliminated) when the
situation was dramatically altered. QVC's unsolicited bid presented
the opportunity for significantly greater value for the stockholders
and enhanced negotiating leverage for the directors. Rather than
seizing those opportunities, the Paramount directors chose to wall
themselves off &om material information which was reasonably
available and to hide behind the defensive measures as a rationaliza�
tion for refusing to negotiate with QVC or seeking other alterna�
tives. Their view of the strategic alliance likewise became an empty
rationalization as the opportunities for higher value for the stock�
holders continued to develop. 2 1 5
And then, in a peculiarly apologetic and defensive final paragraph, Chief
Justice Veasey responds to those who would accuse him of inconsistency
with the Time-Warner case :

It is the nature of the judicial process that we decide only the
case before us-a case which, on its facts, is clearly controlled by
established Delaware law. Here, the proposed change of control and
the implications thereof were crystal clear. In other cases they may
be less clear. The holding of this case on its facts, coupled with the
holdings of the principal cases discussed herein where the issue of
sale of control is implicated, should provide a workable precedent
against which to measure future cases. 2 1 6
In an illustration of how corporate law norms are disseminated , at least
the high�profile cases , a contemporaneous Wall Street Journal article sent
out the message conveyed by the Delaware courts, and supplemented it
with independent research of its own. 21 7 The article detailed Davis's
m

2 1 5 . ld. at 5 1 .
2 1 6. ld. Finally, and consistent with my overall view of Delaware law as a critical part of a
system of norms of behavior, the opinion contains an addendum in which the Delaware Supreme
Court castigates the Texas lawyer defending the deposition of one of the Paramount directors for
his abusive and unprofessional conduct. ld. at 5 1 -56.
For an attempt to provide an internally consistent theory that reconciles these cases, see
Kahan, supra note 10.
2 1 7 . The journal story amplifies the court's opinion:
In a stuffy, windowless conference room on a bleak November afternoon, Para
mount OJmmunications Inc . 's board of directors found itself in the dark-again.
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domineering personality, 2 1 8 and his attempts to drive away Malone and
Diller. It also describes a passive board with personal loyalty to Davis. 2 1 9

Casts off and ties loosened, directors had gathered at this hastily convened meeting
at Paramount headquarters to evaluate competing bids for the company. They knew full
well that their strong-willed chairman, Martin S . Davis, was determined to go with a
friendly Viacom Inc. offer, even though home-shopping giant QVC Network Inc. had
just sweetened a hostile bid that now was valued at $ 1 .2 billion more.
Mincing no words, Mr. Davis attacked the QVC bid as containing too many condi
tions. Then Paramount's investment advisers from Lazard Freres & Co. weighed in with
their written opinion that Viacom's $85-a-share offer was fair.
Director George Weissman . . . raised his hand. Why, he asked, hadn't Lazard
evaluated QVC's $90-a-share bid, too? Lazard's Felix Rohatyn, according to court
records, had this reply: "We haven't been asked."
And with that, the board promptly dropped the issue. QVC' s bid wasn't to be
taken seriously.
The November incident wasn't the only time during the continuing $ 1 0 billion
takeover fight that Paramount directors weren't given the full story. In memos and
statements filed in a suit QVC brought against Paramount in Delaware Chancery Court,
a picture emerges of a chief executive so determined to ward off QVC' s overtures that he
sometimes withheld crucial information. On numerous occasions, the board wasn't given
a chance to weigh information that would have put preferred suitor Viacom in an unflat
tering light-or made archfoe QVC's b id look more attractive.
Mr. Davis had a willing partner in this exercise in denial: The board itself, which,
as Mr. Davis himself put it at one point, followed him " in lockstep" toward the Viacom
deal. For the most part, directors didn't question Mr. Davis's rejection of the higher
QVC b id , court papers and interviews show; and indeed, some legal experts say the board
had reason to believe it was on solid ground. Though several of the directors-including
Lazard partner Lester Pollack as well as one of Mr. Davis's top lieutenants, Donald
Oresman-had reservations about excluding QVC, they rarely if ever voiced their con
cerns to fellow board members.
The extent of the board's complacency, and Mr. Davis's willingness to exploit it,
caught up with Paramount last week. Delaware's Supreme Court upheld an earlier ruling
forcing Paramount to consider both bids equally, effectively throwing the bidding for
Paramount wide open. The lower-court ruling it upheld had lashed out harshly against
Mr. Davis and his passive board. "By skillful advocacy, " Vice Chancellor Jack B. Jacobs
of the Delaware Chancery Court wrote in his opinion, "management persuaded the
board that no exploration [of QVC's offer] was required . "
Johnnie L . Roberts & Randall Smith, The Plot Thickens : Who Gets the Blame for Paramount
Gaffes? Big Cast of Characters , WALL ST. J., Feb. 1 3 , 1 993, at Al .
2 1 8 . "[H]e is characterized even by his fans as a bully who berates his closest allies with the
slightest provocation . " Id.
2 1 9 . As the Journal told it: "Several were appointed by his late predecessor, Charles
Bludhorn, at a time when Mr. Davis was in charge of director relations. He courted them so
assiduously-mixing a flattering deferential attitude with favors like tickets to movie premieres
and Knicks games-that they remain loyalists to this day." Id. at A6.
In an interesting part of the article that does not track the Delaware opinions, the Journal
confirms the concern that players have with how they are portrayed by the Delaware courts:
P aramount's own investment advisers at Lazard had also asked whether the company
should go into an "auction mode." The bankers, led by mergers heavyweight Mr.
Rohatyn, 65 , and Steven Rattner, 4 1 , a boyish former newspaper reporter who is a rising
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Although doctrinally the fit between Time,Wamer and QVC is ques,
tionable , if not implausible, from the internal perspective of Delaware
fiduciary duty cases , the fit is in fact much closer. The principal difference
between the two cases is that the managers and board behaved well in
Time,Wamer and badly in QVC. 22°
And one can see how Paramount went astray. If one thought that
Time,Wamer stood for the proposition that a board need not depart from a
long,term strategic plan simply because another bidder showed up-a per,
fectly reasonable reading of the opinion in Time,Wamer-then one can
understand why Martin Davis and Donald Oresman, having concluded that
they were following a long,term strategic plan in the interests of Para,
mount, felt reasonable in giving Diller the brush,off.
But that is to misunderstand what the Delaware courts are up to. If
one instead reads Time, Wamer as yet another example of a case in which
the courts approve directorial conduct because they are convinced that the
directors behaved in good faith and with due care, then one would never
advise a client to give Barry Diller the brush,off on the grounds that Time,
Warner authorized j ust that action. And, indeed, I would be willing to bet
that Paramount's Delaware corporate lawyers (either those practicing in
Delaware or the experienced outside counsel practicing Delaware law in
New York) advised against this course of action .
The test of my claim is a counterfactual one: Suppose that rather than
giving Diller the brush,off, Davis and Paramount had sat down with him
early and often, had given him a full opportunity to present his proposal , to
discuss and describe his financing, to discuss his plans for the future of the
company, and so forth. And suppose that after these extensive discussions ,
the Paramount board , after long and careful consideration, had decided that

star at the firm, were growing worried. They had their reputations to consider, and
didn't want to be pilloried if Mr. Davis was criticized for proceeding improperly.
Id.

220. The epilogue to the decision is interesting. After the Delaware Chancery Court's opin
ion, and its affirmance by the supreme court by order, the bidding between QVC and Viacom
continued, see-sawing back and forth. Ultimately, Viacom prevailed with a $ 1 0 billion offer
($ 1 07 per share in cash for 50. 1 % of Paramount stock, and securities for the remaining shares).
Randall Smith, WaU Street's Final Analysis: Might Made Right, WALL ST. J., Feb. 1 6 , 1 994, at B l .
This represented an increase of $38 per share over the original deal that Viacom struck with
Paramount at $69 per share, an increase of around $2 billion, and a much larger percentage of
cash. Id.
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a merger with Viacom was in the long,term interests of Paramount because
Viacom offered a much better fit. Would the case have come out the other
way? No one , of course , knows , but I have no doubt that Paramount would
have vastly increased its chances of success had it done so.
Finally, one cannot say that QVC overrules Time,Wamer in any
straightforward way. In an interesting attempt to put a spin on the QVC
case in the New York Law Journal, Martin Lipton and Theodore M irvis, of
Wachtell Lipton, who (somewhat ironically) represented QVC, wrote " 1 0
Questions and Answers Raised by Delaware 'Paramount' Decision. "22 1 Recall
that it was Mirvis who argued after the Time,Warner case that the case
represented an acceptance of the j ust,say,no defense.222 Now, post,QVC,
Lipton and Mirvis adhere to this view, despite the fact that they had just
convinced the Delaware courts not to let Paramount "j ust say no" to
QVC's bid. The question, as always , is all in how you say it:

The Paramount decision expressly states that it does not apply to a
situation where a company is following its own strategic plan and has
not initiated a takeover situation. Where the target of a hostile bid
wishes to consider rejecting the bid and remaining independent it is
critical that the board of directors follows the correct process and
have the advice of an experienced investment banker and legal
counsel. 223
Despite the mildly self,serving quality of the advice, Lipton and M irvis are
clearly right. Indeed, if one looks back at their reading of Time,Wamer, it
is consistent. M irvis earlier argued that Time,Warner was " an undeniable
endorsement of 'Just Say No' when the decision not to redeem the pill is made
in good faith and on an informed business basis. " 224 What Lipton and Mirvis
understood , and what someone on the Paramount side did not, is that in
Delaware , the qualification " in good faith and on an informed basis " is not
an empty formula but in fact is nearly the whole show.
Indeed , QVC makes clear that going through the motions without the
right intention is legally risky in Delaware. Paramount did meet with
2 2 1 . Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, 10 Questions and Answers Raised by Delaware
'Paramount ' Decision, N.Y.L.J . , Feb. 1 0 , 1 994, a t 1 .
222. See Mirvis, supra note 177.
223. Lipton & Mirvis, supra note 22 1 , at 5 .
224. Mirvis, supra note 1 7 7 , at 6 (emphasis added) .
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Diller. They did "consider" his offer. But they did everything grudgingly,
as if they were simply going through the motions, having previously decided
the outcome. And note something else: A reliable way of compiling a
compelling record of good faith and reasonable inquiry is for lawyers to
counsel their clients to act in good faith and to inquire diligently, guiding
them through the steps that this requires . This is what the Delaware courts
are , on my view, seeking to insure, first and foremost.
B.

Shareholder Litigation

Shareholder litigation has come under mounting criticism of late. The
conflicts of interest inherent in the relationship between class counsel and
shareholder plaintiffs have been analyzed in detail.2 25 More recently ,
Kraakman, Park, and Shavell have looked carefully at the relationship
between shareholders' incentives to sue and corporate value, finding that
shareholders incentives may be either excessive or insufficient relative to a
goal of maximizing corporate value. 226
Roberta Romano , in the most careful empirical study to date, could
find little direct benefit to shareholders from shareholder litigation. 22 7
Plaintiffs had abysmal success in litigated cases . In her sample, plaintiffs
won no judgments for damages or equitable relief. Of the two�thirds of the
cases that settled, only half involved a monetary recovery, while attorneys
received fees far more frequently. In addition, the settlements are highly
skewed, which, suggests Romano, is consistent with either of two troubling

225. See John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial Litigation: Balancing Fairness and
Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 877 (1 987); Coffee, supra note 1 1 6 ; John
C . Coffee, Jr. , The Unfaithful Champion: The Plaintiff as Monitor in Shareholder Litigation, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1 985 , at 5 ; see also Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, The
Plaintiffs ' Attorney 's Role in Class Action and Derivative Litigation: Economic Analysis and
Recommendations for Reform, 5 8 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (199 1),
226. Reinier Kraakman et al. , When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests ?, 8 2 GEO.
L.J. 1 7 3 3 (1994).
2 2 7 . Romano , supra note 10 ; see also Daniel R. Fischel & Michael Bradley, The Role of
Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 7 1
CoRNELL L. REV. 2 6 1 (1 986).
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hypotheses: that most fiduciary breaches involve only minor harm to share,
holders , or that most shareholder suits are without merit. 228
Romano finds this "gloomy assessment of the value of shareholder
litigation . . . cross,validated by examining the market's evaluation of law,
suits. " 229 Specifically, standard event study methodology fails to reveal
any benefit to shareholders from litigation. Similarly, Romano finds little
evidence of specific deterrence. 230
Other recent work has been consistent with Romano's "gloomy assess,
ment. " Janet Cooper Alexander's study of a small set of securities class
actions concluded that the merits did not matter, that is, that the merits of
the individual cases had no bearing on the settlement amount. 23 1 This
finding, which has been strongly criticized from a variety of directions ,232
is consistent with a view that class actions are nothing more than a tax on
public offerings, failing to distinguish between prohibited and permitted
behavior.
But the preceding case study of the elaboration of norms governing
MBOs places the role of shareholder litigation in a different light and raises
significant questions regarding both the current wisdom regarding the
excessive quantity of shareholder litigation as well as the measurement of
the benefits conferred by such litigation. Two features emerge from the
study of the MBO cases and will be presented in more detail below. First,
and perhaps most striking, there are very few of these cases. During a
period when MBOs were one of the hottest deal vehicles around, they only
yielded fifteen Delaware cases, with twenty,one opinions, over the period
1 980- 1 990. Further , these opinions came extremely late in the day. By
the time the norms were fully elaborated, MBOs ' day had nearly passed.
Second, the previous discussion of the MBO cases illustrates the role
that shareholder litigation plays in the elaboration of corporate norms , a

Romano, supra note 227 . at 60-6 1 .
Id. a t 65 .
Id. at 84.
Janet Cooper Alexander, Do the Merits Matter? A Study of Settlements in Securities Class
Actions, 43 STAN . L. REV. 497 ( 1 991).
2 3 2 . For a summary of the criticism, see John C. Coffee, Jr. , The 'New Learning' o n Securities
Litigation, N.Y.L.J . , Mar. 25 , 1 993 , at 5 .
228.
229.
230.
23 1 .
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role sometimes mentioned but not often documented. 233 This benefit-a
public good-is separate from and in addition to compensation, specific
deterrence, and general deterrence, the three factors normally considered.
1.

The Strange Paucity of Cases

Management buyouts were one of the hottest transactions during the
1 980s. Moreover, the received wisdom is that lawsuits are filed in almost
every transaction. Therefore, the fact that there were only fifteen MBOs
that yielded published or unpublished Delaware opinions in the 1 980s is
surprising and significant.
Getting a handle on the actual number of MBOs of publicly held
companies is not easy. First, there is the definitional problem: How large a
stake, or how early an involvement in a transaction, must management
have before it is categorized as a "management buyout" ? Second, one
wants to distinguish between management buyouts of publicly held com,
panies and leveraged buyouts more generally and, in particular, leveraged
buyouts of divisions or privately held companies, both of which pose much
less severe conflicts of interest. Because management is so often involved
in LBOs of publicly held companies, often as part of one of the bidding
groups, or at least as a post,deal equity participant, the frequency and size of
leveraged buyouts of publicly held companies gives an approximation of the
number of MBOs.
Table I , drawn from figures in Mergers & Acquisitions , 234 lists the
number and value of LBOs of publicly held companies from 1 98 1 , when
Mergers & Acquisitions began collecting figures on such transactions , until
1 990, by which time the Delaware jurisprudence was well developed and
LBOs began to go into at least a temporary decline.
2 3 3 . See, e.g. , Donald E. Schwartz, In Praise of Derivative Suits: A Commentary on the Paper of
Professors Fischel and Bradley , 7 1 CORNELL L. REV. 322 {1 986).
234. See Leveraged Buyout Trends , supra note 30.
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TABLE l: LEVERAGED BUYOUTS OF PuBLICLY HELD COMPANIES 1 98 1 - 1 990 235

Year

No. of Deals

1981

17

2. 16

1 982

27

2.46

1 983

26

1 .79

1 984

60

13. 18

1 985

41

10.38

1 986

43

24.91

1 987

32

22.43

1 988

74

26.54

1 989

59

50.03

1 990

25

8. 1 4

Total

404

$ 1 62.02

Value ($ billion)

By contrast, consider the number and timing of the MBO cases from
Delaware. Table II is a listing of all Delaware MBO cases that yielded
opinions that were reported on Lexis or Westlaw, cross�checked by inquiries
and examination in the Delaware Chancery Court. As I discuss further
below, there are substantial reasons to conclude that this is close to the
complete universe of MBO cases filed in Delaware during the relevant time
period.
235.

LBO Signposts, supra note 3 0 , a t 60; Leveraged Buyout Trends , supra note 3 0 , a t 8 1 .

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

J.P.

Stevens (op: 4/88)

Defendant
Plaintiff

Class & Bidder

Approved

Settlement

Plaintiff

Defendant

Class & Bidder

Class

Class

Defendant

Plaintiff

Class

Class

Plaintiff

Motion
Individual

Form

Settled

Settled

Settled

Settled

Settled

Prejudice

Dismissed w/o

NA

Final

Benefit Conferred

Benefit Conferred

Benefit Conferred

$2.15M

$2.5M

$0

NA

Recovery to Class

Becor: Settlement approved.
].P. Stevens: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants criticized.
Macmillan: Plaintiffs ' motions for preliminary injunction granted (twice); defendants criticized.

National Medical Care: Defendants' motion to dismiss denied; defendants criticized.
Restaurant Associates: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants praised.
Shoe-Town: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants criticized; defendants' motion to dismiss denied.

EAC: Plaintiffs motion for preliminary injunction granted; defendants criticized.

(op: 7/88, 1 0/88, 5/89)

7 . MLU.millan

6.

5 . Becor (op : 2/88)

(op: 1 /88, 2/90)

4, Shoe�Town

(op: 1 0/87 , 9/90)

3 . Restaurant Assocs.

(op: 6/86)

2. Nat'! Medical Care

l . EAC (op: 8/85)

Case

Outcome

TABLE I I : DELAWARE MBO CASES 1 980- 1 990

$ 1 8M

$950K

$350K

$525K

$ 7 5 0K

$0

NA

Req'd

$2M

$950K

NA

$525K

$7 5 0K

$0

NA

Granted

Attorney Fee

.._

0
0
\0
,.....,
\0
\0
-.J

�

�

�

l'

�

c::
()

�
�

,.....
0
\0
N

13.
14.
15.

10.
1 1.
12.

9.

8.

Class

Defendant

Defendant

Plaintiff

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Defendant

Dismissed

Settled

Settled

Settled

Settled

Dismissed

$0

$ 1 .45M

$2.7M

Disclosure

Additional

$57M

$0

Benefit Conferred

$ 1 3 .4M

Recovery to Class

$0

$ 5 00K

$BOOK

$ 25 0K

$9M

$0

$300K

$3M

Req'd

$0

NA

$BOOK

$ 1 75K

$9M

$0

$300K*

$3M

Granted

Attorney Fee

RJR Nabisco: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants praised.
Formica: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; mild criticism of defendants.
American Home Shield: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants criticized; defendants' motion to dismiss denied.
Young 's Market: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied.
General Instruments: Plaintiffs ' motion for preliminary injunction denied.

Fort Howard: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants criticized.
Amsted: Settlement approved; court ordered that $75 ,000 of the $300,000 attorney fee be awarded to counsel for the objector (*).
KDI: Plaintiffs' motion for preliminary injunction denied; defendants' motion for summary judgment granted.

(op: 8/90)

1 5 . General Instruments

(op: 1 2189)

1 4 . Young's Market

Class

Class
(op: 1 0/89 , 1 /9 1)

1 3 . American Home Shield

Class & Bidder
Class

1 /89)
1 2 . Formica (op: 3/89)

1 1 . R]R Nabisco (op:

1 0 . KDI (op: 1 1 /88, 1 2/90)

Class

Settlement

Class
9 . Amsted (op: 8/88)

Approved

Settled

Defendant
Class
8. Fort Howard (op: 8/88)

Settled

Final

Motion
Case

Form

Outcome

TABLE II: DELAWARE MBO CASES 1 980- 1 990 (continued)

�

0
\0
I...N

�
..,

g·

(/)

g_

�

3'

(/)
�
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When Tables I and II are compared, the disproportion between the
number of reported cases and the number of deals is staggering. Between
1 980 and 1 990, there were approximately 400 LBOs of public companies in
the United States, many of which involved management in some form or
other. By contrast, there were only fifteen litigated MBO deals in the Dela
ware courts , yielding twenty-one opinions. 23 6
The gigantic gap raises several possibilities. First, it is possible that the
accepted wisdom that litigation is brought in every deal is simply an over
statement.
Second, it could be that suits were filed in Delaware in many of the
other deals but that they were settled or dismissed without order or opinion
and therefore do not show up on Lexis or Westlaw. This, however, seems
not to be the case because all of these cases are filed as class actions and
therefore need judicial approval before being dismissed. In addition, offi
cials of the Delaware Chancery Court do not know of any such MBO cases.
A third possibility-consistent with the received wisdom-is that there
are lots of other cases filed, but they are not filed in Delaware. In other
words , most of the cases that arise out of these deals arise either under the
law of other states (for non-Delaware corporations) 23 7 or under the federal
securities laws, with state claims added, if at all, as pendent state law
claims. If correct, this is important: Although there were some important
early MBO cases outside of Delaware, 23 8 no significant jurisprudence of
MBOs developed in any other state. There seems to be a minimum num,
her of cases required to generate a reasonably well,specified j urisprudence,
and only Delaware seems to have passed this threshold.
236. The question of how often suits are filed in management buyout cases during the rele
vant period is complicated and unclear. In a recent study, see Easterwood et al. , supra note 30,
the authors studied 2 1 4 buyout targets between 197 8- 1 988. According to the authors, share
holders filed suit in 83 of the transactions (3 8.8%). In only five instances were there court deci
sions.
Because the authors do not distinguish between cases filed in Delaware versus cases filed in
other states, or between cases filed under state law and cases raising federal causes of action, their
findings do not cast much light on what happened to the 78 cases that did not result in a court
decision.
2 3 7 . See Easterwood et al., supra note 30 (of the 2 1 8 sample suits, only 1 0 2 involved Dela
ware corporations) .
238. See, e.g. , Edelman v. Freuhauf Corp . , 7 98 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1 986) ; Hanson Trust PLC
v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc . , 7 8 1 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986).
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The Time Lag

The second feature that leaps out from the comparison of Tabies I and
II is the timing of the Delaware cases: They come very late in the deal
cycle . Although MBOs of significant publicly held companies , as a transac�
tional form, got going seriously around 1 98 1 , the cases came so slowly that
the defining trilogy of Macmillan, Fort Howard, and RJR Nabisco239 was
not written until l 988 and 1989. 240
This lag, which is endemic to law but which is exacerbated by rapidly
developing transactional forms, 24 1 had several consequences. First, it
interfered with attempts by the Delaware courts to articulate standards in
"real time . " This is a problem that all courts interpreting standards face:
Ex post decision making restricts courts to what comes before them. To
the extent that standards only emerge over time as narratives accumulate,
the process of norm articulation will lag behind deals.
This reactive stance, combined with what I claim to be a fairly self�
conscious attempt by the courts to shape the standards of conduct in a
rapidly developing transactional form, may be the driving force behind
judicial attempts to surpass it. Thus, the "preachiness" of Delaware MBO
opinions , the pattern of criticizing conduct even when no injunction is
issued, and j udges' extrajudicial utterances can all be read as attempts to be
heard on a critical matter in the absence of a case raising j ust the right issue
and in the absence of the articulation (or articulability) of a governing rule.
Such utterances are, in a literal sense, advisory opinions.
As such, these judicial comments share both the vices and virtues of
advisory opinions. They are useful insofar as they help lawyers and parties
plan transactions. They are problematic, however, precisely when they are
239. See supra Part !.B.S .
240. A complementary explanation for the timing of the cases was suggested to me by
Lawrence Hammermesh in a personal conversation. As Hammermesh points out, the Revlon
case , which raised plaintiffs' hopes of prevailing in challenges to board action in takeovers, was
decided in 1 985 , and may well have triggered the increase in challenges to MBO transactions.
That Revlon had such an effect is almost certainly true. But, strikingly, even in the post-Rev/on
enthusiasm, the number of challenges to MBOs as a percentage of the number of deals was small.
24 1 . See generally Henry T.C. Hu, Misunderstood Derivatives: The Causes of Informational
Failure and the Promise of Regulatory Incrementalism, 102 YALE L.J . 1 457 (1993); Henry T.C. Hu ,
Swaps, the Modem Process of Financial Innovation and the Vulnerability of the Regulatory Paradigm,
1 3 8 U. PA. L. REV. 3 3 3 (1 989) .
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" issued " without a full factual record. Given the fact,specific quality of
Delaware opinions, this may make them particularly problematic. At the
same time , the disproportion between the number of cases and transactions
may make them especially necessary.
The lack of law also pushes transactional lawyers into a central and
critical position. The MBO cases show that in a world of vaguely defined
norms and rapidly evolving transactional forms , what the business lawyer
tells the client-rather than what the judge announces to the world-is the
" law. " We see traces in the "memoranda to our clients " genre, but the
core of this body of law resides in the firms and in the advice given to
clients in confidence. This advice necessarily is given in the shadow of ex
post judicial review, with, as we have seen in the Delaware cases , the possi,
bility, albeit somewhat remote, of upsetting the deal. In only two of the
cases , EAC242 and Macmillan 1,243 did the court enjoin a transaction,
the ultimate failure for a business lawyer. Although in other cases criticism
may have signaled a refusal to grant a defendant's motion to dismiss, and
may have led to a subsequent monetary settlement, such settlements can be
budgeted for and do not destroy a deal.
One particularly striking manifestation of the tension in the pro,
duction of law between the judges and the lawyers can be found in the
competing attempts to put a "spin" on new opinions. If, for example, one
compares Chancellor Allen's takeover opinions with, for example,
Theodore Mirvis' columns in the New York Law journal, one immediately
feels that tension. 244 In part, one observes competing attempts to con,
vince the Delaware Supreme Court. But one also observes attempts to
shape accepted practice in the transactional community.
MBOs again provide a good illustration. A per se ban on MBOs is
conceivable. Serious and important commentators made just that argument
in the 1 970s. 245 When MBOs started to arrive in significant numbers in
the early 1980s, the law was clearly unsettled. Lawyers did these deals and,
by the time the Delaware courts had an opportunity to articulate standards,
that is, by the latter half of the 1980s , hundreds of deals had already been
242. EAC Indus. , Inc. v. Frantz Mfg. Co . , No. CIV.A.8003 , 1 985 WL 3200 (Del. Ch. June
2 8 , 1985) , aff'd, 5 0 1 A.2d 40 1 (Del. 1 985).
243. Robert M. B ass Group , Inc . v. Evans (In re Macmillan, Inc. Shareholders Litig.), 552
A.2d 1 2 27 (Del. Ch. 1 988).
244. Theodore N. Mirvis, What Triggers 'Revlon '? Some New Answers, N.Y.L.J . , Dec. 3 ,
1 990, at 5 ("Just when you thought it was safe to go back in the water . . . . along comes the
decision by the Delaware court of Chancery in Roberts v. General Instrument."); see also Lipton
& Mirvis, supra note 22 1 , at 1 .
245 . S ee e.g. , Brudney & Chirelstein, supra note 26.
,
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done. It was too late in the day to hold MBOs illegal per se. By doing
these sorts of deals , in the absence of controlling case law, law office prac�
tice at least influenced and probably constrained judicial decisionmaking.
3.

Case Law as a Public Good
In the closing paragraph of her article, Roberta Romano notes:
[O]ne potential social benefit from a shareholder suit that is ancillary
to its role as a governance device has not been discussed: legal rules
are public goods. All firms benefit from a judicial decision clarifying
the scope of permissible conduct. The benefit of clarification is not
simply deterrence of future managerial misconduct, but rather, given
the contractual setting of the corporation, identification of a rule
around which the parties (managers and shareholders) can trans�
act. 246

But Romano seems skeptical of such benefits:
As few suits produce a legal rule (only two in this sample) , this
explanation of lawsuit efficacy turns on the need for a large number
of lawsuits in order to obtain a ruling. There is no reason to believe
that the current level of litigation is optimal in relation to any public
good benefits , but I leave that cost�benefit calculation for another
study. 247
Note how the rule�centered view of corporate law, which forms a basis
of Romano's skepticism of the efficacy of shareholder lawsuits, understates
the public good aspect of shareholder litigation. If I am correct that fidu�
ciary duty law evolves primarily at the level of norms rather than the level
of rules, then to focus on the number of cases that "produce a legal
rule"-only two in Romano's sample-is to miss a significant part of the
benefit. In the MBO cases, it would be a fair reading of the cases to say
that none of the cases individually "produces a legal rule. " In none of the
cases does the court overrule any prior cases or explicitly adopt any legal
rule at all. Instead, all the discussions are couched as elaborations of the
duty of care and the duty of loyalty. Indeed, one does not find any new
legal "rule" even looking back on the cases as a group. Rather, what we see
is the elaboration of the norms of conduct appropriate to management
buyouts (all under the guise of applying the standard analysis of the duties
246.
247 .

Romano , supra note 10, at
ld.

85 .
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of loyalty and care) . From this perspective, each of the cases individually
told something significant about legal norms governing management
buyouts.
In this context, note the ambiguity in Romano's comment: She allows
for the possibility that a large number of cases is needed to produce a legal
rule. This either means that you need a large number of lawsuits to yield a
lawsuit that changes a legal rule (her actual meaning, I believe) , or that a
legal "rule" or "standard" only emerges out of a large number of cases. This
second possibility seems to characterize Delaware fiduciary duty law most
accurately. Moreover, as my earlier discussion suggests, the problem seems
to be a paucity of cases , not an excess. None of the other states had
enough cases to generate a standard of conduct.
This finding has implications for the awarding of attorneys' fees. First,
because even defense victories , such as RJR Nabisco,248 are valuable in
describing appropriate norms of conduct, fees for plaintiff victories must be
sufficiently generous to make it worthwhile to bring cases that the plaintiff
may end up losing. 249
This likewise raises the issue of the definition of success and failure in
shareholder litigation. Recall Romano's finding that plaintiffs' success rate
in shareholder litigation was abysmal. Should Fort HowarcF50 be defined
as a plaintiff defeat or victory? From one perspective , the defendants won:
The motion for a preliminary injunction was denied and the deal went
through. But although plaintiffs' preliminary inj unction motion was obvi,
ously denied, the court's criticism foreshadowed or perhaps caused the
subsequent settlement.
Cases such as Fort Howard that fall into the middle category are most
appropriately considered partial plaintiff victories. The criticism is a clear
signal (confirmed in the cases) that a defendants' motion for dismissal or
summary judgment will likely be denied, with the consequence that most
such cases will settle. In such cases , plaintiffs' counsel will receive a fee
and will be paid for the efforts expended and benefits provided by the case
as a whole, including unsuccessful motions along the way. Thus , if one
248. In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litig. , No. CIV.A. 10389, 1989 Del. Ch. LEXIS 9
(Feb . 1 4 , 1 989).
249. An alternative solution would be to provide fees to plaintiffs' counsel even when they
lose, but the distorted incentives that such a proposal would create make it impossible.
250. In re Fort Howard Corp. Shareholders Litig., No. CIV.A.999 1 , 1988 WL 83 147 (Del .
Ch. Aug. 8, 1988).
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looks again at the list of cases in Table II, one sees that in each of the
major cases in which the court criticized defendants' behavior without
enjoining the transaction, plaintiffs' attorneys received fees . 25 1 That said,
it is likewise true that even in cases in which the court approved or even
applauded defendants' conduct, plaintiffs' counsel usually still received a
fee, although typically a far smaller one. 25 2
Finally, comparing Tables I and II provides a rough, back,of,the,
envelope estimate of the out,of,pocket cost of developing the specific norms
of conduct for MBOs: Plaintiffs' attorneys were awarded a total of $ 1 7 . 2
million in fees in the fifteen Delaware MBO cases. In the same time
period, approximately $ 1 60 billion was spent on LBOs.
C.

The Delaware Way: Could It Be Efficient?

The earlier case study of the Delaware MBO cases provides a picture of
the Delaware approach as regulating at least one difficult problem of mana,
gerial conduct. In this section, I speculate on how the system might work.
Because of competition from the various markets {product market competi,
tion and interstate competition for charters, principally) , there are reasons
to believe that the system that has emerged in Delaware is a reasonably
efficient system of corporate governance. 253 For present purposes, it is
useful to assume that the Delaware system is pretty good and to ask, specu,
latively, how might such a system, which may seem rather odd and fuzzy,
both in comparison to other areas of U.S. law and in comparison to the
corporate law of other advanced industrial economies, end up working
reasonably well?
25 1 . I cannot discover whether plaintiffs' attorneys received fees in the first two cases, EAC
and National Medical Care. But plaintiffs' a ttorneys received fees in Shoe Town, J.P. Ste\lens,
Macmillan , Fort Howard, Formica, and American Home Shield.
252. The major exception to this finding is the RJR Nabisco case in which the coun
applauded the performance of the special committee, yet still awarded plaintiffs ' counsel an enor
mous fee , finding that their watchdog function benefited the class. Even when a b idder is also
suing, (and taking the lead role ahead of the shareholder plaintiffs) , Delaware courts have found
that class counsel has an important role to play as a watchdog, standing by to take over if the
bidder should strike a deal or lose interest or change its position. See, e.g. , In re Macmillan, Nos.
CIV.A.995 3 , 9909 , 1989 WL 137936 (Del. Ch. Nov. 1 6 , 1 989). It is interesting to note that
parallel federal class actions resulted in a recovery to shareholders of $72.5 million and a fee to
class counsel of $ 1 7.7 million. R]R Nabisco , 1 992 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1 27 02 (S .D.N.Y. 1 992).
253. See generaUy ROMANO, supra note 9. It could be that this is simply wrong, that Dela
ware's system survives despite substantial inefficiency because of network externalities or market
failure or something else. Whether or not this is true is a separate debate.
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The Delaware MBO cases display a number of features. As already
discussed, there were relatively few decisions in relation to the number of
deals , and these decisions came relatively late in the deal cycle. Second,
most of the opinions were written in the context of motions for preliminary
injunction, and almost all such motions were denied. Third, despite the
fact that most such motions were denied, the judicial opinions were often
very critical of defendants' conduct. Fourth, the opinions themselves are
fact,intensive, process,oriented, and deeply and persistently j udgmental of
managerial conduct. Although the individual opinions are highly fact
specific, over time certain features of transactions assume prominence.
Thus, in the case of MBOs, the independence and activism of the special
committee and its investment banker, as well as the extent to which alter,
native bids were sought, all feature prominently in the narratives. Finally,
the opinions-even those in which the motion for preliminary injunction is
denied-seem to shape conduct.
These features raise several questions . First, why might such a system
be superior to potential alternatives, such as a system in which the courts
(or the legislature) articulate rules ex ante that make it clearer what sort of
transactions are permitted and what sort of transactions are forbidden?
Second, if I am right that the system seems to rely on the possibility of
public shaming to constrain behavior, how is it that such a system works?
One might suspect, ex ante, "that being a successful businessman requires
having a very thick skin, even enjoying the reputation of someone who
skates close to the edge, even being something of an outlaw. " 254 How is
it that such a person would be deterred by the possibility of being criticized
by a Delaware civil servant who wears black robes , much less incorporate
such criticism into his or her personal code of conduct? Third, might there
be an alternative explanation for the distinctive Delaware style?
I will try to address these questions separately.
254.

Letter from Eric Posner (Aug. 23, 1 995) (on file with author) .
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The Mushiness of Delaware Fiduciary Duty Case Law

Why might it be that Delaware corporate law shies away from using
"laws" to deter bad behavior and leans, instead, towards morality tales? 255
One can try to answer this question from several directions.
From an historical perspective, one could tell a story (as has already
been told) 256 of the historical differences between law and equity, of
equity's greater concern with "equity," and of the survival of the division
between courts of law and courts of equity in a few U.S. jurisdictions (most
prominently New Jersey and Delaware) . The problem with this sort of
account is that it does not tell us very much about why the equity style
survived in corporate law, or what functions that style serves .
One can gain somewhat more insight from a comparative perspective.
Corporate law can be divided into two alternative and rather incompatible
models. On one side there is the civil code, Germanic approach which,
with some significant parody, can be described as " anything not explicitly
permitted is prohibited. " The second approach is the "enabling" approach
that characterizes Delaware law: Anything not explicitly prohibited is
permitted, and the law mainly serves to save transaction costs by providing
low-cost standard form contracts. Tracking this difference in character is a
difference in j udicial role: In Germany, the free-ranging, fact-specific, fidu
ciary duty analysis of Delaware is absent and utterly foreign to the corporate
law sensibility.
255. Because the Delaware legislarure is responsive to pressures from Delaware-chartered
corporations, (see, for example, the adoption of Delaware General Corporation Law sec
tion 102(b) (6) in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985)) , the persistence of
the Delaware style requires the acquiescence of the relevant players: the courts, the bar, the
legislarure, and Delaware-chartered corporations.
256. William T. Allen, Speculations on the Bicentennial: What Is Distinctive About Our Court of
Chancery , in CoURT OF CHANCERY OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE 1792 - 1 992, at 1 3 (1 992);
William T. Quillen, Constitutional Equity and the Innovative Tradition, LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1 993 , at 29.
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These contrasts in national styles suggest that the peculiar quality of
Delaware cases may be linked to, and is perhaps a necessary consequence of
or supplement to, the open,textured quality of the law. The virtues of the
enabling approach to corporate law have been celebrated. 257 But because
the possibilities are (intentionally) open,ended, the Delaware legislature and
courts cannot promulgate ex ante the standards to govern new situations
until they see a variety of cases and figure out how well or badly people
behaved. 258 To put it differently, in an open,textured regulatory struc,
ture, many important norms can only be generated ex post, and with end,
less possibilities, safe harbors are particularly risky. 259
Because of the enormous discretion exercised by Delaware Chancery
and Supreme Court j udges , the personnel are critical. If one is to depend
on the courts to fill out the details of proper behavior in the corporate
community, the j udges must be respected by the community. Delaware
accomplishes this in two ways. First, a substantial number of the j udges are
drawn from the very world at issue, that is, they are experienced and
respected practitioners of Delaware corporate law. Second , the Delaware
courts have traditionally been characterized by a very high degree of collegi,
ality among the j udges, so that even those judges who did not practice in
the area are socialized into the peculiar practices after joining the court.
But, if most law,following is self,induced, then a system of enabling
rules with ex post judicial review, like Delaware's, faces an additional prob,
lem: It is notably lacking in mandatory rules that themselves provide the
guidance that individual law followers need to follow the rules. Moreover,
in such a system, the type of law,following required goes more to process
and motive than to substantive outcome. In such circumstances, the artie,
ulation of substantive rules does not provide the sort of guidance required.
On the contrary, the particular sort of guidance demanded seems to be
better provided by narrative than by rule. Martha Nussbaum has argued
See, e.g. , FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE
LAW (1991); ROMANO, supra note 9; Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Debate on
Contractual Freedom in Corporate Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1 395 (1 989).

257.

OF CORPORATE

2 5 8 . Alternatively stated, It is too expensive to figure out ex ante the appropriate response to
the uncountable number of cases that could arise under the open-textured Delaware provisions.
See Kaplow, supra note 10, at 568-86.
259. Note that on this view, the Delaware system requires a functioning court system. In
economies in which this feature is absent-Russia, for example-this particular combination of
flexibility and constraint is unavailable, leading one generally to prefer a system of greater manda
tory rules. See Bernard Black & Reinier Kraakman, A SelfEnforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109
HARV. L. REV. 1 9 1 1 (1 996).
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that narratives , especially moralistic novels like those of Henry J ames ,
provide the kind of moral guidance one needs to be a moral person, and, in
their thick descriptions, provide a better guide-that is , more useful, rele,
vant, and interesting-than the kind of principles discussed in traditional
moral theory. 2ro The suggestion here is similar.
2.

But How Could Shame Constrain the Shameless ?

It is fine to claim that Delaware fiduciary duty law relies, in large
measure , on the possibility of public shaming or praise to constrain manag,
ers, but, as was pointed out before, would one not expect that successful
businessmen might have sufficiently thick skins to be immune to such
influence?
Here, it seems to me, the answers are particularly interesting. The
short answer is "yes , " one would expect some particularly successful busi,
nessmen to be immune to such influence, and here the effect of Delaware
corporate law seems particularly subtle.
Consider what I have claimed is a characteristic style of Delaware law:
The denial of a preliminary injunction motion coupled with strong criti,
cism. In the next deal, the "thick,skinned" businessman wants to skate
close to the edge. Will he be constrained by the possibility that he will go
down in history as a villain of Delaware corporate law? Probably not. But
his lawyer is likely to advise him that such behavior will make it more
likely that the deal will be enjoined, or that he will be left unprotected
against maneuvers by his opponents. In other words , even the corporate
actor who is immune to the social sanctions of Delaware corporate law will
be constrained to some degree by Delaware "law. " In this regard, it is
worth recalling T. Boone Pickens, a corporate actor who fits the mold of
the outsider unlikely to be constrained by Delaware norms. Although it is
possible that a negative portrayal in Delaware opinions meant little to him
and other outsiders, it is likely also that the principle of Delaware law that
eventually emerged-that Pickens always loses-meant more. 261
And what about the others? Will the nonlegal sanctions have bite,
separate from the possibility that the deal might not go through? To put it
260. NUSSBAUM , supra note 1 3 , a t 1 25 -47 . I owe this point, and cite, to Eric Posner.
2 6 1 . Ivanhoe P artners v . Newmont Mining Corp., 5 3 5 A.2d 1 3 3 4 (Del . 1 987); Unocal Corp.
v . Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); see also Dale Arthur Oesterle, Delaware 's
Takeover S tatute of Chills, Pills, Standstills and Who Gets Iced, 1 3 DEL. J. CORP. L. 879, 923 n. l 7 1
(1988).
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differently, under what circumstances are Delaware norms likely to be internalized?
Here we come to what one might call the silver lining in the agency
cost cloud. The prototypical Delaware corporation is a large, publicly held
corporation in which ownership is separated from control. In such corpora,
tions, the principal actors are agents. For them, the financial gains from
allowing the corporations they manage to skate close to the edge are likely
to be small. Moreover, the culture of such an organization is typically more
bureaucratic than entrepreneurial, with directors of such corporations serv,
ing as much a ritual function as a managerial function. A system that relies
on public shaming is perfectly suited to such contexts: The cost to the
actor-the disdain in the eyes of one's acquaintances , the loss of director,
ships, the harm to one's reputation-may often be sufficiently great to deter
behavior, even without anything more.
Consider how this dynamic played out in the MBO context. MBOs,
overnight, provided the opportunity for the senior managers to become very
rich, to go from being bureaucrats to entrepreneurs. Under such circum,
stances , one can expect that some managers might rather quickly become
indifferent to the criticism of the judges. The possibility of becoming seri,
ously rich sometimes has that effect.
How did the courts respond? In the MBO cases, one sees a subtle shift
of attention from the managers to the special committee. Although the
potential gains to managers in MBOs might lead them to develop resistance
to the deterrent effect of public shaming, the members of the special com,
mittee had no such prospects. They were not getting rich. They were
simply trying to do their best as outside directors. One would predict that
such actors are likely to be far more susceptible to the kind of influence
that Delaware opinions exert than the managers. The Delaware courts,
perhaps sensing this, focused much of their attention-both in the opinions
and in extraj udicial utterances-on influencing the conduct of the special
committees.
Note, now, a surprising implication of this analysis. If the success of
Delaware's method for constraining or encouraging managers to act on
behalf of shareholders depends critically on a separation of ownership and
control, with the greater susceptibility to reputational effects that agents
have in comparison to principals, then the system is likely to be less suit,
able for corporations not characterized by this separation, such as closely
held corporations. The Delaware style may well have evolved in response
to the particular needs and properties of the large , publicly held corpora,
tion. The same mixture of flexibility and court scrutiny may be less effec,
tive when the objects are less susceptible to shaming.
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A Complementary Explanation of the Delaware Style

To this point, I have largely described the Delaware judicial style as
one well suited to the articulation and expression of standards of managerial
conduct. But might there be a different, politically driven explanation?
Delaware is a small state. It is, in part because of historical accident,
the state of incorporation for some of the largest and most powerful corpo,
rations in the country and the world. Delaware law governs the internal
affairs of corporations because of the internal affairs doctrine, a doctrine
that is in tension with the approaches to choice of law and conflict of law
dominant in the United States. 262 Within Delaware, five appointed
judges on the chancery court and five appointed judges on the supreme
court interpret and apply Delaware corporate law, with the nominal power
to stop the largest business transactions in the country. Billions of dollars
ride on these deals, with millions of dollars in fees involved. In a word, the
Delaware courts may be, or at least may feel themselves to be, politically
vulnerable.
How could actors in such an institution be expected to j ustify their
decisions? One method of increasing the political legitimacy of wielding
such extraordinary j udicial power will be to demonstrate that the obj ects of
such power, the directors and managers of particular companies, have
behaved very badly. On this analysis , the style of Delaware opinions can be
understood as deriving from political considerations.
If we assume that this explanation is true, how does it affect the rest of
my analysis? First, even if true, judges may be acting from mixed motives: a
desire to defend the political legitimacy of their power; and, likewise, a
desire to shame, praise, or influence the behavior of the relevant actors.
Indeed, to the extent that the judges' efforts are successful in constraining
the relevant actors, their political legitimacy may be increased. Thus , the
spectacle of important Delaware Supreme Court arguments being broadcast
live on CNN with leading corporate law academics as "color comrnenta,
tors " may bolster the legitimacy of the Delaware courts by showing graphi,
cally how, through the existing system, even the most powerful actors in
the economy are held accountable. On this account, the "morality play"
aspect may serve both functions simultaneously. It may promulgate com,
munity standards for the community of senior managers at the same time
that it j ustifies the exercise of extraordinary power by unelected judges of
the second smallest state.
262 .

See generally

P. John Kozyris, Corporate Wars and Choice of Law, 1 985
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CONCLUSION

This Article proposes a theory of how corporate law works, of the
mechanisms that link what the Delaware courts do with the behavior of
members of the governed community, the managers and directors of Dela,
ware corporations . The core of my claim is that we should understand
Delaware fiduciary duty law as a set of parables or folktales of good and bad
managers and directors, tales that collectively describe their normative
role. 263 The evolution during the 1 980s of the norms of managerial and
directorial conduct in management buyouts provides a case study in which
we can trace out this process in sufficient detail to begin to understand
some of its subtlety and complexity.
The evidence I gather leaves unsettled the important question of how
the norms are transmitted. In particular, it is still unclear how (and
whether) the parables make their way to their audience. There is evidence
that some of the most important and dramatic tales are transmitted fairly
directly, while others are mediated by corporate lawyers who digest them,
transmitting the lessons through the exercise of j udgment and through the
ways in which they structure the board's deliberations . The mechanism by
which Delaware opinions influence conduct is ultimately an empirical
question, the full description of which awaits further research.
An appreciation of how Delaware law works has implications , first, for
how lawyers advise their clients. Second, it affects our view of the role of
shareholder litigation in the Delaware courts , finding greater benefits than
the current skepticism recognizes. Such a system, which has at least with,
stood the pressures of interstate competition for corporate charters , may
have developed as an efficient response to Delaware' s unique corporate
environment.
The fiduciary duty cases of the Delaware courts form an important part
of U.S. corporate law. We know, or at least have good grounds to believe,

263. Robert Cover argued that the "folktales" of jurisdiction in which judges assert authority
to judge kings serve important inspirational and aspirational functions, that they inspire judges to
resist "[p]rudential deference . . . the great temptation, and the final sin of judging." Cover,
Folktales, supra note 1 5 , at 190. This aspirational function is closely related to their mythical
character:
[W]ere the gesture and aspiration of resistance not the principal motif of these stories, we
would have no reason to remember them or to make them our own. We would need no
myth to prepare us to cave in before violence and defer to the powerful. We must get
the relative roles of myth and history straight. Myth is the part of reality we create and
choose to remember in order to reenact.
Id. One claim of this Article is that Delaware folktales of fiduciary duty have similar ambitions
and serve similar purposes.
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that U.S. corporate law works reasonably well. But we know extremely
little about how that system works, about the connections between corpo,
rate law and corporate managers. This Article is an attempt to begin to
answer this central, but largely unasked, question of corporate law.

